Technological University Dublin

ARROW@TU Dublin
Doctoral

Applied Arts

2017-4

A Critical Analysis of Grand Corruption with Reference to
International Human Rights and International Criminal Law: The
Case of Nigeria
Florence Anaedozie
Technological University Dublin

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/appadoc
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons

Recommended Citation
Anaedozie, F. (2017) A Critical Analysis of Grand Corruption with Reference to International Human Rights
and International Criminal Law: The Case of Nigeria. Doctoral thesis, 2017. doi:10.21427/D7V983

This Theses, Ph.D is brought to you for free and open
access by the Applied Arts at ARROW@TU Dublin. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral by an authorized
administrator of ARROW@TU Dublin. For more
information, please contact arrow.admin@tudublin.ie,
aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License

A Critical Analysis of Grand Corruption with
Reference to International Human Rights and
International Criminal Law: The Case of Nigeria

By

Florence Anaedozie, BA, LL.B, LL.M

School of Languages, Law and Social Sciences
College of Arts and Tourism

Dublin Institute of Technology

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

Lead Supervisor: Dr Stephen Carruthers
Advisory Supervisor: Dr Kevin Lalor

April 2017

Abstract
Grand corruption remains a domestic crime that is not directly addressed by the
international human rights and international criminal law regulatory frameworks.
Scholars argue that the right to a society free of corruption is an inherent human
right because dignity, equality and participation significantly depend upon it. The
academic discourse linking corruption to the violation of human rights is relatively
new, no regional or global human rights instrument has referred specifically to
corruption while anti-corruption treaties rarely refer to human rights. There is also
insufficient research within this area, establishing the direct causal link between
high-level corruption and systemic human rights violations. Therefore, using
qualitative interpretative analysis, this thesis aims to address this lacuna with
reference to the case of Nigeria by interrogating case law, treaties, and other
relevant legal human rights instruments. Consequently, the project placed the
relevant international and regional oversight mechanisms under scrutiny by
examining the impact of grand corruption upon human rights, as well as the
analysis of accountability processes at the domestic level. Furthermore, it
undertakes an assessment as to whether a normative gap exists within international
criminal law regimes when it comes to the structural violations of socio-economic
rights. The project considered the question of whether corruption ought to be
framed as an international crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court. In conclusion, the thesis suggests that grand
corruption in Nigeria violates certain human rights and recommends that
international criminalisation of the crime of grand corruption could help to combat
it in Nigeria.
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Chapter one
A Critical Analysis of Grand Corruption with Reference to International Human
Rights and International Criminal Law: The Case of Nigeria.
1.1 Introduction and Background to the Study
Grand corruption ‘consists of the acts committed at a high level of government that distort
policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense
of the public good’.1 Grand corruption represents a very dangerous social phenomenon
plaguing Nigeria since the colonial era. There have also been several legal and
institutional efforts to combat it over the years and so far, none has proved successful.
Corruption is referred to as “public enemy number one” that needs to be combated using
a holistic approach.2 The endemic nature of grand corruption in Nigeria elicits such
thought-provoking questions: is it proper for government officials to take for their private
use State’s resources that are sufficient to offset the country’s external debt or to
underwrite the cost of basic services to millions of the people? Should the rights to water,
health care, education, housing, food, and shelter not be realisable particularly in states
endowed with abundant natural resources? Is it morally acceptable for government
revenues to be disbursed in an opaque and unaccountable manner? These questions are
thought provoking, and allude to the enormous corruption happening in Nigeria and
moves one to inquire further whether ‘corruption is the space in which the state

Transparency International, ‘What is Corruption?’ <
http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/#define> accessed 15 January 2017.
2
See the speech on ‘Corruption is “Public Enemy Number One” in Developing
Countries’, by the World Bank Group President, Jim Yong Kim <
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/12/19/corruption-developing-countriesworld-bank-group-president-kim> accessed 25 September 2016. The speech by Jim Yong Kim
and some other key policy leaders such as James Wolfensohn is key to this thesis. The speeches
propelled international community’s policy and reform initiatives aimed at tackling corruption.
1
1

intertwines with social practices, relations and even moralities’?3 Could it be inferred that
Nigerian official elites are ‘… more susceptible to becoming involved in grand corruption
than their opposite numbers in other countries …’?4
Corruption is an extensively studied, but still contested phenomenon without a universally
accepted definition. Arnold Heidenheimer notes ‘the word corruption has a history of
vastly different meanings and connotations’.5 Transparency International (TI), the leading
anti-corruption NGO, defines corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private
gain’.6 Scholars have criticised this definition, for instance, Vito Tanzi argues that
‘corruption can be committed not only for private gain, but … for the benefit of one’s
party, class, tribe, friends, family, and so on’.7 The World Bank defines corruption as ‘the
abuse of public office for private gain’.8 The World Bank’s definition asserts only public
corruption, leaving out private corruption. This omission is a drawback as it is recognised
that private sector corruption enables public corruption to thrive. Ian Bannon argues that
‘this definition is not original, but it was chosen because it is concise and broad enough
to include most forms of corruption that the Bank encounters, as well as being widely

David Torsello, ‘Introduction: The Anthropology of Corruption’ in David Torsello
(ed) Corruption in Public Administration: An Ethnographic Approach (Edward Elgar
Publishing 2016) 10.
4
George Moody-Stuart, Grand Corruption: How Business Bribes Damage Developing
Countries (Worldwide View Publishing 1997) 6.
5
Arnold Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Reading in Comparative Analysis (Holt
Rinehart and Winston Inc 1970) 3; Dan Hough, Political corruption and Governance (Palgrave
Macmillan 2013) 2-3.
6
Transparency International (n 1).
7
Vito Tanzi, ‘Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures’,
(IMF staff papers, December 1998) IMF Staff Papers Vol. 45 No. 4, Washington, D.C
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/1998/12-98/pdf/tanzi.pdf> accessed 28 January
2016.
8
The World Bank Group, ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the
World Bank’ (The World Bank Group) <
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm>accessed 6 April
2016.
2
3

used in the literature’.9 For Humphrey Asobie, World Bank’s definition ‘creates the
impression that corruption is a malady that primarily or even solely afflicts those in the
public service, especially state authority, whereas those in the private sector and civil
society may be equally culpable’.10 Daniel Kaufmann saw the public office centered
approach towards the definition of corruption as deficient, asserting that ‘… we
challenged this definition of corruption as placing too much emphasis on public
office...we presented empirical evidence of the extent to which many powerful private
firms engage in undue influence, to shape state policies, laws and regulations, for their
own benefit’.11 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines corruption as ‘the abuse
of public authority or trust for private benefit’.12 From the perspective of the IMF,
corruption is linked unequivocally to the activities of the state and is public office centred.
The IMF’s definition is therefore defective for excluding private sector corruption.
In view of the difficulties inherent in defining corruption, this thesis adopts TI’s definition
because it is broader than the IMF and the World Bank definitions. It deals with the actor
rather than the action and constitutes an improved way of defining corruption. Yet,
adopting this definition of TI or any other still succumbs to the Torsello’s question ‘why

Ian Bannon ‘The Fight Against Corruption: A World Bank Perspective’ (Consultative
Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America, 25-28 May
1999)<http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/groups/transparency_workshop6.ht
m>accessed 6 April 2016.
10
Humphrey Asisi Asobie, ‘Meaning and nature of Corruption’ (2012) United Nations
Development Programme (United Nations Development Programme 2012)
<http://escuelapnud.org/biblioteca/pmb/opac_css/doc_num.php?explnum_id=873> accessed 6
April 2016.
11
Daniel Kaufmann, Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption (Social
Science Research Network, November 2005)<http://ssrn.com/abstract=829244>accessed 06
April 2016.
12
See ‘The International Monetary Fund
Factsheet2013<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm>accessed 06 April 2016.
3
9

stick to a single definition if the phenomenon is in constant mutation?’.13 I would suggest
that proffering a working definition helps in providing a solid platform that could help in
providing ways of combating corruption. In this regard, I would define corruption as acts
performed by persons in course of their daily activity that breaches the workplace ethics,
gives them undue advantage over others and bestows undue personal gain on them.
While other types of corruption exist, TI classify corruption as ‘grand, petty and political,
depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs’. 14 This research
adopts the classification (petty and grand) as a preferred taxonomy providing the
framework for a thorough analysis of the typical corruption in Nigeria. George MoodyStuart15 is known for his seminal writings on the concept of grand corruption while
scholars such as Alina Mungiu-Pippidi16 and Susan Rose Ackerman17 also adopted the
TI’s taxonomy of classifying corruption into petty and grand levels. Rose-Ackerman
states that the term grand corruption refers to ‘corruption that occurs at the highest level
of government and involves huge government projects and programs’.18 Petty corruption
also called,
“Low” and “street” corruption, indicates the kinds of corruption that people
experience in their encounters with public officials and when they use public
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services (hospitals, schools, local licensing authorities, police, tax offices, etc.). It
generally involves modest sums of money’.19
Rose-Ackerman submits that ‘grand corruption involves a small number of powerful
players and large sums of money … Heads of states may engage in outright embezzlement
of public funds … ’. Deals involved in grand corruption ‘are by definition the preserve of
top officials and frequently involve multinational corporations operating alone or in
consortia with local partners’.20 The Halliburton $180 million bribery scandal in Nigeria
offered to facilitate a contract on the construction of the liquefied natural gas plant in
southern Nigeria;21 the Sagem S.A of France bribe scandal in Nigeria where prominent
government officials were indicted for collecting bribes worth $3 million dollars each in
order to facilitate and guarantee Sagem S.A winning the bid for the National Identity Card
Scheme;22 and the diversion of $2 billion Defence budget in 2015 by the former National
Security Adviser to the President, retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki, are a few instances of
established cases of grand corruption in Nigeria.

Although recognising that corruption exists in the private and public sectors, this research
focuses on public sector corruption. Grand corruption is rampant within the Nigerian
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public sector and remains one of the important constraints to efficiency in the civil service
and an impediment to a viable productive public sector.23

The consequences of public sector corruption are devastating, it affects the distribution
and allocation of public services (such as health care, housing, water and sanitation),
whether administered directly by the state or outsourced to private companies. Corruption
also manifests itself in acts of cronyism, particularism, graft, bribery, fraud, kickbacks,
embezzlement, nepotism and other illegal diversions of the state’s scarce resources.
Corruption makes it possible to the silence of critics, subvert of justice and nonpunishment of human rights abuses. When corruption is rampant, it threatens basic human
rights and liberties thereby foreclosing fundamental guarantees.
The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 is the bedrock of the international
legal campaign against corruption.24 The United Nations Convention against Corruption
which entered into force in December 2005, was the first global legal agreement to
provide a framework for tackling corruption-related offences at the national (state)
level.25 UNCAC provides a strong platform for holding states accountable by calling for
international cooperation in the criminalisation of corruption offences. The UNCAC
provide the avenues for combating endemic corruption which could help to address
human rights abuses. Besides UNCAC, other International and Regional anti-corruption
instruments include: the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
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anti-corruption.html> accessed 20 June 2016.
24
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
25
United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted 31 October 2003 and entered
into force 14 December 2005.
6

Crime 2003;26 the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
2003;27 the United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions 1996;28 the International Code of Conduct for Public
Officials;29 the Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight
against Corruption (ECOWAS Protocol) 2001;30 and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Protocol against Corruption.31 The existence of these international
and regional legal instruments demonstrate an international consensus that corruption
poses a systemic problem that has the potential to violate human rights. In the words of
James Wolfensohn, the former President of the World Bank, ‘where countries fail to …
confront the issue of corruption… their development is fundamentally flawed and will
not last’.32 Wolfensohn laments ‘Corruption is a core poverty issue, robbing from the poor
the little they have’.33
Linking corruption and human rights frameworks in practice requires understanding how
the cycle of corruption facilitates, perpetuates and institutionalises human rights
violations. This research examines grand corruption through human rights and
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international criminal law lenses, thereby concentrating on the consequences of a
government’s acts of impunity on its citizenry. It is premised on the assumption that
people have the right to be protected by their respective states and also within the
international sphere.34 Human rights according to the Preamble of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights are natural and inalienable rights which everyone enjoys
by virtue of their humanity. ‘These rights are based on the principles of dignity, equality
and liberty and are underpinned by notions of solidarity’.35 This research interrogates
international and regional human rights frameworks on grand corruption by emphasising
the obligations of the state to realise these rights for the people.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
This research undertakes an analysis of endemic grand corruption in the Nigerian public
sector. Nigeria is located in West Africa and has a population of an estimated 167 million
people.36 Nigeria’s economy is petroleum-based and the presence of vast petroleum
resources presented exceptionally high corruption incidents acceding to the dictum of
‘natural resource curse’.37 Various manifestations of grand corruption occur in most
Nigeria public offices,38 and recent cases arising from the fight against the terrorist group
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Boko Haram highlight the extent of the devastation caused by endemic grand corruption
in Nigeria.39 More recently, names of prominent Nigerian political elites featured in the
leaked “Panama Papers”,40 and exposed further the global dimension of the involvement
of Nigerian public political elites in grand corruption. The Panama leaks raises concerns
that transparency and probity remain elusive in Nigerian public office.
In SERAP V Nigeria, the ECOWAS Court in a landmark judgment delivered on 30
November 2010 ruled that ‘ … embezzlement or theft in part of funds allocated to the
basic education will have a negative impact …’41 on human rights to basic universal
education in Nigeria. The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP),
a non-governmental organisation operating in Nigeria also petitioned the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to commence an immediate investigation into corruption in Nigeria

Force> https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/images/Annexture%20I.docx.pdf> accessed 30 June 2016;
See ‘Former Nigerian Governor James Ibori Jailed for 13 Years’ BBC Africa (London, 17 April
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earned him 13 years jail term in the United Kingdom; See<
https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/images/Annexture%20II.pdf> accessed 30 June 2016. R. (On
application of Alamieyesegha) v Crown [2006] Crim. LR.669; [2005] EWHC 274 (Admin).
This case involved Mr DSP Alamieyeseigha, was a former governor of Bayelsa State Nigeria
who stole billions of dollars belonging to the oil-rich Bayelsa State in Nigeria. He was arrested
by the Metropolitan Police in London but disguised himself as a woman and fled London. Upon
return to Nigeria, he was arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned. Most of the stolen funds were
recovered and he agreed to forfeit certain assets illegally and criminally acquired by him.
39
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with the aim of fast-tracking the inclusion of corruption among crimes under international
law.42 The argument of SERAP is that the effects of corruption on the people are heinous
and bear a direct connection to crimes against humanity.43 The extent to whether, and
how far this petition can progress is uncertain considering that, currently, the ICC has not
commenced any investigation into corruption allegations in Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the
SERAP petition is still relevant as it has stimulated further intellectual engagements on
why this process should be fast-tracked. A recent publication by the Global Organisation
of Parliamentarians against Corruption “GOPAC” appears to be furthering the campaign
of SERAP by mobilising renewed intellectual engagement towards the international
criminalisation of the crime of grand corruption.44
This research explores a number of international engagements with grand corruption, but,
will strongly argue for the prosecution of grand corruption as a crime under international
law. The research supports the argument of the thesis by drawing from Article 7(1) of the
Rome Statute which provides a definition of crimes against humanity. The Rome Statute
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provides for international prosecution for the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community. Crimes covered by the Rome Statute include war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide and aggression. Crimes against humanity in contrast to
genocide, for example, do not require proof of specific intent to destroy a qualifying
group, or in contrast to war crimes, need a particular connection to armed conflicts. The
ingredients of crimes against humanity when scrutinised present the same characteristics
as grand corruption in Nigeria. In line with Sonja Starr’s reasoning, this thesis argues that
referring ‘corruption cases to the ICC would increase transparency and accountability,
making it harder for kleptocrats to extract bribes from international companies or use
financial institutions to move or hide ill-gotten assets’.45

1.3 Aims and Objective of the Study
1. To assess, analyse and map out the various manifestations of grand corruption and its
institutional facilitators in Nigeria.
2. To investigate the extent to which international law has recognised grand corruption as
violating human rights and as constituting either actual or potential crimes against
humanity.
3. To investigate the procedure for upgrading grand corruption to a crime under
international law in the Rome Statute.

Starr (n 37) cited in Richard L Cassin, ‘Kleptocrats in Court’ (2009) FCPA Blog <
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/3/31/kleptocrats-in-court.html> accessed 30
September 2016.
45
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1.4 Research Questions
1. How can grand corruption violate human rights in Nigeria?
2. How have the existing international, regional and domestic legal frameworks facilitated
efforts at combating grand corruption?
3. How can international criminal law conceptualise grand corruption as a crime under
international law to be prosecuted as a crime against humanity?
4. Why are violations of socio-economic rights less susceptible to international
criminalisation?

1.5 Scope and Significance of the Study
This research undertakes an analysis of grand corruption in the public sector in Nigeria
and how it impacts human rights from the perspectives of international human rights and
international criminal law. It is one of the first studies to undertake a country-specific
exploration of grand corruption within the context of international human rights and
international criminal law. Although there are other studies on grand corruption in
Nigeria,46 the uniqueness of this research is the ability to locate the subject within the
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realm of international human rights and international criminal law while at the same time
thematically anchoring it in an inter-disciplinary and country- specific platform.
Hence, this research seeks to follow an interdisciplinary examination of the impact of
grand corruption upon human rights, and an analysis of accountability processes at the
domestic level by placing the relevant international and regional oversight mechanisms
under scrutiny. It will equally undertake an assessment as to whether a normative gap
exists within international criminal law regimes when it comes to structural violations of
socio-economic rights. The research considers the question of whether corruption ought
to be framed as an international crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court.

1.6 Methodological Approach
The thesis is rooted in qualitative interpretive paradigm adopting the inductive and
hermeneutic approaches.47 It views the phenomenon of grand corruption through the lens
of the people being studied as hermeneutic phenomenology focuses on the subjective
experience of individuals and groups.48 Hermeneutic process attempt to show the world
as experienced by the subject through his/her life world stories. This school of thought
advances that interpretations are all we have and description itself is an interpretive
process.
A wide range of primary and secondary sources, including books, journals, case laws,
treaties, statutes, articles, reports, institutional records, government publications,

47
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Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 697.
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technical documents archival and internet sources was accessed. The study used snowball
sampling technique in recruiting the elite sample participants in the research. Snowball
sampling in this context refers to an activity whereby the researcher employs the help of
existing participants/interviewees in recruiting other interviewees who are their
acquaintances. This sampling technique is purposive and adequate for this research owing
to the secretive nature of the concept under study.
Being aware that corrupt practices occur in a secret “grey area” of social behaviour,
thereby limiting considerably the measurement of the real extent of grand corruption, and
in consideration of the limitations of data generated by TI’s Corruption Perception
Index,49 the World Bank Governance Indicator,50 MO Ibrahim Foundation,51
Afrobarometer,52 additional data obtained by the researcher through elite interviews
augment the other secondary data listed above. The use of the semi-structured interviews
allowed participants to provide additional information for the purposes of enriching the
subject of the research. The semi-structured interviews were recorded on a Dictaphone
and selective transcribing used in extracting the themes and findings. The thirteen
questions (see appendix iv) were related to the research objectives such as matters arising
from the reviewed literature; definitions of grand corruption; assessment of grand
corruption in Nigeria; the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in anti-
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corruption projects; donor agencies; the justice system; and the government in combating
grand corruption in Nigeria; assessment of the public perception of grand corruption; the
role of political heritage in the dynamics of grand corruption and the main efforts being
made to combat grand corruption. Thirteen elite participants were selected for the project.
The thirteen selected Nigerians live in Lagos and Abuja, in Nigeria. The elite samples in
this context do not represent people with high economic, social or political standing, but
rather, these people are chosen because of who they are and the positions they occupy
and for particular reasons of their involvement in anti-corruption projects.

1.7 Structure of the Thesis
This research work is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one holistically introduces the
thesis, sets out the research objectives, research questions, methodologies, theoretical
framework, research structure and reviews relevant literature related to the work. Chapter
two considers the history of grand corruption in Nigeria setting out why it has remained
systemic and has proved so difficult to combat. Chapter three examines the Nigerian legal
instruments on corruption and the connection between grand corruption and human rights
abuses. Emphasis is laid on the two major anti-corruption agencies, the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, in
contextualising the argument of the chapter. Chapter four considers the international and
regional human rights instruments against corruption with the special focus on the United
Nations Convention against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing
and Combating Corruption. Chapter five examines economic and social rights in relation
to its relevance to grand corruption as well as the normative gap in international criminal
15

law in this regard. Chapter six assesses the relationship between international criminal
law and grand corruption by highlighting the role of the Rome Statute within the research.
Chapter seven argues for grand corruption as a crime against humanity by setting out the
categories of international crimes and interrogating whether grand corruption merits
inclusion as a crime under international law. Chapter eight contains the conclusions,
summary of findings and suggestions/ recommendations of the entire thesis. Appendix vi
elaborates further the methodology of the research and presents the data obtained from
the research empirical field trip.
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Conceptual Analysis of Related Literature
1.8 General Perspectives on Corruption and Grand Corruption in Nigeria
Susan Rose-Ackermann and Bonnie Palifka suggest that ‘public-sector corruption deserves
special emphasis because it undermines developmental and distributional goals and conflicts
with democratic and republican values’.53 Moreover, the inability of States plagued with a high
incidence of grand corruption to implement robust policies that could combat it has necessitated
renewed efforts by the international community to combat corruption. Sharon Eicher remarks
that ‘people everywhere are more concerned than they ever have been about corruption and
business ethics’.54 However, these efforts at promoting transparency in governance do not
interpret human rights frameworks and content. The exclusion of human rights contents within
corruption research reiterates the views of Daniel Kaufmann that corruption, human rights and
international criminal law are intertwined, the linkages are multi-faceted, yet, with little formal
interface in the international convention or advocacy world.55 The United Nations Convention
against Corruption, for instance makes no reference to “human rights”, but corruption siphons
funds into private bank accounts, thereby impairing economic, political and social
development.56 Lyal Sunga and Ilaria Bottigliero assert that a human rights approach to
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corruption research is essential as ‘a human rights approach maintains a broader international
focus on the effects of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights’.57 They argue that human
rights based approach ‘represents a direct and potentially effective way in which to empower
ordinary individuals to demand transparency, accountability and responsibility from elected
representatives and public officials’.58

The pervasiveness of grand corruption in Nigeria and its effects on social, economic and
political development begs the question as to why a state with huge natural resource deposits
should be afflicted. John Mbaku cautions that ‘unless and until Nigerians provide themselves
with institutional arrangements that adequately constrain ... civil servants and politicians from
engaging in corrupt enrichment, corruption will remain pervasive and the average citizen will
continue to find it very difficult to have access to free public goods and services’. 59 Nihal
Jayawickrama asserts in this regard that corruption violates human rights. He describes how
grand corruption leads to violations of the UDHR, ICESCR, and ICCPR.60 In recent times,
scholars have linked international human rights and international criminal law to grand
corruption with the aim of highlighting the effects such violation of human rights has on people,
at the same time, pressing for international codification of the crime of grand corruption.61
Daniel Kaufman saw merit in such academic engagement concurring, that ‘the covenants and

(2007)< http://km.undp.sk/uploads/public1/files/SungaBottigliero_Revised_Final_Report_on_HR_and_Anti-Corruption_Strategies1.pdf> 10 March 2016.
57
ibid.
58
ibid.
59
John Mbaku, Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Cleanups (Lexington Books
2010) 48.
60
Nihal Jayawickrama, ‘Corruption – A Violation of Human Rights’? Sofia, 1998, 1-6.<
file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Corruption%20%20a%20violation%20of%20human%20rights%20_TI%20Working%20Paper_%20(2).pdf>
accessed 12 January 2016.
61
Ndiva Kofele Kale; Sonja Starr; Raj Kumar, Ilias Bantekas; Zoe Pearson and Daniel
Kaufmann are some of the scholars that are very active in linking corruption and human rights.
18

declarations on human rights do not include freedom from corruption …this implies that a key
mechanism linking first and second generation issues is explicitly omitted from coverage by
human right conventions, declarations and work by activists in this area’.62 This thesis submits
that the international human rights instruments at the global and regional levels could
potentially contribute to monitoring, reporting and following up matters involving grand
corruption that relate to human rights violations.

International criminal law and human rights law are two fields of international law concerned
with the individual. Larissa Van Den Herik observes that ‘it is true that international criminal
law and international human rights law share significant existential traits ... the articulation
between international criminal law and human rights law seems rather one-sided’.63 She
submits that ‘international criminal law is primarily concerned with violations of civil and
political rights... Economic, social and cultural rights have, so far, less directly inspired the
development of international criminal law...’.64 Van Den Herik argues that ‘the bias against
socio-economic and cultural rights might be explained by the traditional conceptualization of
this generation of human rights as having the character of programmatic aspirations rather than
justiciable rights’.65 This thesis will interrogate this claim as it examines grand corruption from
the international criminal law and international human rights law perspectives within the
context of Nigeria. It will argue, in line with Robert Klitgaard, that ‘when corruption becomes
systematic, fighting it must go beyond implementing liberal economic policies…Fighting
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systematic corruption requires administering a shock to disturb a corrupt equilibrium’.66 In line
with this approach, the succeeding sections will outline the theoretical frameworks, and
critically analyse grand corruption in Nigeria through the lens of international criminal law and
international human rights law.

1.8.1 Theoretical Framework
In conceptualising the theoretical framework for this research, it is important to emphasise the
opinion of Alt and Lassen that ‘there is no commonly agreed-upon theoretical framework
approach on which to base an empirical model of corruption, let alone to investigate the causes
of corruption’.67 It is also vital to be guided by the views of Chabal that ‘the reality of [African]
history is far more complex and [nobody] can account for all ... events [in the continent] within
one particular theoretical framework or by means of a single conceptual apparatus’. 68 This is
to say that, the various causes of corruption in Nigeria underline the connection and
convergence of various theories on the concept. Hence, this research’s theoretical framework
concurs with the arguments of the UK Department of International Development that
combating corruption involves understanding ‘what are the conditions that facilitate
corruption, what are its costs and what are the most effective ways to combat it’? 69
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1.8.2 The Soft State Theory
Gunnar Myrdal’s70 “soft state theory” characterises the state-society relations, particularly in
the third world.71 Myrdal’s “soft state” means ‘a lack of some discipline; deficiencies in law
enforcement; disregard of the rules by public officials at all levels, their collusion with powerful
persons whose conduct it was their duty to regulate’.72 Myrdal argued that at its base, softness
refers to a condition in which civil society is weakly developed and state institutions lack
autonomy73 and ‘the soft state is marked by corruption, racketeering, bribery, black market,
arbitrariness, and political expediency in the enforcement of laws, and the abuse of power’.74
Goldthorpe went further to argue that ‘the soft state and corruption were linked in turn with an
elitist conspiracy in which ... higher officials, legislators ... acted together to hinder reforms,
manipulate them in their favours and obstruct their implementation’.75 Soft states are
characterised by citizens who have a weak or a diffuse sense of national interest and who do
not have a commitment to public service.76 Mbaku argues that corruption persists in ‘soft
states’ like Nigeria as a result of the ‘inability or failure to ... secure, efficient, professional and
“modern” bureaucracies with competent, well -trained, honest and highly skilled civil
servants’.77 To this end, Kandeh submits that ‘the failure of those who wield state power is a
failure to promote the development of their societies and articulate a vision for the future is a
failure to optimise the ruling class functionality of their states … it is precisely this narrow,
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immediate formative, preoccupation of the state bourgeoisie that deprives the soft state of any
real reproductive dominant class functionality’.78 Ilufoye Sarafa Ogundiya adds that a soft state
is ‘a state where the legal system and its paraphernalia are moribund or at least ineffective’.79
This would agree with the situation in Nigeria where there is a pervasive culture of impunity
across the social strata, the egregious culture of impunity has itself sabotaged and stultified the
growth of the rule of law by fuelling a legal system bedevilled by delays. Corrupt officials have
devised technical means to evade the national justice system and to protect themselves from
the consequences of breaking the law by use of business fronts and pseudo names in contracts.
Rothchild and Foley posit that some modern African states can be portrayed as ‘soft ― i.e. a
state limited in its control over society and therefore incapable of implementing its regulations
efficiently throughout its territory and of achieving its many-faceted goals, and requires policy
implications to harden the state’.80 Scott identified the problems of the soft state as corruption,
tribalism, nepotism, collusion between civil servants and politicians, and the circumvention of
the law and regulations.81 The argument of the term “soft state” was elaborated upon by
Forrest82 in his analysis of the “hardness” of some African states. Forrest outlined four cardinal
points synonymous with “hard states”, ‘ … a measure of structural autonomy from social forces
… political penetration in the sense of control over local-level structures … the extraction of
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resources from society and peasant agriculture … and ideological legitimacy to facilitate the
achievement of the three goals without resort to coercion’.83 Forrest concludes that ‘some
African states have not been able to decisively realise its state-building goals and therefore
remains to a large extent soft’.84 Chabal states that ‘I believe that the African post-colonial
state, although overdeveloped, hegemonic and omnipresent, is both soft and over-extended’.85
Reviewing these developments, Villalón validates Forrest’s opinion and adds that “soft” is ‘the
most frequently used term to describe the African state; the context in which it is used varies,
but the term refers to the weakness vis-à-vis the society; and the state is “soft” because it is
mostly incapable of achieving the goals stated in its definition; the soft states of Africa have
failed either to establish their predominance over other organisations in the society or to
institute binding rules to regulate their activities or both’.86
However, the “soft state theory” is not without critics. For instance, Sangmpam condemned it,
highlighting its failure to adopt a detailed comparison between Africa and other third world
states as a major weakness.87 Sangmpam further argued that the theory focuses on the decline
or softness of the state in Africa, and that Africa shares most of its socio-economic features
with other Third World countries that are not characterized by the softness of their states, and
concludes that the theoretical issue of the state is the underlying pitfall of the soft state
paradigm.88 In his criticism of the “soft state”, Fatton points out that the thesis is mistaken
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because it refutes the reality of an authoritarian, interventionist, and class-based state.89 Fatton
also insists that the state is never soft; it is always an organ of dominance; to characterise the
state as being soft is to miss class relationships and class struggles.90 Besides, other scholars
have also opined that corruption in Nigeria has moved from prebendalism to predation in which
office holders and public officials try to repay their supporters, family members, cronies and
ethnic group members with sums of money, contracts and jobs.91 The corruption in Nigeria, a
product of the soft state has indeed resulted in weakly developed civil society, low coherence,
low capacity and low autonomy of government organisations.

1.8.3 Natural Resource Curse Theory
The “resource curse” or “paradox of plenty” literature describes a tendency for states not to
harness their resources for national development, and even to be harmed by them in many
cases.92 It brings to fore the question as to why some mineral dependent states in Africa are
quite corrupt. Could it be inferred that the revenue from the natural resources are too much for
the system to absorb? Has the appropriation of revenue from the natural resources not run
contrary to the guarantee by Article 21 (1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights that, ‘all peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived
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of it’.93 The United Nations General Assembly has inter-alia recognised this right as belonging
to the people when it adopted Resolution 1803 (XVII) ‘the right of peoples and nations to
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources’.94
The “resource curse” argument first used by Richard Auty in the early 1990 argues that ‘a
growing body of evidence suggests that a favourable natural resource endowment may be less
beneficial to countries at low and mid-income levels of development than the conventional
wisdom might suppose’.95 It appears that the degree of corruption in most African states makes
it look as if there is a correlation between wealth from natural resources and corruption.
Nicholas Shaxson pointed out that ‘this seems to afflict countries where the resource is
extracted onshore (as in the Niger Delta) ...’.96 O'Brien and Rathbone expressed similar views
using Nigeria and Sierra Leone as examples of states where ‘diamonds and oil have ... provided
the bulk of government revenue ..., making possible a greater weight of central government.’97
Thus, Nigeria, though endowed with abundant natural resources, presents a scenario where
these rich resources have resulted in low growth rates, low levels of human development, and
high levels of inequality and poverty. This is partly because various individuals wish to divert
as much of that endowment as possible for their own private benefit;98 with the understanding
that natural resource endowment is exclusively handled by the state and in doing that, ‘they
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necessarily maintain and strengthen their hold on resource extraction and allocation’.99
However, this can be contrasted with, for example, states like Norway, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and Botswana. Most especially in Norway, unlike Nigeria, ‘the management of the
petroleum resources reflects the view among Norwegian decision makers that the resources
belong to the nation, and that the development should benefit the society as a whole, including
future generations’.100 Norway is able to manage the government oil fund using transparent
measures in ensuring that ‘money from the Fund could not be used to finance purposes which
were not given priority in the ordinary budget procedure in Stortinget (the Parliament)’.101 The
Norwegian experience suggests that natural resources can be blessings and not just curses. In
light of this, one can ask, to what extent can the Norwegian experience be useful in overturning
the natural resource curse afflicting Nigeria? Steinar Holden submits that ‘this is hard to assess,
in particular when it comes to countries in an entirely different political and economic phase
of development’.102 She further argues that ‘when oil was discovered in Norway, the country
had been a stable democracy since it acquired independence in 1905...The state bureaucracy
functioned well, with little corruption ... The legal system worked well’.103

Leite and

Weidmann support the resource curse theory, arguing that capital-intensive resource industries
tend to induce more corruption, hampering economic development.104 This assertion is
particularly relevant to the Nigerian oil sector since Nigeria’s rating is below the median rank
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on both the United Nation’s Human Development Index and most of the World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators.105
The “resource curse” theory focuses on the inability to promote growth and development
despite the abundant resources indicating huge failures on the part of the oil-rich Nigerian state.
These failures have many domestic implications, including the undue influence of power
constellations and elites, human rights violations, the occurrence of uprisings, ethnic uprisings
and insurgency and forms of corruption such as illicit enrichment, cronyism, active and passive
bribery and graft. Shaxson gives the example of the paradox of resource curse citing a historic
Nigerian incident when: ‘Diepreye Alamieyesiegha, the onetime governor of Nigeria’s oil-rich
Bayelsa state, was arrested for money-laundering in London in 2005, local militants did not
repudiate him for stealing oil money, but instead welcomed him as a local son of the soil’.106
In this example, the abundance of oil resource in Bayelsa state, Nigeria was used as the ‘ethnic
card, which was to play the card of corruption by promoting the narrow interest at the expense
of the wider interest’.107 Another remarkable resource curse incident was the “Malabu Oil
Scandal” involving a former Nigerian Petroleum Minister, Chief Dan Etete, Shell Company
and ENI. In this deal, $1.1billion was fraudulently paid to Chief Dan Etete with the connivance
of the sitting Attorney General of Nigeria (Mohammed Bello Adoke) and the Minister of State
for Finance (Yerima Ngama) at the expense of impoverished Nigerian citizens whose natural
resources had been hijacked by the oligarchs.108 It can thus be cogently argued that part of the
reason for the endemic grand corruption in Nigeria is from the poor management of abundant
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natural resources. Shaxson reiterates that ‘mineral dependence turns out to be a curse not just
in terms of economic growth, but in terms of violent conflict, greater inequality, less democracy
and more corruption’.109 In sum, the discovery of mineral resources helped in aggravating an
already existing problem, particularly in states suffering from dysfunctional political economic
and legal systems. Williams gives the example of Nigeria: ‘... the oil boom... And the discovery
of oil simply ensured that parasites grew fatter and more bloated’.110 His views derived from
the fact that the business-like nature of a state’s economy makes it susceptible to corruption
reiterating the views of Sachs and Warner that the sudden exploitation of natural resource stock
may create social and economic turmoil.111

1.8.4 State Capture Theory
The World Bank defines state capture as ‘the efforts of a small number of firms (or such groups
as the military, ethnic groups and kleptocratic politicians) to shape the rules of the game to
their advantage through illicit, non-transparent provision of private gains to public officials’.112
Similarly, Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann define “state capture” as the ‘efforts of firms to
shape the laws, policies, and regulations of the state to their own advantage by providing illicit
private gains to public officials’.113 For them, this form of grand corruption is the ‘most
pernicious and intractable problem in the political economy of reform; a form of behaviour by
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so-called oligarchs manipulating policy formation and even shaping the emerging rules of the
game to their own, very substantial advantage’.114 State capture is also defined as ‘the undue
and illicit influence of the elite in shaping the laws, policies, and regulations of the state. In
essence, this form of capture is a manifestation of grand corruption’.115 State capture connotes
grand corruption implying that the state apparatus has been captured by some groups or
oligarchies that, capitalising on the gains achieved through illegal payments and favours, can
now influence the outcome of public policies. Laurence Cockroft notes that:
Two countries in Africa - Nigeria and Kenya – reflect the same determination by very
small and corrupt elites to sustain their position. Thus, the reluctance of General
Babangida to implement the long-awaited transfer to multi-party democracy, and the
takeover of the process by General Abacha, represent a determination by a small group
who were dominant within the military to ensure the survival of the status quo.116
John Mbaku refers to the forces that capture the state as ‘a group that control the state and by
implication, the allocation of resources...’117 The reason for capturing the state, according to
Mbaku, is that it ‘allows interest groups to control/or influence the design and execution of
policies, the enactment of legislation, and the enforcement of government regulations; and
principally for self-enrichment’.118 Mbaku believes that ‘in many countries in Africa, those
individuals or groups, which have captured political power often use the power to generate
benefits and privileges for themselves and their supporters’.119 An important outcome of state
capture is the passage of fiscally discriminating legislation which makes allowance for various
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income and wealth transfer schemes.120 The late Nigerian military President, General Sani
Abacha, epitomised this illicit wealth transfer scheme. The proceeds of his corrupt activities
are still being located at different safe havens abroad.121 Recently, the United States ordered a
freeze on $458 million in assets stolen by former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha and his
accomplices and hidden in European accounts.122 According to the Justice Department of the
United States, ‘the assets frozen … along with additional assets named in the complaint …
represent the “proceeds of corruption” during and after the military regime of Abacha, who
became president of Nigeria through a military coup on 17 November 1993, and held that office
until his death on June 8, 1998’.123 Daniel Kaufmann and Joel Hellmann conclude that ‘the
capture economy is trapped in a vicious circle in which the policy and institutional reforms
necessary to improve governance are undermined by collusion between powerful firms and
state officials who reap substantial private gains from the continuation of weak governance’.124

1.8.5 Conclusion
In an effort to define corruption, one is cautioned that ‘attempts to develop a more precise
definition invariably encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political
problems’.125 On the other hand, an absence of a definitional consensus should not deter
scholarly engagement with corruption; rather, it should drive further critical research. As
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scholars engage in the search for a unified working definition of corruption, this research
among other things, argues for concerted academic engagement on extending the core
international crimes beyond their present sphere of competence.
This chapter adopts TI’s definition of corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private
gain’.126 As argued earlier in this chapter, TI’s definition, despite shortcomings, is the preferred
choice for the purpose of this research as it offers universality and flexibility in working on the
thesis topic. TI plays an active role in the global campaign against corruption and most donor
agencies follow its prescriptions as a determining factor in deciding who receives
developmental aid.127 This supports with the views of Grace Morgan that, ‘bilateral and
multilateral organisations ... must ensure that their assistance is spent as intended, and is not
siphoned off into the pockets of public or private interests’.128
This research further argues for the upgrading of grand corruption to the status of a crime under
international law in view of its overwhelmingly, detrimental impact on human rights. It
interrogates why deaths caused by bloodshed attract the attention of international criminal
lawyers more than the slow deaths of those deprived of food, water and medicine through
corrupt acts. The recent starvation of internally displaced persons (IDP) fleeing from Boko
Haram’s terrorism in some rehabilitation camps in northern Nigeria highlights examples of
recent incidents where factors other than political violence could result in enormous loss of
life.129 The relevance of this argument is underscored by the fact that only very rarely are socio-
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economic rights violations tackled by any of the available mechanisms of transitional justice;130
yet, the constantly expanding literature on transitional justice and international criminal law
has remained largely detached from the human rights literature on socio-economic rights. This
research also highlights the failure of domestic remedies in grand corruption cases, a response
to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies which holds that individuals should exhaust their
avenues of redress in the domestic legal systems before turning to international redress. 131 In
essence, it is the intention of this research to argue, like Kale, that ‘remedies are ineffective
when domestic laws do not afford adequate relief or when the injured party is prevented from
having recourse to them’.132 Kale reasons that the domestic remedies are also ineffective if ‘the
courts are not independent or the proceedings take too long to dispose of the dispute’.133 Alina
Mungiu-Pippidi agrees, ‘if courts and legal battles against corruption are conspicuously
missing in this analysis, it is because ... courts are not autonomous from status groups, and
legislation is frequently not implemented’.134 Mungui-Pippidi believes that international
assistance is crucial ‘to push for the adoption of some “institutional weapons” that an
anticorruption coalition or isolated anticorruption entrepreneurs can use.135 It is argued here
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that establishing international legal regime is a vital link that drives the process of combating
grand corruption forward.
The succeeding chapters will interrogate relevant literature, regulation and case law analysing
grand corruption, international human rights and international criminal law focusing on the
Nigerian state as the case study.
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Chapter Two
Grand Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Review
2.1 Introduction
Robert Tignor asserts that ‘perhaps no country in the continent has devoted more attention and
energy to continuing allegations of corruption than Nigeria’.1 Tignor submits that ‘by the time
that independence was achieved in 1960, many Nigerians regarded corruption as the main issue
by which they and the outside world would judge the country's capacity for self-rule’.2 Nigeria
is a victim of high-level corruption, bad governance and political instability. Consequently,
national development is impaired, political environment remain uncertain and socio-economic
rights are grossly unrealised.
While the literature on corruption is copious, there is scarce empirical research on the history
of corruption in Nigeria.3 This may be explained in the context that, quite unlike other socially
constructed practices, the study of corruption presents great challenges because it occurs in
secret. Moreover, while the scandals associated with corruption are always discussed in the
literature, there is a little exploration of the institutional, legal, political, economic and social
structures that have consistently constructed the landscape which facilitates the continuous
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corruption. These gaps and other scholarly output in this area provide the springboard for the
analysis in this chapter.
A historical background is essential in providing the context and framework for analysing
grand corruption in Nigeria. Hence, this chapter, using a historical lens, seeks to explore this
area and aims at encouraging scholarly debates on the relevant structures and the actors
constructing corruption in a larger institutional context not as an act of recriminations over the
past but, to uncover how we got it wrong from the past and to suggest ways to strategically
reposition the future. What then is the origin of grand corruption in Nigeria? How did Nigeria
become an endemically corrupt state? Or in the words of Chidi Odinkalu, ‘how has a country
so richly endowed blown the opportunities for itself and its generations yet unborn so
spectacularly’?4 How did Nigeria become a crippled giant?5
This chapter examines the underlying bases of grand corruption in Nigeria as a framework for
the analysis undertaken in the entire research. What counts as grand corruption in Nigeria?
How do we account for its endemic nature? Answers to these and other relevant questions
attempted in this chapter will provide the conceptual framework for the succeeding chapters of
this research.
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2.2 Grand Corruption (Colonial Era 1882-1960)
According to Tignor, ‘concerns about corruption were seen as one of the reasons colonial rule
was needed as it provided good government in place of oppression and chaos’. 6 On the
contrary, Osoba argues that the British colonial administration laid the foundation of what
metamorphosed into endemic grand corruption, emphasising that the scourge remains a
national epidemic.7 Tignor observes that ‘indeed, from the late colonial period up until the
present, critics of those in power have lamented the level of venality, and numerous published
reports have catalogued a wide range of iniquities and called for reform’. 8 He further asserts
that ‘a considerable amount of bribery, nepotism, and the use of political office for personal
enrichment did exist in late colonial Nigeria. Evidence of administrative malfeasance was
palpable…’.9 It follows then that British colonialism in Nigeria (1900-1960), contrary to the
views of Tignor, can be argued to have been founded on corruption and exploitation legitimised
by a system of indirect rule, a major tool for the governance of the native authorities. Onigu
Otite agrees that ‘experience of colonialism created a culture of unbridled corruption and
fettered democracy’.10 Walter Rodney was more emphatic as he blamed colonialism for
upsetting Africa and in particular, Nigeria’s development.11
The colonial administrative policy of indirect rule in Nigeria created “two classes of publics”
among Nigerians as captured by Peter Ekeh, ‘two publics… such that while the primordial
public … was built on a system of accountability and control, based on moral principles, the
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civic public (ruled by the postcolonial state and its institutions) became a contested terrain for
private accumulation based on amoral principles’.12
To this, Paul Ocheje replies that the ‘corruption of public officers existed in Nigeria since the
establishment of modern structures of public administration in the country by the British
Colonial administration, however, its escalation has coincided with the expansion of
administrative structures’.13 To corroborate this assertion, Stephen Pierce notes that ‘British
authorities complained about governmental corruption from the very beginning of the colonial
period’14. Osoba agrees that ‘corruption in Nigeria is a kind of social virus which is a hybrid
of traits of fraudulent anti-social behaviour derived from British colonial rule and those derived
from and nurtured in the indigenous Nigerian context’.15 The arguments by scholars on where
grand corruption originates rest on two sides of a contrived opposition and as such this research
agrees with Laura Routley that ‘the relationship between corruption and colonialism in Nigeria
is an ambivalent one… I find this discussion of the roots of corruption unfruitful to the hybridity
of these practices, which cannot simply be traced back to its roots or have their hybrid elements
separated out’.16 I also agree with Chabal and Daloz’s views on it as ‘long-running, interesting,
but ultimately fruitless set of debates in terms of comprehending the rationale of contemporary
practices’.17 The recurrent and converging facts from these diverse arguments which also
remains the focal point of this research hinges on the view that over the years, Nigeria has seen
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its wealth withered by endemic grand corruption which has systematically drained its natural
resources, precipitating poverty, and economic crisis which inevitably magnifies dispossession,
hunger, disease, illiteracy, human rights violations and insecurity.
There are history records of grand corruption incidents associated with politicians who worked
with the colonial administrators. Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, who became the first president of
Nigeria immediately after independence, was indicted in a grand corruption case involving
African Continental Bank (ACB) in which he had a personal interest. Dr Azikiwe failed to
abide by the rules of the code of conduct for public officers and thus failed to relinquish his
personal business interests before assuming office as a public minister. According to Michael
Ogbeidi,
In 1956, the Foster-Sutton Tribunal of Inquiry investigated the Premier of the
defunct Eastern Region, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, for his involvement in the affairs
of the defunct African Continental Bank (ACB) … The Foster-Sutton Tribunal
discovered that Azikiwe did not sever his connections to the bank when he
became a Premier. The Tribunal reported that Azikiwe continued to use his
influence to promote the interests of the bank.18
Following indictment by the Tribunal, Dr Azikiwe transferred his interest in ACB to the
government of Eastern Nigeria. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, another prominent post-colonial
minister and the first premier of the western region, was found guilty of corruption by the Coker
Commission in 1962. He was blamed for the diminished fortunes of the Western Region
Marketing Board due to his corrupt acts. The Coker Commission found Awolowo responsible
for the economic meltdown of the Western Region Marketing Board because he diverted the
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total of N4.4 million in cash and N1.3 million in overdraft from the National Bank to finance
his political ambitions through the sponsorship of the Action Group (AG).19
Azikiwe and Awolowo became prominent political personalities that received the authority of
governance from the colonialist upon Nigerian independence in 1960. The colonial
administration made no effort to sanction them despite the overwhelming evidence against
them. This episode sent a wrong signal that ‘corruption was not simply an objective reality,
standing on its own. It became a symbol and a metaphor, constructed in the midst of political
competition’.20 This supports the view that the foundation laid by the British colonial authority
could be argued to be primarily a political structure which allowed and at times even
encouraged corruption. This chapter argues that these incidents marked the beginning of
grand/official corruption in Nigeria, a clear indication of a privatised/oligarchic state. Johnston
defines such state as ‘appropriated to the service of private interests by the dominant faction of
the elite’.21 In this regard, Daniel Agbiboa suggests that ‘the failure of the political elites who
took over power from the colonialists complicated matters in the postcolonial period, due to
their failure to address the root of these problems and, particularly, their inability to transform
… social structures … ’.22
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2.3 Grand Corruption: A Post-Colonial Experience (Nigeria’s First Republic, 1960-1966)
Michael Ogbeidi recounts that ‘the First Republic under the leadership of Sir Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa, the Prime Minister, and Nnamdi Azikwe, the President, was marked by widespread
grand corruption’.23 Ogbeidi maintains that ‘government officials looted public funds with
impunity. Federal Representatives and Ministers flaunted their wealth with reckless abandon…
Politically, the thinking of the First Republic Nigerian leadership class was based on politics
for material gain; making money and living well’. 24
The immediate civilian regime after independence did not last long. Grand corruption was
pervasive with records of abuse of office, personal material aggrandisement, kickbacks,
nepotism, awarding contracts to front companies, lodging public funds into private accounts,
over invoicing, approval of substandard projects, disregard of due process, bribery, fraud,
stealing and misappropriation of public funds. Ogbeidi submits that ‘the First Republic, with
Azikiwe as the President, was marked by widespread corruption. Government officials looted
public funds with impunity’.25
The unexpected transfer of political power to inexperienced nationalist political elites saddled
them with power and wealth which had serious negative implications for good governance and
transparency. Sadly, the nationalist politicians were unable manage the instruments governance
efficiently, but rather exhibited flagrant abuse of public office for personal gain. Michael
Crowder observes that ‘by the end of 1965, the politicians had earned almost universal
contempt for their corruption, profligacy and lack of real concern for those they ruled and who
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had elected them’.26 In the midst of the confusion and disillusionment associated with the first
republic politicians, the military launched a coup d’état that immediately overthrew the regime,
set aside all democratic institutions and introduced martial law. Ogbeidi argues that ‘the 1966
coup was a direct response to the corruption of the First Republic’.27 For Effeh, ‘it follows that
the ideals for economic emancipation- the supposed inspiration behind the quest for
independence- has become the subject of escapist antics, grandiloquent rhetoric, and/or outright
buffoonery’.28 However, amidst all this rhetoric, people seemed to overlook the complexities
within the system that nourished and sustained the unwavering wind of grand corruption with
greater emphasis laid on its manifestations and consequences as reflected in the speeches of
succeeding military regimes as will be analysed in the next section (section 2.4).

2.4 Grand Corruption (The Nigerian Military Connection 1966-1999)
The military played prominent roles in sustaining grand corruption in Nigeria as ‘corruption,
already bourgeoning under the early politicians, became entrenched under the military rule’.29
Military coups forcefully circumvent democratic institutions and because of their illegitimacy,
it can be argued that the track record of the military indicate that they had little regard for the
well-being and welfare of the populace and as such pursued no mandate of accountability and
transparency. The military rulers were able to institutionalize their dominance by ‘defusing
inherent potential sources of opposition, suppressing and placating, employing reversal and

26

Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria (Faber & Faber London 1962) 260.
Ogbeidi (n 18) 7.
28
Ubong E Effeh, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study on How Not to Realise Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, And A Proposal For Change’ (spring 2005) NorthWestern University
Journal of International Human Rights Volume 3 Issue 1, 8.
29
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria (MIT Press
2012) 4; John Mukum Mbaku, Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Cleanups (Lexington
Books 2010) 32.
41
27

insistence tactics in a bid to ensure a delicate balance of legitimacy’.30 Fagbadebo argues
further that, ‘this explains the reasons for the multiplicity of corruption and the further
decimation of available resources and potentials for national development’.31 The argument
reiterates that military intervention in politics is harmful to democracy and accountability.
Mbaku notes that ‘throughout their tenure in power, Nigeria’s several military governments
were never able to help the country develop a consistent, predictable, and a fair legal framework
for dealing with corruption’.32 Rather, a series of grand corruption scandals characterised
several military regimes in Nigeria.
For instance, the English Court of Appeal case, Trendtex v Central Bank of Nigeria 33 remains
a very important case in the history of Nigerian military’s involvement in endemic grand
corruption. In the Trendtex case, the Nigeria Ministry of Defence ordered 20 million tonnes of
cement from about 80 different suppliers, at a cost of over US$8 billion (in 1975 prices).34
More than 400 ships arrived at the Lagos seaport with the cement consignment, with more
arriving daily, completely paralysing a seaport that had no capacity for such shipments. Lord
Denning criticised the transaction maintaining that ‘yet early in 1975 the government
departments then in charge ... had ordered 10 times that quantity ... to be delivered over the
next 12 months ... Even for all commodities together, the discharging capacity at Lagos...did
not amount to two million tons a year’.35 The main issue with the Trendtex case in this context
is that Nigeria never needed those quantities of cement at the time, rather, a few high-ranking

Omololu Fagbadebo, ‘Corruption, Governance and Political Instability in Nigeria’
(November 2007) African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 1 (2), 034.
31
ibid 032.
32
John Mukum Mbaku, Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Cleanups
(Lexington Books 2010) 42.
33
[1977] 1 QB 529 .
34
Effeh (n 28) 11.
35
[1977] 1 QB 529.
42
30

government officials used the pretext of importing cement for national development to embark
on illicit enrichment thereby showing flagrant abuse of public office for private gain. Ubong
Effeh asserts that ‘the Trendtex case was to become the prelude to how the country was to be
misgoverned, with the Abacha regime taking “Mobutuism” to a different depth, adeptly
combining Mobutu’s plundering disposition with a degree of viciousness unparalleled in
Nigeria’s history’.36 This period also exposed the ‘Nigerian rulers who had begun to set an
example that was to become a living testament to mind-boggling profligacy, if not to supreme
folly’.37
Aside from the “Cement Armada Scandal” associated with the General Gowon’s regime,38 the
regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha took Nigerian grand
corruption to a whole new level.39 For instance, the Iraq/Gulf war led to an exceptional oil
boom, a surplus/steady flow of foreign exchange into the Federation account, as well as
opportunity for extraordinary rent seeking. This translated to the situation where ‘the sum of
US$12.67 billion earned during the war could not be accounted for by the Babangida-led
regime’.40 In addition, Osoba argues:
The indiscipline in Babangida’s years in office was … exemplified by regular budget
overruns: N8.3 billion in 1988; N14.6 billion in 1989; N18.6 billion in 1990; N24.6
billion in 1991; and N41.5 billion in 1992, which the self-styled President was able to
underwrite using the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Ways and Means Advances to
underwrite his regular budget overruns ... consequently, the money in circulation in
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Nigeria increased from N11.8 billion when Babangida assumed office in August 1985
to N100.5 billion when he stepped aside in 1993.41

Paul Ocheje describes the Babangida’s regime as having officially sanctioned corruption in the
country and made it difficult to apply the only potent measures, … for fighting corruption in
Nigeria in the future.42
The late General Sani Abacha’s grand corruption record became a national and international
scandal leading Enrico Monfrini to argue that ‘Nigeria had long been plagued by corruption,
but under General Sani Abacha, corrupt practices became blatant and systematic’. 43 General
Abacha ousted the interim national Government headed by Ernest Shonekan in a military coup
d’état in 1993 and became notorious for institutionalising Nigeria’s grand corruption.44
Monfrini asserts that ‘a total of 130 bank accounts in Switzerland were identified as having
been used by the Abacha criminal organisation’.45 The US Assistant Attorney General, Leslie
Caldwell comments that ‘rather than serve his country, General Abacha used his public office
in Nigeria to loot millions of dollars, engaging in brazen acts of kleptocracy’.46 General
Abacha’s regime marked a dark era for the fight against grand corruption in Nigeria and
remains the era when Nigeria’s Corruption Perception index rating by the Transparency
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International was among the worst scores.47 General Abacha, his family and cronies48 looted
the treasury of Nigeria to the tune of about US $50 Billion.49 General Abacha died in June 1998
and since his death, Nigeria through international co-operation with countries like the United
Kingdom, Switzerland and Liechtenstein has succeeded in repatriating some of the looted
public funds stashed away in foreign banks/safe financial havens.50 Notably, Switzerland has
repatriated over $700 Million hidden in different Swiss banks, Jersey returned $100 Million,
$150 million in Luxembourg, and several hundreds of million Dollars in the USA, United
Kingdom, Liechtenstein, and others.51 Augustine Aminu reports that ‘the assets were held in
banks that included Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Holdings PLC and Banque SBA, according to
the lawsuit… in June [2014], after a 16-year legal battle, Nigeria recovered from Liechtenstein,
$228 million stolen by Abacha and his associates…as of last year, Nigeria had recovered about
$1.3 billion of Abacha's money from various European jurisdictions’.52 The US recently took
control of $480 stolen by Abacha on 6th August 2014. US District Judge, John Bates ordered
that the funds frozen by the Justice Department, and linked to the Abacha dynasty be forfeited
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to US control and ‘the forfeiture judgment includes approximately $303 million in two bank
accounts in the Bailiwick of Jersey, $144 million in two bank accounts in France, and three
bank accounts in the United Kingdom and Ireland with an expected value of at least $27
million. The ultimate disposition of the funds will follow the execution of the judgment in each
of these jurisdictions. Claims to an additional approximately $148 million in four investment
portfolios in the United Kingdom are pending’.53 The case of Sani Abacha and recently the late
Duvalier (former Haitian dictator), precipitated the Swiss government to enact the Swiss
Restitution of Illicit Assets Act 2010. The Swiss Act is a law instituted to checking the influx
of corrupt and illegally acquired funds into Switzerland.54
It remains a subject of debate among researchers on why grand corruption flourished during
the military era in Nigeria. Scholars argue that the military practice of suspending constitutions
to rule with “Decrees” and “Edicts” could have ensured the brazen kleptocratic tendencies
recorded in Nigeria.55 In the words of Mbaku, ‘in fact, military rule has contributed more than
any single factor, to making corruption endemic in Nigeria’.56
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2.5 Grand Corruption: Post Military Era to Date (29 May 1999-April 2017)

The coming into power of civilians in Nigeria in 1999 regrettably failed to restore transparency
in governance. The civilian democratic regime headed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo established
two major anti-corruption agencies57 and ratified some of the regional and international legal
instruments on corruption. However, Shehu argues that ‘during the eight-year period of the
Obasanjo administration, Nigeria lost between US$4 billion and US$8 billion annually to
corruption’.58
Obasanjo’s regime was inundated by local and global corruption scandals. At the global level,
Halliburton-KBR, one of the world’s largest providers of products and services to the oil and
gas industry, got entangled in a messy bribery scandal in Nigeria.59 In 2012, former Kellog
Brown and Root, CEO Albert Stanley, received 30 months in jail for his complicity in the $180
million bribery scandal in Nigeria.60 The bribe facilitated their bid for a contract for the
construction of liquefied natural gas plant in southern Nigeria. Another high-profile case
involved Siemens. Siemens was fined about $1.6 billion for bribery offences, and that remains
one of the largest fines for bribery in modern corporate history.61 The offences leading to these
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fines were tied to corrupt practices indulged by these companies in Nigeria. Moreover,
Willbros Incorporated paid $32 million to the USA authorities for the same involvement in
bribery in Nigeria. It cost Sagem SA $200 million to bribe senior government officials in
Obasanjo’s administration in order to win the bid for the National Identity Card Scheme.62 In
all these cases, this research argues that the involvement of these multi-national corporations
in Nigerian bribery cases portray Nigeria as a weak state that tolerates illegalities. It also raises
the red flag about the level of corruption in Nigeria. Otherwise, the pertinent question, why is
it always happening in Nigeria? A closer look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
violations shows that most of the serious cases have a strong presence and affiliation to Nigeria.
It is simply pointing to the fact that there is systemic corruption in the entire system, giving
rise to many of the situations where it is easy to compromise the set rules.
At the domestic level, ‘between 2005 and 2007, state Governors, politicians and public officials
allegedly embezzled US$250 billion hidden in western banks and other offshore financial
centres’.63 Other documented cases include indictment and conviction of a one-time Inspector
General of the Nigerian Police, the highest ranking police officer in Nigeria at the time, Tafa
Balogun. Mr Balogun was indicted for embezzling $128 million or N13billion Naira belonging
to the Nigerian Police Force. Following a plea bargain, he was fined N4 million and received
a light six months imprisonment.64 The sentencing of Balogun represented a mockery of justice
and in the words of Olaniyan, ‘the level of prosecution and punishment of corruption involving
high-ranking state officials are simply not commensurate with the gravity of the problem… ’65
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It goes further to expose the charade of the Nigerian justice system caused by systemic grand
corruption. According to the Human Rights Watch Report 2014, this depicts ‘a weak and
overburdened judiciary’.66
Some elected state governors in Obasanjo’s administration have been indicted on serious grand
corruption offences. Agbiboa notes, ‘the first case involved Joshua Dariye, former governor of
Plateau state, who was found to operate 25 bank accounts in London alone. Dariye used front
agents to penetrate western real estate markets where he purchased expensive properties’.67
The London Metropolitan Police determined Dariye had acquired £10 million in benefits
through criminal conduct in London, while domestically, the EFCC were able to restrain
proceeds of his crimes worth $34 million.68 Another corruption scandal that hit the Obasanjo’s
regime was the arrest on 17 September 2005 of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, Governor of the oilrich Bayelsa State. Alamieyeseigha was arrested upon his arrival in London for being in
possession of over £100,000 in undeclared cash. Following subsequent raids £1 million in cash
was found in his London home and £800,000 ($1.048 million) in his bank accounts in Britain.69
Alamieyeseigha jumped bail and escaped from London.70 He returned to Nigeria, where he was
impeached, tried and imprisoned. The EFCC played a pivotal role in securing his indictment.
However, how he was able to amass USD $ 1.5 million in cash, acquire four properties in
London worth USD $7 million and a penthouse in Cape Town valued at USD $ 1.5million
under the supposed watchful eyes of the EFCC remains a mystery. Bolaji Akinola queries how
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his asset declaration which was $547,000 (N68.6 million) as at 1999 could have transformed
to £1.8 million within the space of a few years.71
In another case, a former governor of the oil-rich Delta state, James Ibori was convicted by
Southwark Crown Court in London of money laundering offences involving USD $67 million
following his extradition from the United Arab Emirates to stand trial.72 Ibori was sentenced to
13 years in prison in the UK and finished serving his prison term in December 2016.73 A major
issue arising from the analysis of Ibori’s case is a question of why a Nigerian court previously
absolved him of the charges. Does it mean that the laws in Nigeria are wrongly crafted or that
the judiciary is ineffective? Human Rights Watch answers this asserting that the ‘the
appearance of judicial impropriety has been striking’ while Albin-Lackey, opines that ‘Ibori
was renowned for fuelling widespread corruption and political violence’.74 Generally, I
emphasise that Ibori’s vindication in a Nigeria Court highlights the depth of decay in the
Nigerian judicial system and, as such, the judiciary retains the blame in the Ibori’s case.
There are other former state governors who have pending grand corruption cases instituted by
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) which are stalled in Nigerian courts:
Orji Uzor Kalu, Chimaroke Nnamani, Saminu Turaki, Reverend Jolly Nyama, Ayo Fayose,
and Peter Odili. According to Nuhu Ribadu, ‘when you fight corruption, corruption fights
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back’.75 The judicial system has remained an unrestrained instrument for the corrupt governors
in fighting back using prolonged court adjournments. Moreover, the alleged complicity of some
state governors begs the question of why the system in the state administrative machinery is so
vulnerable.76 Why have some of these governors stolen so much and yet there was an
insufficient internal audit at the state levels to check these excesses? The state governors’
alleged collusion simply suggests that the entire system may have been compromised.
The vice president to former president Obasanjo, Atiku Abubakar, was also involved in the
corruption scandals that tainted the reputation of Obasanjo’s administration. Abubakar was
accused of diverting more than $100m in public funds to private interest. 77 The investigating
panel concluded that Mr Abubakar helped divert $145m from Nigerian government accounts
to personal bank accounts held in various parts of the world. A Senate inquiry recommended
that Mr Abubakar should be prosecuted for illegally siphoning off public money.78 Abubakar’s
numerous scandals were also linked him to William Jefferson, a Louisiana Democrat. Mr
Jefferson was jailed after years of investigation by the US authorities (since March 2005) for
using his position to help iGate, a multinational company which sought contracts with Nigeria
and other African nations and taking bribes in return. The FBI found $90,000 stashed in a
freezer in his home. Jefferson was a close business ally of Abubakar and has since been
sanctioned by the US justice department.79 Moreover, many prominent cabinet ministers under
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Obasanjo were investigated and indicted on major grand corruption offences. 80 The huge
number of state officials enmeshed in grand corruption offences shows it as a national problem
within a vicious circle of the political elites holding the rest of the Nigerian population captive.
This conforms to the doctrine of “state capture”.81 State capture is defined as ‘the undue and
illicit influence of the elite in shaping the laws, policies, and regulations of the state. In essence,
this form of capture translates into grand corruption’.82
In relation to former President, Goodluck Jonathan, Remi Adekoya argues that ‘Jonathan's
record on corruption is a disgrace’.83 A recent report from Human Rights Watch states that
‘endemic public sector corruption continued to undermine the enjoyment of social and
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not sanctioned even where El-Rufai’s allegation were not contested by the accused Senators. The former
President’s daughter, Iyabo Obasanjo Bello, a Senator of the Federal Republic was involved in two
separate scandals. In December, 2007, Iyabo Obasanjo Bello was involved in a contract scandal
amounting to N3.5 billion involving her and Mr Schneider, her foreign business partner. According to
the EFCC, the Senator used her mother’s maiden name, Akinlawon to conceal her identity in the
contract deal. Senator Iyabo Obasanjo, was again involved in another financial scandal of
mismanagement of funds in the Ministry of Health. It was this scandal that led to the resignation of
Mrs. Adenike Grange and her Deputy, Architect Gabriel Aduku’.
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economic rights in Nigeria’.84 Former President Jonathan did not deny that his administration
was undermined by systemic grand corruption as he has constantly referred to it as ‘common
stealing’.85 He has been accused by his political allies of only paying lip service while
encouraging corruption through his “body language”.86 Recently, Jonathan received a letter
from Obasanjo87 with ‘vitriolic criticisms, which include comparing Mr Jonathan’s rule to that
of the late General Sani Abacha, the widely hated former military dictator’.88 In the eighteen
page letter, Mr Obasanjo accused Mr Jonathan of failing to tackle Nigeria’s many problems, in
particular, the endemic grand corruption.89
Prominent among the grand corruption cases that emerged from former President Jonathan’s
regime includes the Police Pension Fund scam where 32.8 billion Naira (US$210 million
Dollars) belonging to the Police Pension Fund was embezzled by serving public officials.90
The porous public structure arguably made it possible for the highly placed public officers to
siphon off the pension fund. Moreover, in April 2012, the House of Representatives committee
investigating the fuel subsidy programme (between 2009 and 2012) released a report showing
the misappropriation of US$6 billion.91 Ironically, the chairman of the investigating committee,
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Mr Farouk Lawan, demanded a bribe totalling $3 million from the subsidy recipients, a
bargaining chip for influencing favourable committee recommendations. He is alleged to have
collected $500,000 of the $3 million bribe solicited from an oil tycoon to drop his company
from the investigation.92 Farouk has been charged with the offence93 but has continually filed
frivolous and vexatious challenges and petitions against the presiding judges in a bid to delay
the hearing and determination of his case.94
Moreover, revelations from the submitted investigative report into Nigeria's oil and gas
industry exposes the depth of corruption in the system. Aminu Tambuwal, a former speaker of
the National Assembly laments that ‘a total of 15 fuel importers collected more than $300m
two years ago without importing any fuel, while more than 100 oil marketers collected the
same amount of money on several occasions…officials in the government of former President
Goodluck Jonathan were among those who benefited from the subsidy fund’.95 Another leaked
report into the Nigerian oil and gas industry revealed a series of financial improprieties, in
particular, the report showed that ‘oil and gas companies owe the national treasury more than
$3bn in royalties…’.96 It emerged that between 2005 and 2011, another $566 million was owed
by companies for the right to exploit an oil block, known as “signature bonuses”.97
In another major grand corruption scandal, the government of former President Jonathan was
accused of shielding the former Petroleum Minister (Diezani Alison-Madueke) from audit and
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prosecution for diverting oil revenue totalling about $20 billion to her own use. Human Rights
Watch states that ‘In February 2014, the government suspended the then-Governor of the
Central Bank of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, on allegations of financial impropriety. Sanusi
had alleged large-scale corruption by the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, which the
government has yet to investigate’.98 To date, Sanusi insists on the veracity of his claims and
it took another corruption allegation, this time, made by another ex-governor of the Nigerian
Central Bank, Charles Soludo,99 for the former President Jonathan to declare publicly that he
has received the result of the forensic financial audit conducted by Price Water Coopers (PWC)
on Sanusi’s $20 billion dollar allegation. The forensic audit concludes that US$1.48billion was
misappropriated thereby giving credence to Sanusi’s allegation.100
The recent grand corruption case involving the stealing of N32.8 billion ($210m) from the
Police Pension Fund is a clear example of using proceeds of grand corruption to circumvent
the justice system.101 In the Police Pension Fund case, the perpetrator received a mere two-year
prison sentence or an option of a fine of N750, 000 ($4,740) supporting the argument that in
soft states, the worst perpetrators of corruption are often unlikely to face national justice.
Furthermore, the report of a further missing $20 billion oil revenue102 by the erstwhile Central
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Bank Governor and the indictment of the National Security Adviser (NSA), Colonel Sambo
Dasuki, for misappropriating and laundering billions of dollars intended for use in combating
the Boko Haram insurgency, epitomises the pervasiveness of grand corruption within the
system. According to a news report by the Punch newspaper in December 2015, the former
finance minister, Okonjo-Iweala agreed that she transferred $322 million from the looted funds
recovered from the late General Sani Abacha to the Office of the NSA for military operations
in the North-East. Reacting through her Media Adviser, Mr. Paul Nwabuikwu, Okonjo-Iweala
stated that the transfer of the funds was approved after a committee set up by former President
Jonathan gave approval for the use of the money and based on the decision of the committee,
she personally requested that part of the recovered fund be used for funding security operations
while the rest be channelled into developmental projects. There has not been any
official/independent audit report or gazette to confirm whether the developmental projects were
ever commenced. However, the outcome of the National Security office misappropriations
suggests that the entire fund were siphoned off. In contrast to this period, the disbursement of
previously recovered loot from the Abacha family (2005-2006) was closely monitored and a
World Bank report suggests that to a large extent, the recovered funds at the time may have
been channelled into government budgetary spending and some developmental projects.103
These events add up to expose how most Nigerian public offices and in particular, the office
of the National Security Adviser, colluded with oligarchs to consolidate their capture of the
state by ensuring that state departments become money laundering and financial conduit
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accessories from where state funds are siphoned off through imaginary projects linked to
national security and other white elephant projects. In this light, this thesis argues that “state
capture” results in a high level of corruption and remains a vicious cycle within official circles
in Nigeria. The controversies of impropriety around the Nigerian Centenary celebrations and
the on-going discovery of abandoned cash hauls in different states of Nigeria by the EFCC as
a result of the current whistle-blower motivation and reward policy of the government reaffirms
the pervasiveness of the grand corruption problem.104 The whistle-blower reward policy aims
at rewarding honest individuals who pass on vital confidential information regarding
misappropriated public funds to designated government bodies. When such information lead
to tracing and recovery of such funds, the individual receives monetary reward based on the
total amount of money reported and recovered.
Gray and Kaufmann have pointed out: ‘where there is systemic corruption, the institution
values, and norms of behaviour have already been adapted to a corruption modus operandi
…’.105 The postulations of Gray and Kaufmann to a large extent mirror the institutional malaise
prevalent in Nigeria as argued in this chapter, thereby reiterating the argument that grand
corruption is so pervasive in Nigeria that it permeates almost all aspects of the national life.
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2.6 Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Grand Corruption in Nigeria
The discussion of the endemic grand corruption in Nigeria is inadequate without the scrutiny
of the role played by multinational companies (MNCs) in facilitating and sustaining grand
corruption. Scholars argue that companies, especially multinationals, are the biggest
perpetrators and use a sophisticated network of notional companies and corporate structures to
facilitate corrupt practices in developing countries.106 In essence, grand corruption in Nigeria
is to a large extent sustained by the involvement and collusion of multinational corporations
operating within and outside Nigeria.107 The quest for global expansion, global competition
and profit maximisation underscores the multinational corporations’ exploitation of the
endemic corrupt administrations in Africa by offering huge bribes.108
Leslie Wayne states that ‘as business has gone global, so has graft, particularly as companies
in rich nations push into poorer regions’.109 The World Bank estimates that about $1 trillion in
bribes is paid annually to government officials.110 Jeffrey M. Kaplan, a U.S lawyer who
specialises in cases brought under the Foreign Corrupt Act, comments that ‘you are talking
about millions of dollars going to dictators who are selling their national patrimony in countries

S Kapoor, ‘Plugging the Leaks: A Very Short Paper on Curbing Capital Flight, Tax
Avoidance and Tax Evasion for International Policy Dialogue (2005) Organised by WEnt and the
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) <http://www.newrules.org/docs/kapoor4.pdf >accessed 15 March 2016; J Martens, ‘The Precarious State of Public
Finance; Tax evasion, Capital Flight and Misuse of Public Money in Developing Countries – and
What can be done about it’ (2007) Global Policy Forum, 1-54, Online <
http://www.globalpolicy.org/eu/en/publ/martens_precarious_finance_%20207.pdf >accessed 15
March 2016).
107
Olatunde Julius Otusanya, Sarah Lauwo, and Gbadeges Babatunde Adeyeye, ‘A Critical
Examination of the Multinational Companies’ Anti-Corruption Policy in Nigeria’ (2012)
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest.
108
ibid.
109
Leslie Wayne, ‘Hits, and Misses, in a War on Bribery’ New York Times (New York, 10
March 2012).
110
See < http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption> accessed 16
December 2016.
58
106

where you cannot even get clean water’.111 Kaplan argues, ‘bribery is endemic to the human
condition. If it cannot be rooted out, then you need to do something, and the FCPA is that’.112
This underscores why proper attention should be paid to the complicity of MNCs in fuelling
grand corruption in the developing world. One wonders what would have been the state of
affairs with U.S companies’ business interests abroad without the checks and intervention of
the Justice Department through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 1977. This is
identified because of a large number of indictments against U.S companies operating abroad
from FCPA-related violations. According to Otusany, Lauwo and Adeyeye, ‘in developing
African countries [Nigeria] many MNCs aggressively sought to increase their profits through
financial engineering and corruption’.113 The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group (AAPPG)
recounts that ‘in many cases, western companies and western agents have been guilty of
offering bribes to government officials to secure contracts and other advantages’. 114 TI adds
that bribe money often stems from multinationals based in the world’s richest countries.115
Otusanya, Lauwo and Adeyeye argue that this is worrisome considering that ‘a large amount
of corruption and bribery is also associated with the looting of countries by their rulers; a
process that frequently carries the fingerprints of corporations’.116 Incidentally, these funds are
re-looted by the political elites thereby contributing to capital flight in Africa, with more than
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$400 billion stashed away in overseas safe havens.117 Of the estimated $400 billion, around
$100 billion has been estimated to have originated from Nigeria.118
Ever since the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA- discussed extensively
in chapter four, section 4.5), there has been a series of revelations about US Corporations
making corrupt payments to foreign government officials to win business. Osoba notes that ‘in
1978, the US-based Lockheed Corporation had bribed political and military decision-makers
worldwide in order to induce them to buy their planes, Nigeria was the only country named as
a victim by the US Congress’.119 AAPPG,120 for example, draws attention to numerous cases
which demonstrate the role played by foreign companies in Africa in paying bribes and
facilitating other forms of grand corruption. The Halliburton bribery case in Nigeria featured
prominently as one of the examples given by AAPPG. Though Halliburton and its former
subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), agreed to the largest corruption settlement ever
paid by a US company under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) - $579 million –
their historic guilty plea was only the latest in a string of high-level bribery cases to secure
contracts in Nigeria.121
Halliburton and its subsidiary KBR allegedly paid $180 million to officials to secure a
construction contract for a liquefied natural gas plant on Bonny Island in the Niger
Delta. German industrial conglomerate Siemens also recently agreed to pay a $1.6
billion settlement to the US and European authorities for bribery of officials around the
world, including Nigeria. Willbros Incorporated, an oil services company, pleaded
guilty to criminal corruption offences under the FCPA, and the company consented to
117
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pay $32 million in penalties and disgorgement of profit for involvement in the bribery
of Nigerian government officials for pipeline contracts in the country. In October 2008,
Swiss oil services and logistics company Panalpina withdrew its business from Nigeria
following a bribery probe by the U.S. Department of Justice.122

Panalpina pulled out of Nigeria at a time the corporation was already enmeshed in another
bribery case involving SAGEM SA, a French company. This was a case concerning Nigeria's
national identity card scheme, whereby SAGEM allegedly dispensed more than $200 million
to senior government officials as bribes.123 According to the SEC Press Release, 26 April
2007,124 the US conglomerate Baker Hughes Incorporated, allegedly paid approximately $5.2
million to two agents as bribe inducement for officials in Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia, Russia,
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Baker Hughes Incorporated pleaded guilty to three charges of
corruption and was fined $44 million for hiring agents to bribe the aforementioned officials.
Royal Dutch Shell Plc pleaded guilty to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
agreed to pay $26 million in criminal fines in connection with the payments to Nigerian
customs officials through Courier Subcontractor to obtain preferential treatment during the
customs process.125According to another SEC report,126 Pride Forasol Drilling Nigeria Limited
and Somaser S. N. C., majority owned subsidiaries of Pride Forasol which operated in Nigeria
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played a key role in the bribery scheme designed by Pride’s managers by authorising illegal
payment through agents and tax consultants. Pride Forasol Nigeria through its agent paid
between $15,000 and $93,000 for Temporary Importation permits (TI), $15,000 for new TI
intervention and $35,000 for the importation of rigs without completing certain legally required
steps. In addition, Pride Forasol Nigeria, also paid $55,000 and $65,000 to the Rivers State
Internal Revenue and the Bayelsa State Internal Revenue tax officials to reduce the amount of
PAYE taxes. The sum of $52,000 was also paid to the Federal Inland Revenue Service of
Nigeria (FIRS) for resolution of VAT tax audit.127 Through these several bribery practices,
Pride was reported to have obtained improper benefits totalling approximately $19.3 million.
Pride was later indicted by the US SEC, for violating the provisions of the FCPA. As a
consequence, Pride agreed to pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $23,529,719 and
Pride and its subsidiary Pride Forasol agreed to pay a criminal fine of $32.625 million.128
Amidst these bribery scandals, it is pertinent to state that Section 9 (1) and (2) of the Corrupt
Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 expressly prohibits bribery of public officials.
Nonetheless, the MNCs have continued their complicity in bribery of public officials in
Nigeria. Nigeria has laws applicable to indigenous companies, however, the extent of the
applicability of the laws on MNCs complicity with grand corruption is uncertain. It is on record
that the charges and investigation of high-level corruption in Nigeria focus on public officials,
yet not much effort is applied to the investigation and prosecution of the MNCs who are the
supply source. For instance, when the public officials implicated in the Siemens scandal were
charged in court, the only thing the Nigeria government did to the MNC (Siemens) was to
suspend and revoke the 128.4 million Naira contract involved. Nigeria’s approach to MNC led
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corruption is lopsided. While the Nigerian government pursued and prosecuted some of the
officials involved in the corrupt practices listed above, the same aggressive prosecutorial drive
has not been extended to the MNCs. This research suggests that Nigeria should follow the
example of the US and aggressively pursue foreign companies for foreign-oriented domestic
corruption. Moreover, appropriate domestic laws should be enacted to fill the gap in the
legislation that has not apportioned the correct sanctions to MNCs found complicit in
corruption cases. The government should desist from actions that project its inactivity in
prosecuting MNCs as a national fear that corporate prosecution of the MNCs could lead to job
losses?129
It is also pertinent to note that the “collective action project” on corruption currently sponsored
by Siemens Global was started partly as a result of the Siemens bribery scandal in Nigeria and
the attendant sanctions by the World Bank and other regulatory bodies.130 The table below sets
out a list of some of the MNCs involved in high-profile bribery scandals in Nigeria who
received various fines from the SEC in the USA. Disgorgement means giving up profits
obtained by illegal acts and aims at discouraging unjust enrichment. In the cases in table 2.1,
the companies were involved in Nigeria corruption scandals and were fined for the illegal
profits which they paid back to the USA Treasury Department.
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Table 2.1: Lists of some MNCs charged with Corrupt Practices
NAME

EXTENT OF

DISGORGEMENT

OF COMPANY

BRIBE $

GLOBAL
SANTAFE CORP.

-

3,758,165

2.1 million

NOBLE CORP.

-

5,576,998

2.59 million

PRIDE INC.

2.7 million

23,529,718

32.625 million

TIDEWATER INC

1.6 million

8,321,362

7.35 million

TRANSOCEAN

-

7,265,080

13.44 million

DUTCH 3.5 million

18,149,459

30 million

11,329,369

70.56 million

& INTEREST $

CRIMINAL FINE
$

INC. -

ROYAL

SHELL PLC.

PANALPINA INC

-
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TOTAL

77,930,151

158.665 million

Source: Extracted from the US SEC Complaint and Administrative Proceedings 2010.

2.7 Conclusion
Human Rights Watch notes that Nigeria is reputed as one of the most disappointing performers
in sub-Saharan Africa due to the high incidence of public sector corruption.131 This has dented
the image of the state and may have driven away potential investors. Recently, grand corruption
has been blamed for the terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria.132 What actually went wrong?
Should the law be blamed?
Some scholars argue that the law as set out in the ICPC and EFCC Acts are impeccable. Ocheje
remarks ‘these laws, enshrined in Sections 9, 10, 12, 17 of the Corrupt Practices and Other
Related Offences Act (2000) are the most comprehensively drafted and tightly worded anticorruption pieces of legislation in the history of Nigeria’.133 If this is so, why has it been
difficult for the ICPC and EFCC to prosecute the high-profile corruption cases pending in
different courts in Nigeria? On a closer analysis, this research argues that one of the problems
associated with combating systemic grand corruption in Nigeria may be tied to using only
criminal law for prosecution. However, what is needed instead are ‘legal tools that empower
citizens to challenge corrupt actions and to recover stolen assets to national treasuries as a
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corollary to state investigations and prosecutions’.134 Ramasastry remarks that ‘if corruption is
seen only as a financial crime, then the state has the duty to prosecute wrongdoers rather than
to provide victims with rights to a remedy.135
Other scholars advocate strong political will from leaders as one of the ways to combat
systemic grand corruption in Nigeria.136 Osita Agbu affirms that ‘it is not that corruption has
not been recognised as the “enemy within,” it is, however, that the political will to begin to
tackle the problem in Nigeria has been non-existent…’.137 Strong political will, international
collaborations combined with citizen’s involvement through collective action138 programmes,
and structural reforms of political institutions are advanced as prerequisites in combating grand
corruption.139 Bearing in mind that an entrenched culture of corruption is exceedingly difficult
to transform, and no reform can completely eradicate corruption, Nigeria’s efforts need further
acceleration in meeting the challenges posed by endemic grand corruption.
Who then should be blamed for Nigeria’s systemic grand corruption? While there are many
suggestions on the methods to combat the endemic grand corruption in Nigeria, it remains an
indisputable fact that grand corruption ‘is cancer that eats deep into the fabrics of the economy,
politics and social life of the state’.140 In view of the historical facts, this research argues,
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alongside Tignor, that ‘a considerable amount of bribery, nepotism, and the use of political
office for personal enrichment did exist in late colonial Nigeria. Evidence of administrative
malfeasance was palpable, although public awareness was not automatic’.141 This unfortunate
trend has continued unabated and appears to be eating deep into the fabric of the nation. In
view of the arguments raised in this chapter, the next chapter analyses the Nigerian legal
instruments and the connection between corruption and human rights violations.

141

Tignor (n 1) 176.
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Chapter Three
Nigerian Legal Instruments and the Nexus between Corruption and Human Rights
3.1 Introduction
It is not the intention of this chapter to engage in the definitional quandary of human rights.1
However, the chapter relies on the definition proffered by the United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner Human Rights:
Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality,
place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or
any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without
discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.2

The effects of corruption in Nigeria are devastating, well discussed in the literature and
contradicts the basic guarantees of human rights as defined by OHCRC.3 Empirical findings
on the level of corruption in Nigeria from data obtained from the World Bank and the
Transparency International Indexes remain alarming.4

1

Attempts at endorsing a particular definition of human rights have repeatedly reflected
ideological, intellectual, political, moral and emotional disposition of definers and at times, could be
either too narrow or too broad to distil.
2
Office of the High Commissioner Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘What are Human Rights?’<
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx> accessed 20 July 2017.
3
ibid; See the speech given by former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan,
on the preamble United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) where the consequences of
corruption on the economy of states and human rights were clearly stated<
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf>
accessed 9 January 2015; Melvin D Ayogu and Julius Agbor, ‘Illicit Financial Flow and Stolen Assets
Value Recovery’ in S IbiAjayi and LeonceNdikumana (eds) Capital Flight In Africa, Causes, Effects,
and Policy Issues (Oxford University Press 2015) 359; Kolawole Olaniyan, Corruption and Human
Rights Law in Africa (Hart Publishing 2014) 163; Charles Carter, ‘Corruption and Global
Governance’ in Sophie Harman and David Williams (eds) Governing the World? Cases in Global
Governance (Routlegde 2013) 76.
4
See World Bank Governance Indicator (WGI) < http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria>
accessed 8 January 2016; Transparency International Corruption perception Index (CPI)<
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview> accessed 8 January 2016; Pogge (n1).
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Figure 3.1
(Source:
World Bank
2016)

(Source: World Bank, 2016)
Thomas Pogge writing on the imperative of maintaining the requisite human rights standards
by states suggests that ‘the preeminent requirement on all coercive institutional schemes is that
they afford each human being secure access to minimally adequate shares of basic freedoms
and participation, of food, drink, clothing, shelter, education, and health care’. 5 Pogge’s
postulation needs reassessment in view of its relevance to various human rights violations and
attendant deprivations which are often tied to endemic corruption in some states.
This chapter assesses the various legal instruments against corruption in Nigeria and attempts
to draw causal links between grand corruption and human rights violation. It interrogates why
the laws and the anti-corruption agencies are failing to combat corruption. What are the human
rights implications of grand corruption in Nigeria? What is the constitutional position on the

5

Thomas W Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and
Reforms (Cambridge Polity 2002) 51.
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justiciability of socio-economic rights? How have the judiciary intervened in achieving the
realisation of socio-economic rights? Could the justiciability of socio-economic rights assist in
facilitating transparency in the public sector and could it reduce the high incidence of grand
corruption in Nigeria? To analyse these issues, firstly, the chapter will provide some insight
into the legal instruments against corruption in Nigeria so as to serve as a foundational basis
for structuring the analysis. It will progressively develop the other sections of the chapter: the
Nigerian anti-corruption agencies; the structure and the failure of anti-corruption agencies in
Nigeria; universal human rights framework; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
and the justiciability of socio-economic rights in Nigeria. The conclusion contextualises a
critical assessment of these perspectives in accordance with the arguments developed.

3.2 Legal Instruments against Corruption in Nigeria
Nigeria has a wide range of legal instruments designed to combat corruption.6 Public officials
are legally required to work within the system of these frameworks that delineate the
boundaries of permissible conduct since the law, by ‘threatening sanctions for non-compliance,

6

Section 15 (5) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution provides that the state shall abolish corrupt
practices and abuse of office; Section 3 of the Fifth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution (part 1) outlaws
the operation of a foreign account by any public official; The Criminal Code and the Penal Code (The
Criminal Code Act,- Chapter 77 “section 98-99”); The Fifth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution
provides for a Code of Conduct for Public Officers at the federal and state levels (The Code of
Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act 1990). It was this provision that became the mandate for the
establishment of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal; Public Complaints Act, 1976 providing
for the establishment of the Public Complaints Commission; Corrupt Practices Act, 2000 led to the
establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission; Corrupt
Practices, the Money Laundering Act, 2004; Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(Establishment) Act, 2004; Due Process Offices were established at both the federal and state levels
of government to ensure compliance with standard procedures in the procurement and execution of
public contracts.
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seeks to constrain and guide the behaviour of public officials’.7 Given the state of systemic
corruption in the Nigerian public and private space, it remains a puzzle that the state with one
of the largest number of enacted anti-corruption laws and statutory bodies remains ravaged by
endemic grand corruption.
The agencies established with the sole aim of fighting corruption are:
a, The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission
(ICPC)8;
b, The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)9;
c, The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)10;
d, Technical Unit of Governance and Anti-Corruption Reform (TUGAR)11;
e, The Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEIT)12;
f, The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP)13;
g, Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU)14.
For the purpose of this chapter, the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences
Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) are
discussed. These are the specialised anti-corruption agencies with the statutory mandate to

Okechukwu Oko, ‘Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform Prospectus’
(2001-2002) N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol.424.
8
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 is the enabling legal instrument of
the The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC).
9
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act, 2004 is the legal basis
for the establishment of The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).
10
Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 1991 is the legal basis for the establishment of
the Code of Conduct Bureau.
11
Tugar is an ad hoc government department established to respond to the critical need for a
dedicated institution or department to monitor the ongoing anti-corruption and governance initiatives,
evaluate both the structure and their output for impact, access public feedback, and generate empirical
data which will feed into the policy framework, and enable reforms.
12
The Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act 2007 underscores the
establishment of the Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI).
13
The Public Procurement Act, 2007 is the legal basis for the establishment of the Bureau of
Public Procurement.
14
The establishment of the NFIU is based on the requirements of Recommendation 29 of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards and Article 14 of the United Nations Convention
against Corruption (UNCAC). NFIU remains an autonomous agency domiciled within EFCC.
7
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investigate and prosecute large scale public sector corruption. Most of the other agencies
mentioned above perform services ancillary to the realisation of the objectives of ICPC and
EFCC. Most importantly, the EFCC and the ICPC are permanent and, it is assumed
independent bodies, whereas the ‘traditional law enforcement agencies like the police and state
justice officials are plagued by corruption themselves and are often susceptible to political and
ethnic pressures’.15

3.3 Nigeria Anti-corruption Agencies (Structure and Failures)
3.3.1 The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission
(ICPC)
The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission was established
on the 29th of September, 2000 on the legal platform of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related
Offences Act 2000 (the ‘ICPC Act, 2000’). This legislation prohibits and prescribes
punishment for corrupt practices. The ICPC is the pioneer agency at the vanguard of Nigeria’s
fight against corruption having been invested with the duty to receive complaints, investigate
and prosecute offenders. Other duties include education and enlightenment of the public about
and against bribery, corruption and related offences. The ICPC also has the task of reviewing
and modifying the activities of public bodies, where such practices may aid corruption.16 As
provided for in section 3(3) of the ICPC Act 2000, the ICPC consists of a Chairman and twelve
(12) Members, two of whom represent each of the six geo-political zones of the country.17

15

Oko (n 7) 444.
See The ICPC’s website <http://icpc.gov.ng/icpc-history/> accessed 10 January 2016.
17
The zones in Nigeria are South- East, South -West, South-South, North - West, North East
and North Central.
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The duties of the ICPC are set out in section 6 (a-f) of the ICPC Act 2000:
To receive and investigate complaints from members of the public on allegations of
corrupt practices, and, in appropriate cases, prosecute the offenders; to examine the
practices, systems and procedures of public bodies and where such systems aid
corruption, to direct and supervise their review; to instruct, advise and assist any officer,
agency, or parastatal on ways by which fraud or corruption may be eliminated or
minimized by them; to advise heads of public bodies of any changes in practice, systems
or procedures compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of public bodies to
reduce the likelihood or incidence of bribery, corruption and related offences; to
educate the public on and against bribery, corruption and related offences; to enlist and
foster public support in combating corruption.18
The ICPC chairman is vested with additional powers, including the power to seize movable
property in the custody or control of a bank or financial institution, where the property is the
subject of any investigation under the ICPC Act;19 the power to obtain information from any
person including relatives, associates and their banks suspected of having committed an offence
under the ICPC Act 2000;20 and the power to make an application to Court to prohibit any
person from dealing with any property which is the subject matter of an offence under the Act,
where the property is held or deposited outside Nigeria.21 The ICPC Act 2000 collectively
established and redefined nine offences relating to corrupt practices and abuse of office:
• Accepting gratification (section 8).
• Fraudulent acquisition of property (section 12).
• Fraudulent receipt of property (section 13).
• Making a false statement or return (section 16).
• Bribing a public officer (section 8).
• Use of office or position for gratification (section 19).
• Bribery in relation to auction (section 21).
• Bribery in relation to contracts (section 22).

18

ICPC (n 8) Section 6.
ibid Section 45.
20
ICPC ( n 8) Section 44
21
ibid Article 46.
19
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• Failure to report bribery transactions (section 23).

The ICPC has the sole mandate to prosecute corruption committed in public offices, even
without the benefit of a prior petition. The general view had been that ICPC could only initiate
prosecutions upon receipt of petitions through the general public or the Public Complaints
Commission. This general perception about ICPC hampered its ability to prosecute a lot of
potential corruption cases for a long time. However, in a landmark decision in FRN v Alhaji
Zakari Sani and Alhaji Abdullahi Amore22, Hon. Justice Obande F. Ogubuinya of the Court of
Appeal, Markurdi on 2 May 2014 made far-reaching pronouncements on the powers of ICPC
as provided for in sections 6 [a] and 27 [3] of the Act. The Court notes that ‘a petition is just a
guide and it is not ultra vires the powers of the commission to investigate and prosecute
offences outside a petition or initiate investigations and prosecutions without a petition’.23
According to the ICPC, ‘the implication of this landmark judicial pronouncement by the
justices of the Court of Appeal has now laid to rest the misconception in some quarters as to
whether the ICPC can initiate investigations without relying on petitions’.24
The ICPC-originated convictions up to 2015 show that despite having the legal mandate to
investigate, arrest and prosecute without the need for a petition, ICPC has been unable to
convict a substantial number of offenders. For instance, the ICPC’s most up to date criminal
case database records that most of the cases are stalled due to court bureaucracy. The ICPC
Monitor magazine25 summarised the cases in courts between 2001 and 2008 as a total number

22

[2014] NWLR 16 (pt 1433) CA/MK/16C/2012.
ibid; See ‘ICPC can prosecute without petitions – Court of Appeal Rules’
<http://icpc.gov.ng/icpc-can-prosecute-without-petitions-court-appeal-rules/#sthash.H0revtKs.dpuf>
accessed 22 May 2016.
24
ibid.
25
ICPC (n 8) ICPC’s Monitor Magazine (2008) 8.
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of 146 cases involving 277 persons, out of all these (146) cases, only 15 convictions were
obtained. Likewise, the status of criminal cases as of March 2015 show that the trend of 20012008 is still sustained.26 The heavy backlog of corruption-related cases27 in Nigerian courts is
indicative of the endemic corruption that has permeated even the judicial system. Former
President Jonathan was aware of this when he stated in his letter to former Nigeria President,
Obasanjo, ‘I can hardly be blamed if the wheels of justice still grind very slowly in our country,
but we are doing our best to support and encourage the judiciary to quicken the pace of
adjudication in cases of corruption’.28 It cannot be argued that the prosecution department of
the ICPC is not competent enough to drive the cases to the conclusion based solely on the
testimony of the former President. This research argues that the collusion of corrupt politicians
with corrupt judicial staff facilitates the use of legal technicalities that frustrate the prosecution
of such cases.29 However, although the ICPC has arraigned a number of prominent Nigerians
such as ‘Ghali Umar Na’Abba, former Speaker of the House of Representatives (2002), Fabian
Osuji, Head of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Education (2006), Cornelius Adebayo, Head
of the Federal Ministry of Communication and Transportation (2007) and Vincent Ogbulafor,
PDP National Chairman (2010), no one among them has been convicted’.30

26

See < file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/STATUS-OF-CRIMINAL-CIVIL-CASES-AS-ATMARCH-2015-PART-1%20(3).pdf> accessed 01 November 2016.
27
See file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/STATUS-OF-CRIMINAL-CIVIL-CASES-AS-ATMARCH-2015-PART-1%20(1).pdf> accessed 08 October 2016.
28
See ‘President Jonathan’s Reply to Obj’s Letter’ This Day (Abuja, 23 December 2013).
29
A Nigerian High Court Judge, Justice Abubakar Talba was sanctioned by the Judicial
Service Commission for complicity in the “Pension Fund Fraud case” (Esai Dangabar v FRN [2012]
LPELR-19732 (CA). Recently, Justice Adeniyi Ademola of the Abuja Division High Court is charged
to court by the Federal Government for corruption related offences involving huge sums of bribe
money; see Ikechukwu Nnochiri ‘Judicial Corruption: FG Slams 15-Count Charges on Justice
Ademola, Wife’ Vanguard (Abuja, 15 November 2016).
30
Johnson Nna Nekabari and Adeniran Jacob Oni, ‘The Institutional Approach to Anti-graft
Crusade: The Case of The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission in Nigeria’ (2012) African
Journal of Social Sciences Volume 2 Number 1 116-129, ISSN 2045-8460 (Online) 125.
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Nekabari and Oni argue that ‘the greatest obstacle to the activities of ICPC …in eradicating
corruption in recent times has been the incessant withdrawals of case files of criminal charges
against very privileged persons and politically exposed persons by the Attorney General and
Minister of Justice Mr Mohammed Bello Adoke…’.31 ‘Adoke, has within the last eight months
of his tenure withdrawn about 25 high-profile cases …the most recent was his letter dated 28
January 2011, to the acting chairman of ICPC calling for the withdrawal of Minister of State
for Health, Mr Suleiman Bello’s case file who was alleged to have received N11.2 million from
Governor Murtala Nyako …’.32 The incessant withdrawal of high-profile cases is often tied to
the interference from the Attorney-General’s and presidency offices and is denting the image
of the ICPC and casting doubt on its competence to carry out its statutory functions.
On the positive side, the ICPC has recovered huge sums of money from corrupt public officials.
ICPC recovered N20.1 million Naira from some staff of the Federal Government College,
Odogbulu, Ogun State in 2016.33 ICPC also recovered lost N23 billion pension funds stashed
away illegally in forty different bank accounts.34 They also recovered N497 million as accrued
interest from the recovered N23 billion lost pension funds accounts.35 A total of N11 billion
was discovered as funds misappropriated from the customs, prisons and immigrations pension
funds in 2016. The funds were scattered in 10 different accounts and the ICPC was able to
consolidate them into three accounts.36 These recoveries indicate that given the proper structure
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ibid 125; Section 174 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria gives the Attorney General
prosecutorial powers in criminal matters. However, events in Nigeria has led to uncontrolled abuse of
such powers. Mr Adoke represents one of such Attorney generals in Nigeria that took controversial
stance on grand corruption cases.
32
Nekabari and Oni (n 30) 125.
33
See ICPC News, April 2016, 8 file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/ICPC-News-Vol-11-No-2April-2016%20(2).pdf> 05 October 2016.
34
See ICPC News, January 2016,5 file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/ICPC-News-Vol-11-No1-January-2016%20(1).pdf> accessed05 October2016.
35
ibid 5.
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and administrative competence, the ICPC could contribute robustly to the mission of combating
grand corruption in Nigeria.

3.3.2 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
Former President Olusegun Obasanjo established the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) three years after the establishment of the ICPC. The EFCC
(Establishment) Act of 2004 mandates the EFCC to combat financial and economic crimes.
The EFCC is empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise economic and
financial crimes and is charged with enforcing the provisions of other laws and regulations
relating to economic and financial crimes including: money laundering, embezzlement,
bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deals, smuggling, human
trafficking, child labour, illegal oil bunkering, illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange
malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy,
open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes, and prohibited goods.37 The EFCC is also
responsible for identifying, tracing, freezing, confiscating, or seizing the proceeds derived from
terrorist activities. EFCC is also host to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), vested
with the responsibility of collecting suspicious transaction reports (STRs) from financial and
designated non-financial institutions, analysing and disseminating them to all relevant
government agencies and other Financial Intelligent Units all over the world.38
The EFCC from the onset has been at the forefront of the government’s anti-corruption project.
The EFCC has investigated and prosecuted a number of high-profile cases, securing
37

EFCC Establishment Act, (2004) Article 46<https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/> accessed 20
November 2016.
38
ibid.
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convictions for some of them. Nevertheless, the EFCC is faced with the challenge of remaining
an unbiased commission in the midst of political intrigues, monetised politics and judicial
impropriety. People have criticised EFCC for not doing enough to stop the endemic grand
corruption in Nigeria. This is argued, because, irrespective of the legislative and executive
backing, the EFCC has performed relatively less efficiently than the Hong Kong system on
which it was modelled.
The EFCC is also criticised for over-reliance on “plea bargaining”, a notorious bargain chip
regularly used by the EFCC in obtaining settlement of most of the high-profile cases.39 It
appears that in Nigeria, official kleptocrats rely on “plea bargaining” as a legal way of
circumventing the full legal sanctions for engaging in corrupt acts. Plea bargaining, a practice
common in America, is a legal process that allows ‘prosecutors and trial judges offer
defendants concessions in exchange for their pleas’40 it consists of ‘the exchange of official
concessions for a defendant’s act of self-conviction’.41 One of the most prominent corrupt
families in Nigeria, the Abacha clan, is known to have bargained in 2002 to keep $1billion in
return for handing over $100 billion of the Abacha looted funds to the federal government.42
While this settlement defeats good moral principle, transparency and accountability, the
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Plea bargain featured in the seminal grand corruption case involving a former Nigerian
Police chief, Tafa Balogun, in 2003. EFCC used the instruments of plea bargaining in mitigating his
prison sentence to six months with a fine of N4 million (Naira) after embezzling $128 Million of the
Police fund. See also Federal Republic of Nigeria v Alamieyeseigha [2006] 16 NWLR (Pt 1004) Pg
123; and Federal Republic of Nigeria v Lucky Igbinedion [2014] LPELR-22760 (CA).
40
Albert W Alschuler, ‘Plea Bargaining And its History’ (1979) Columbia law Review Vol
79 no 1, 1.
41
ibid 3.
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Robert Rotberg (ed), When States Fail (Princeton University Press) 214.
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Nigerian government was happy to agree to the deal, arguing that ‘they saved Nigeria
exorbitant legal fees and ended an endless case’.43
The EFCC recently published the “High-Profile, Oil Subsidy, ETC Matters Being Prosecuted
by EFCC”.44 This was in reaction to public calls for the EFCC to justify the existence of the
anti-corruption agency in the light of the pervasive nature of grand corruption in Nigeria.45 The
publication showed inconclusive cases which EFCC claims they have made appreciable gains
in commencing of prosecutions. However, Human Rights Watch disagrees with the purported
gains of EFCC’s “profile cases” arguing that ‘in terms of pure numbers, the sum total of the
EFCC convictions of nationally prominent political figures is underwhelming: a mere four
convictions in eight years - between 2003 and July 2011. This represents less than 5% of the
total high-profile corruption cases between 2003 and 2011’.46 This research argues, like
Human Rights Watch, that the prolonged list of inconclusive cases casts serious doubt on the
ability of the EFCC to bring such cases to logical ends.
Thus, while the existence of these legal frameworks directly confirms the pervasive nature of
grand corruption in Nigeria, the legal frameworks have not been effective in combating grand
corruption. The question is why is this so? Would it be a question of enforcement of the law or
Jubril Olabode Oke, Great Presidents of Nigeria’s 4th Republic: Democratic Nigeria from
1999 (Trafford Publishing 2012) 345; John Hatchard, Combating Corruption: Legal Approaches to
Combating Good Governance and Integrity in Africa (Edward Elgar) 175.
44
See EFCC Website on ‘High Profile, Oil Subsidy, ETC Matters Being prosecuted by
EFCC’ <
https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/images/HIGH%20PROFILE%20CASES%20BEING%20PROSECUTED
%20BY%20THE%20EFCC%20FOR%20%20%20%20%20%20%20AG.pdf> accessed 18 December
2016; E Inyang, Z Peter, N O Ejor, ‘The Causes of the Ineffectiveness of Selected Statutory AntiCorruption Establishments in Fraud Prevention and Control in The Nigerian Public Sector’ (2014)
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) Vol.5, No.5. 168.
45
Mohammed Usman, ‘Corruption in Nigeria: A Challenge to Sustainable Development in
The Fourth Republic’ (2013) European Scientific Journal February 2013 edition vol.9, No.4 e - ISSN
1857- 7431.
46
Human Rights Watch, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission (New York 2011).
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issues with the legal framework? Oko argues that the laws on corruption in Nigeria are carefully
crafted and issues of pervasive corruption have nothing to do with legal drafting.47 Oko
reiterates that ‘Combating corruption, especially in a country like Nigeria where it is endemic,
pervasive, and deep-rooted, must involve much more than the promulgation of laws and setting
up an independent commission. To be effective, an anticorruption regime must involve
multifaceted strategies that address the underlying structural and social problems that spur
corruption’.48 Olaniyan argues differently insisting that the fight against corruption in Nigeria
fails because ‘… these acts are nearly always approached from a criminal law and enforcement
dimension … ,’49 devoid of human right ingredients that put the victims in focus with
guarantees for their human rights protection. Olaniyan further posits that the application of
such a “restrictive approach” is fundamentally flawed, the ‘approach has proved counterproductive, thus making durable and sustainable solutions to the problem elusive’.50 Olaniyan
further criticises the justice system for paying lip service to the prosecution of corruption in
Nigeria, adding that ‘comparatively, few high-ranking officials are prosecuted, and corruption
cases that are taken to court proceed at a snail’s pace and serve no more than a symbolic
purpose’.51 The process of “plea bargain” was further cited also by Inyang, Peter and Ejor as
an impediment to combating corruption in Nigeria. Through this process, indicted corrupt
officials merely relinquish a part of their loots while still enjoying the remainder, and at the
same time evade prison terms.52 This sends the wrong signal to the public that, after all, it is
still profitable to be corrupt. Human Rights Watch identifies cases against, Tafa Balogun, the
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former police Chief, Lucky Igbinedon, former Edo State governor, Diepreye Alamieyesiegha
former governor of the oil-rich Bayelsa State and Chief Olabode George, the Chairman of the
Nigerian Ports Authority as among the key plea bargain cases that involved dropping some of
the most serious charges against the accused.53 EFCC argues differently, its acting chairman,
Ibrahim Magu stated that:
One of the big challenges we have in the effective prosecution of the war on
corruption is that of very senior lawyers who Nigeria has been very kind
to...When we have corruption cases, cases of people who have stolen food from
the mouths of our children; when we have cases of people who have stolen
money meant to build hospitals and buy drugs. When we have cases of people
who have stolen all the money meant to buy guns for our soldiers to fight Boko
Haram, when we have all these cases of wicked people who have stolen
Nigeria’s money, they run to these same senior lawyers…Give them part of the
stolen money and mobilise them to fight us, to delay us in court and to deny
Nigerians of justice. These are the people who do not want justice for the
common man.54
The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) observed that the
government is not committed to the anti-corruption agencies. SERAP avers that the
government meddles with the statutory roles of the anti-corruption agencies to the extent that
‘governments have not allowed them to perform their statutory duties independently and
effectively’.55 In other words, by implication, anti-corruption frameworks and agencies may be
gimmicks employed by some states as ploys for attracting donor funds, whereas there is no
evidence of political will to back the anti-corruption projects.56 Some writers argue strongly
that regimes without strong political will to combat grand corruption are totally dishonest with
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their intentions.57 For instance, Paul Okojie and Abubakar Momoh opine that anti-corruption
laws and initiatives fail because ‘countries enter into bilateral or multilateral treaties on anticorruption without a sincere desire to implement them. Therefore, “donor treaties” proliferate
for the purpose of satisfying the demands of international financiers’.58 This research argues
that the failure of the anti- corruption agencies, aside from discriminatory prosecutorial
practices, is mostly tied to the deficiency of laws that exclude human rights considerations by
emphasising criminal law procedures.59

3.4 Corruption and Human Rights in Nigeria
Human rights represent the ‘vision of creating conditions whereby persons and cultures may
be free from persecution and deprivation’.60 This remains a ‘common denominator for
advocates and critics alike’.61 The concept of human rights has been described as ‘one of the
greatest inventions of civilisation [which] can be compared to its impact on human social life
to the development of modern technological resources and their application to medicine,
communication and transportation’.62
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The entrenched interdependent, interrelated and indivisible guarantees of human rights
jurisprudence raise salient questions around the human rights realisation, especially in Africa.
Within the ambit of this research, such questions are: How can a human rights-based approach
deliver meaningful improvements to the corruption crisis in Africa? Has the human rights
agenda become more relevant to the needs of Africans or is it overtly tilted to western concepts?
The subsequent sections in this chapter will address these issues.

3.5 Universal Human Rights Framework
Human rights are universal, inalienable, indivisible, interrelated and interdependent. To violate
the human right of someone else is to treat that person as though they were not a human being.
Meaning that advocating for human rights is demanding respect for the human dignity of all
people.63
According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘universal human rights
are often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international
law, general principles and other sources of international law. The International human rights
law lays down obligations on Governments to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain
acts, in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals or
groups’.64
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The United Nations Charter (‘UN Charter’) promotes universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination as to race, sex, language
or religion.65 The UN Charter upholds the equal rights of men and women.66 Following the UN
Charter, three major international instruments commonly referred to as the International Bill
of Human Rights were adopted.67 They are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).68 The UDHR is
‘the first authoritative international footprint on the path towards the collective affirmation by
the international community to the supremacy of the human being over man-made
institutions’.69 Thus, the global recognition of human rights started with the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on ‘10 December 1948 with 48 votes in
favour, none against and eight abstentions’.70 The ‘UDHR was adopted by Resolution 217
(111) which consists of five parts … the Declaration has 30 articles covering the most important
fundamental human rights’.71 Subsequently, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration as
‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’.72 While the declaration is
clearly not a treaty and therefore lacks any enforcement provisions, it is a set of principles to
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which United Nation Member States are obliged to show commitment for the sake of
guaranteeing human dignity. Moreover, over the past 50 years, the UDHR has acquired the
status of customary international law. However, governments have not applied this customary
law equally. According to Joshua Castellino, an internal divide among opposing ideologies
during ‘the negotiation and deliberations stages at the Commission on Human Rights, resulted
in the bifurcation of the human rights agenda into civil and political rights on the one hand, and
economic, social and cultural rights on the other’.73 Vinodh Jaichand states that ‘civil and
political rights have been unfortunately referred to as the “first generation” of human rights
while economic, social and cultural rights are the so-called “second generation” … This
nomenclature is unfortunate because it has the effect of prioritising rights, one right over the
other and which is detrimental to all human rights.74 Most states, including Nigeria, despite
ratification of the ICESR, still treat socio-economic rights as non-justiciable rights.75
The treatment of socio-economic rights as mere rights to be progressively realised has created
judicial impasse as well as an untold hardship to the people, leading to the questions on why
sustain the narrow definition of human rights? This is also boosting the campaign to place
socio-economic rights on par with civil and political rights. Francis Moore argues that the ‘right
to eat is as fundamental as the right not to be tortured or jailed without charges’.76 Accordingly,
in 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action sought to correct this misperception
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by restating the original intent that ‘all human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated’.77

3.6 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981)
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter ‘The African Charter’) was
‘adopted in June 1981 at the 18th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the OAU’.78
The African Charter is a robust and innovative human rights document aimed at the promotion
and protection of human rights and basic freedoms in the continent of Africa. Known popularly
as the “Banjul Charter”, the African Charter substantially departs from the narrow formulations
of other regional and universal human rights instruments like the European Convention on
Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights by fully recognising civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights. The 68 articles of the Charter are divided into
four chapters: Human and Peoples’ Rights; Duties; Procedure of the Commission; and
Applicable Principles. The Protocol to the ‘African Charter’ on the establishment of an African
Court of Human Rights was adopted in 1998.
The Protocol came into effect on 20 May 2004.79 As of 6 October 2016, fifty-three countries
have ratified the African Charter, fifty-four African countries are State Parties while twentyfour Member States have ratified the Protocol. The Charter ties the concepts of human rights
to peoples’ rights and duties on individuals. The African Charter is an amalgam of three
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“generations” of rights: civil and political rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; and
group and peoples’ rights.80
According to Chowdhury, Shasthri and Bhuiyan, ‘African Charter reflects a high degree of
specificity due in particular to the African conception of the term “right” and the place it
accords to the responsibilities of human beings’.81 African conception of the term right involves
the peculiar way Africans conceive human rights by incorporating the ethnic diversities,
traditional values, duties and culture of the continent as embodiment of the concept and
principles of human rights. Richard Kiwanuka argues that ‘even in its imperfect form, the
Banjul Charter is still the source of hope for a much needed system of international protection
of human rights in Africa’.82 However, Mutua criticised the imposition of duties on individual
members of African societies as the most controversial provisions of the African Charter.83
This research argues likewise that the imposition of duties on individual members of African
societies hampers the full realisation of human rights as by imposing such duties on individuals,
the Charter indirectly empowers the States to use the pretence of such duties to derogate on
certain human rights. Kiwanuka gave an example of such derogation as ‘the freedom of
movement (art 12) could be derogated by the duty to place one’s physical and intellectual
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abilities at the service of the national community (art 29, par 2)’.84 Article 29 (1) indirectly
passes the state’s welfare responsibilities to individuals by suggesting that ‘ … to respect his
parents at all times; to maintain them in case of need …’.85 Moreover, due to the various
cultural and religious trajectories of Africa, what is permissible in one state could be a taboo in
another state, and this being the case, it becomes impossible to achieve a normative human
rights standard with such impositions.
Despite the human rights guarantees given by the African Charter, it is confronted with several
drawbacks. Mutua states that ‘perhaps the most serious flaw in the African Charter concern its
“claw-back” clauses. These clauses permeate the African Charter and permit African states to
restrict basic human rights to the maximum extent allowed by domestic law’.86 Mutua further
asserts:
This is especially significant because most domestic laws in Africa date
from the colonial period and are therefore highly repressive and draconian.
The post-colonial state, like its predecessor, impermissibly restricts most
civil and political rights, particularly those pertaining to political
participation, free expression, association and assembly, movement, and
conscience. Ironically, it is these same rights that the African Charter
further erodes.87
Vincent Nmehielle asserts that ‘the effect of claw-back clauses as expressed in the African
Charter is that it seriously emasculates the effectiveness of the Charter as well as its uniform
application by member states’.88 Nmehielle reasons that ‘instead of the Charter having primacy,
the various national laws of the member states actually assume a primary place … the
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effectiveness of the Charter will thus be reduced since it would appear to be subject to national
standards as laid down by domestic law’.89
The African Charter does not provide any right of derogation for the States Parties in public
emergencies.90 This omission according to Mutua ‘is all the more serious because the Charter
in effect permits states through the “claw-back” clauses to suspend, de facto, many fundamental
rights in their municipal law’.91 Mutua recommends inserting a ‘provision on non-derogable
rights, and another specifying which rights states can derogate from, when, and under what
conditions’.92 This suggestion would add substance to the Charter and could enhance the
realisation of human rights in Africa.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the serious human rights abuses associated with most
dictators in Africa brought the need for a regional human rights framework. The distinctive
contributions of the African Charter to the human rights corpus, which include the concept of
duty and the inclusion of the “three generations” of rights in one instrument makes it a unique
framework. Yet, the lack of robust enforcement mechanisms to date remains a factor
undermining the realisation of the Charter.

3.7 Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights in Nigeria
There are numerous scholarly engagement on the justiciability of socio-economic rights in
Nigeria and this centres on legality of judicial interpretation and the competence of courts to
arbitrate on it. While socio-economic rights form an important part of the rights currently
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enunciated in the Nigerian Constitution, its realisation, unlike civil and political rights has
remained a subject of contention. Research has also tied the endemic corruption in Nigeria as
part of the obstacle impeding the justiciability of socio-economic rights.93 The International
Council on Human Rights explains further:
Corruption implies that the state is not taking steps in the right direction. When
funds are stolen by corrupt officials, or when access to health care, education
and housing is dependent on bribes, a state’s resources are clearly not being
used maximally to realise economic and social cultural rights.94
Justiciability of socio-economic rights simply refers to whether or not a duty exists to facilitate
judicial remedies if a violation of socio-economic right has occurred. Justiciability or
enforceability raises the question: if the executive arm of government refuses to provide
facilities guaranteed by socio-economic rights, are there rights under the Nigerian Constitution
to approach the courts for a judicial remedy? While the debate on the enforcement mechanisms
for socio-economic and civil and political rights continues, emerging case law indicates that
socio-economic rights are becoming realisable in some jurisdictions.95 The 1979 Constitution
of Nigeria is credited as the first Constitution of Nigeria to contain provisions on “Fundamental
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy”. Thereafter, it was restated in Chapter II
of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria still retaining the title “Fundamental Objectives and
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Directive Principles of State Policy”. This section of the constitution is core to the realisation
of socio-economic rights and consists of 12 sections (Sections 13 to 18).96
The key constitutional provision in Nigeria, establishing the non-justiciability principle is
Section 6 (6) (c) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution:
The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of
this section (c) shall not except as otherwise provided by this
Constitution, extend to any issue or question as to whether any act of
omission by any authority or person or as to whether any law or any
judicial decision is in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and
Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of this
Constitution.97
Accordingly, section 6 (6) (C) rendered Chapter II non-justiciable. Historically the Court of
Appeal in Archbishop Anthony Okogie and Others v The Attorney-General of Lagos State98
had the first opportunity to define the judicial attitude in the adjudication of socio-economic
rights based claims. The facts of the case related to a circular dated 26 March 1980 and issued
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by the Lagos state government purportedly abolishing private primary education in the state.
Archbishop Okogie and others relying on the relevant provisions of the 1979 constitution
challenged the circular as unconstitutional on the grounds that:
•
•
•

It violated their rights to participate in sectors of the economy other than the major
sectors of the economy (S. 16(1) (c), a ‘non-justiciable’ section of the of the 1979
Constitution).
the responsibility of the Government to provide equal and adequate educational
opportunities at all levels is restricted to government but does not preclude the plaintiffs
(i.e. private sector) from providing educational services; (S. 18, CFRN, 1979).
It violated their constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right to hold opinions, receive
and impart ideas without interference (S. 36(1) of the 1979 Constitution, an expressly
identified justiciable section of the Constitution).99

Their application filed in the Federal Court of Appeal by Archbishop Okogie and others raised
among others the questions:
Whether or not the provision of educational services by a private citizen or organization
comes under the classes of economic activities outside the major sectors of the economy
in which every citizen of Nigeria is entitled to engage in and whose right so to do the
state is enjoined to protect within the meaning of section 16(1) (c) of the Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.100
Justice Mamman Nasir in his ruling set out the rationale for Directive Principles of State Policy
as aimed to identify the ultimate objectives of the nation and lay down the policies which are
expected to be pursued in the nation’s quest to realise its objectives. Justice Nasir also examined
the contradictory provisions of sections 13 and 6 (6) (c) of the 1979 Constitution and concluded
that:
While Section 13 ... makes it a duty and responsibility of the judiciary among other
organs of government, to conform to and apply the provisions of Chapter II, Section
6(6)(c) of the same Constitution makes it clear that no court has jurisdiction to
pronounce any decision as to whether any organ of government has acted or is acting
in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles. It is clear that
section 13 has not made chapter II justiciable.101
99
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Justice Nasir underlined that ‘the obligation of the judiciary to observe the provisions of chapter
II is limited to interpreting the general provisions of the Constitution or any other statute in
such a way that the provisions of the chapter are observed ... subject to the express provision
of the Constitution’.102 The judge also clarified ‘the arbiter for any breach of and guardian of
the fundamental objectives ... is the legislature itself or the electorate’103 as ‘it is clear from the
provisions of section 4(2) and item 59(a) of the Exclusive Legislative List in the Second
Schedule to the Constitution’104 that the National Assembly ‘has the duty to establish
authorities which shall have the power to promote and enforce the observance of chapter II of
the Constitution’.105 Until such authorities are established, it will be ‘mere speculation to say
which functions they may perform or in which way they may be able to enforce the provisions
of chapter II’.106 The rulings in Okogie’s case emphasised that the courts had no intention to
make socio-economic rights justiciable even though the court acknowledged that it was
amenable to the Plaintiffs strictly on the basis that sections 16(1) (c) and 18 of the Constitution
guarantee their rights to undertake business enterprises within the economy and hindering them
would amount to a violation of their fundamental rights under Section 36 of the 1979
Constitution. The court held that fundamental rights in chapter 1V of the 1979 Constitution are
superior to Directive principles in chapter 11 of the same Constitution.
The rulings on other prominent cases decided after Archbishop Okogie and others including:
Oronto Douglas v Shell Petroleum Development Company Limited (case on environmental
protection);107 Aiyeyemi and Others v The Government of Lagos State and Others (case on the
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planned eviction of the former Maroko, Lagos residents);108 Mojekwu v Mojekwu;109 Bello v
Attorney General of Oyo State110 and Ukeje v Ukeje111 showed that justiciability of socioeconomic rights remain elusive in Nigeria.
However at the regional level, the reliance on the provisions of the African Charter provided
an alternative route towards exploring the realisation of socio-economic rights in Nigeria. The
African Charter112 ratified on 22 June 1983 is now part of the municipal laws of Nigeria113
having been incorporated at the sub-constitutional level complies with section 12 (1) of the
1999 Constitution of Nigeria.114 The African Charter upholds the justiciability of socioeconomic rights,115 and has in paragraph 8 of the preamble foreclosed the ideological rift
between socio-economic rights and civil and political rights by stating that: ‘ … civil and
political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their
conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural
rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights …’.116
The jurisprudence of the African Charter was tested in the Supreme Court case of Abacha v
Fawehinmi,117 a case about the use of the African Charter on the enforcement of fundamental
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rights arising from the unlawful arrest and detention of the human rights lawyer and activist,
chief Gani Fawehinmi by the military government at the time. The main issue that faced the
Supreme Court of Nigeria was ‘the value of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
in the domestic legal system. The Supreme Court held that the African Charter which is
incorporated into Nigerian laws remains binding and Nigerian courts must give effect to it like
all other laws falling within the judicial powers of the courts. However, the Supreme Court
emphasised that the provisions of the African Charter are not superior to the Nigerian
Constitution.118 The ruling of the Supreme Court in Abacha v Fawehinmi raised a critical legal
point that socio-economic rights in Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution are enforceable
under the African Charter but are unfortunately not justiciable in Nigeria because the provisions
of the African Charter are not superior to the Nigerian Constitution. Succinctly, socioeconomic rights in the African Charter cannot be justiciable in Nigerian courts owing to
constitutional stipulations.119 Hence, the Supreme Court stand explains why Nigerian courts
are still refraining from exercising jurisdictions in matters of socio-economic rights realisation
despite the express guarantees contained in the African Charter.
However, while it is clear that the socio-economic rights are non-justiciable in Nigeria reading
from section II of the 1999 Constitution, some scholars argue that socio-economic rights are
indeed to some extent justiciable where relevant legislations are enacted to guarantee it.120 This
would mean compliance to section 13 and item 60(a) of the Exclusive Legislative List where
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the organs of government have the duties of giving effect to the provisions of Chapter 11 of
the Constitution. The decisions in A.G Lagos State v A.G Federation121 and the resultant
enactment of the Federal Environment Protection Agency Act represents a decision that
expressly underscores the leeway to circumventing the provisions of section 6 (6) of the 1999
Constitution by the courts on the footing of valid legislative enactments. Hence, the contents
of Chapter 11 can be the subject of legislative enactments and in view of such enactments,
courts can enforce the provisions of such a law notwithstanding the limitations contained in
section 6(6)(c). Okeke and Okeke argue that ‘there are ways by which Chapter II of the
constitution can be made justiciable and these are contained within the very section 6 (6) (c)
that made chapter II of the Constitution non-justiciable’.122 This argument is restated in the
case of the Federal Republic of Nigeria v Anache & 3 ors,123 where Niki Tobi (JSC) observes
that ‘in my humble view section 6 (6) (c) of the Constitution is neither total nor sacrosanct as
the subsection provides a leeway by the use of the words “except as otherwise provides by this
Constitution”. This means that if the Constitution otherwise provides in another section, which
makes a section or sections of Chapter II justiciable, it will be so interpreted by the courts’.
Accordingly, the court, in Federal Republic of Nigeria v Anache,124 upheld the position
affirming that since Section 6 (6) (c) is qualified by the phrase, “save as otherwise provided by
this Constitution”, the justiciability of Chapter II is not entirely barred. Furthermore, in
Olafisoye v Federal Republic of Nigeria,125 the Supreme Court ruled that the non-justiciability
of section 6(6) (c) of the Constitution is not sacrosanct as the subsection provides also a leeway
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through using the words, “except as otherwise provided by this Constitution”. The implication
is that where the Constitution provides, in another section, the principles that make a section
or sections of Chapter II justiciable, it will be so interpreted by the Courts.126
The Constitutional position remain that chapter II of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria is nonjusticable.127 However, in some few restricted cases and circumstances, there have been counter
arguments upholding justiciability. For instance, where the ‘implementation of Chapter II
infringes on rights in Chapter IV (fundamental rights), particularly on the right of the private
investment in education and where statutes enacted to actualise Chapter II provisions are
challenged’.128
It is inferred that the non-justiciability of Chapter II of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution is politics
rather than law.129 It ‘amounts to the practice of using legislation to modify the provisions of
the constitution, … .’130
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progressive and purposive interpretation of the laws as opposed to restrictive and conservative
interpretations. Justice Kayode Esho emphasised such judicial activism:
It would be tragic to reduce Judges to a sterile role and make an automation of them. I
believe it is the function of Judges to keep the law alive, in motion, and to make it
progressive for the purpose of arriving at the end of justice, without being inhibited by
technicalities, to find every conceivable, but acceptable way of avoiding narrowness
that spells injustice. Short of being a legislator, a Judge, to my mind, must possess an
aggressive stance in interpreting the law.131

This judicial innovation could be achieved by judges applying the principles in section 16 (1)
(b) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.132 So far, ‘judicial attitude to socio-economic rights
litigation in Nigeria is characterised by great caution and subtle passivity. … Nigerian courts
are almost always incapable of or unwilling to entertain socio-economic rights claims’.133
Further limitations to the realisation of socio-economic rights are enforcement mechanisms and
the fear that extending constitutional protection to socio-economic rights could undermine the
doctrine of separation of powers. The separation of powers argument implies that the powers
would be concentrated in the courts at the cost of the elected public officials. This thesis argues
that it is more productive for socio-economic rights to be protected at the constitutional level
rather than at the legislative level as this will ensure a more permanent, fundamental guarantee
enjoyed by all as opposed to the whims and the discretion of the legislators and politicians. The
realisation of socio-economic rights should be viewed as entitlements and as fundamental
rights could prompt further government attention and engagement. This is to say that

131

Trans bridge Trading Company Limited v Survey International Limited [1996] 4
NWLR (Part 37) 576 at 596-597.
132
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entrenching socio-economic rights as fundamental rights will ensure that sufficient public
resources are channelled into social spending. Amy Makinen concurs that ‘the constitutional
entrenchment of socio-economic rights raises the priority of social programs in the eyes of the
legislators, and may encourage groups to lobby for increased benefits’.134
Despite the legal conundrums inherent in the justiciability of socio-economic rights in Nigeria,
this thesis argues that realising socio-economic rights is relevant to combating systemic grand
corruption in Nigeria.

3.8 Nexus between Grand Corruption and Human Rights in Nigeria
The fight against corruption is arguably linked to the struggle for actualisation of human rights.
In other words, corruption and human rights are intertwined in different ways. While not all
acts of corruption could constitute human rights violations, it is vital to establish the issue of
causality. In so doing, one may begin by asking the question: ‘does the corrupt act itself violate
the right concerned, or are there other circumstances involved’?135 This section examines how
corrupt acts in Nigeria can run contrary to the state’s institutional obligation to realise the socioeconomic rights of the people.
Human rights conventions enumerate the legal obligations of a government to the people and
emphasises protection of people from abuse. These obligations include guaranteeing that all
people resident in a country enjoy equality, a fair justice system, and access to goods and public
services, among other rights. However, the ability of a government to protect and fulfil these

Amy Makinen, ‘Rights, Review and Spending: Policy Outcomes with Judicially
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135
Martine Boersma, Corruption: A Violation of Human Rights and a Crime Under
International Law? (Intersentia 2012) 195.
99
134

rights at times are undermined by the endemic level of corruption in the state. In a quest to
strike a balance between guaranteeing human rights protection and good governance, it appears
that the commitment made by states to combat corruption runs parallel to the commitments to
promote, respect and fulfil human rights. This is the nexus of corruption and human rights.
Albin-Lackey argues that the ‘focus on corruption-human rights nexus offers an easy point of
entry for mainstreaming human rights group to work on progressive realisation issues, using
the methodologies they are more comfortable with’.136 Albin-Lackey goes on to say that when
socio-economic rights are undermined by systemic corruption, such rights violations can be
challenged using the different national, regional and international mechanisms that exist to
monitor compliance with human rights standards. However, where these mechanisms are
disabled (like the provisions of chapter II of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria), such clauses
become a direct burden on the people.
Since Nigeria presents as a state with a very high incidence of corruption, global indicators
suggest that corruption impedes sustainable development and disproportionately affects the
economically and socially vulnerable, weakens the rule of law, erodes public trust in
government and permeates critical institutions of the state.137 Systemic corruption may imply
that the State is not taking steps in the right direction. For instance, when funds are stolen by
corrupt officials, or when access to health care, education and housing is dependent on bribes,
a state’s resources are clearly not being used maximally to realize socio-economic rights.138
Olaniyan argues that:
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Theoretically, corruption has implications for a state’s human rights
obligations in at least three ways. First, corruption, per se, is a human rights
violation, insofar as it interferes with the right of the people to dispose of
their natural wealth and resources, and thereby increases poverty and
frustrates socio-economic development. Second, corruption can lead to a
multitude of human rights violations. Third, corruption is a violation of the
obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil human and peoples’
rights. These presumably will include a state’s failure to create conditions
to achieve human rights (and access to effective remedies in cases of
violations) or to establish effective and independent anticorruption
mechanisms to combat corruption.139
Arguing further that the research has tied non realisation of socio-economic rights to incidents
of corruption, Olaniyan cites more examples of corrupt practices that could contravene human
rights as ‘the siphoning-off of public funds (whether the funds are derived from illicit
enrichment, embezzlement, abuse of office, trading in influence or even the proceeds of
bribery) into private bank accounts of senior state officials’.140 The siphoned funds would have
been the same funds that could have been injected into public social projects, for example,
infrastructural provisions and upgrades. In the absence of these much needed funds, the social
projects are abandoned, and as such, the vital things ensuring man’s enjoyment of the right to
life are jeopardised. Take, for instance, hospitals without drugs, bedding and trained staff as
well as lack of good roads which leads to regular accidents and loss of life and inadequate water
facilities leading to poor hygiene and water/air borne diseases. Moreover, the politics
surrounding non-justiciability of socio-economic rights in Nigeria to a very large extent
infringes on the human rights of people. It also creates an avenue for illicit enrichment, abuse
of office and money laundering as state budgets earmarked for the provision of essential
services are siphoned off by high-ranking government officials taking advantage of the state’s
weak and dysfunctional institutions.
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In Nigeria, public stealing appears to be institutionalised. Recent examples include
embezzlement of civil servant’s pension funds by a cartel comprising top ranking public
servants. This particular case involved a permanent secretary, Atiku Abubakar Kigo, and five
other senior civil servants in the Federal Civil Service (Esai Dangabar, Ahmed Wada, John
Yisufu, Veronica Onyegbula and Sani Zira) who stole NGN32.8 billion accruing from the
Police Pension Funds in Abuja between January 2009 and June 2011.141 The diversion of funds
meant for the Universal Basic Education programme (UBE) in Nigeria presents another tragic
case where funds budgeted for education purposes were embezzled by public servants. 142 In
SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission,143 SERAP
alleged the violation of the right to quality education, the right to dignity, the right of peoples
to their wealth and natural resources and the right of peoples to economic and social
development guaranteed by Articles 1, 2, 17, 21 and 22 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. The ECOWAS Court ruled that the right to education can be enforced before
the Court and dismissed all objections brought by the Federal Government of Nigeria through
the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), that education is ‘a mere directive policy
of the government and not a legal entitlement of the citizens’.144 The core of the argument in
this section is that the impact of uncontrolled grand corruption falls on the ordinary people,
their socio-economic needs will simply not be met ‘when the resources to provide those needs
are stolen, diverted into private pockets, and then stashed abroad’.145
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3.9 Conclusion
Corruption is not a victimless crime. It impacts directly on individuals and by so doing affects
their rights. This is why this study seeks to increase our understanding of the adverse
consequences of grand corruption on peoples’ rights by highlighting how grand corruption,
international criminal law, human rights and the state’s capacity in containing it are
intertwined.
To address the questions driving this chapter: why are the laws and the anti-corruption agencies
failing in the bid to combat corruption? How has grand corruption affected human rights in
Nigeria? The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that the laws fail mostly as a result of
the ingrained culture of corruption, political and judicial complicity which sabotage efforts to
tackle corruption. While this chapter is not intended to chronicle the overwhelming corruption
scandals in Nigeria (chapter two has addressed this issue), evidence of corruption scandals,
including; the infamous Abacha loot,146 the James Ibori’s case147, Alamieyesha’s case148,

Abacha’s loot chronicled by StAR on< http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Star_Report.pdf>
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Joshua Dariye’s case,149 the police pension fund scam,150 the missing oil subsidy funds,151 and
recently the Diezani Alison Madueke’s152 case all point to the systemic grand corruption in
Nigeria and how the Nigerian judiciary has aided in hindering the fight against grand
corruption.
Hence, from the point of view of the analysis of human rights issues followed in this chapter,
the research submits that if we are to go by the supposition that human rights fulfilment signify
actions aimed at establishing a level playing ground where rights deprivation and persecution
are unacceptable, it becomes important to assert that corruption leads to deprivation and is a
pointer as to how it affects human rights. In this context, this chapter argues that the nonjusticiablity of socio-economic rights in Nigeria is mostly attributable to endemic grand
corruption. It reiterates that funds needed to actualise the socio-economic rights are the same
funds hidden in different overseas financial safe havens by corrupt public officials. 153 There
have been calls for the review of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria to ensure the realisation of
socio-economic rights and, propel the government to invest in social infrastructure, thereby
plugging most of the conduits for official leaks and grafts. This is yet to happen and goes to
reiterate the need for legal intervention backed by the commitment and political will to achieve
the needed reform.
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It is well settled in the Indian Supreme Court ruling in State of Maharashtra Tr.C.B.I v
Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar and the South African Constitutional Court ruling of Hugh
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa & Ors that there is a close link between
corruption and human rights. In the Indian case, Ms. Jayaram, a popular leader, was sentenced
to four years imprisonment on charges that she illegally enriched herself in the first of her three
consecutive terms as chief minister. The

Indian Supreme Court in this case held that

‘corruption is not only a punishable offence but also undermines human rights, indirectly
violating them, and systematic corruption, is a human rights’ violation in itself, as it leads to
systematic economic crimes’.154 The Constitutional Court of South Africa also held that ‘it is
incontestable that corruption undermines the rights in the Bill of Rights and imperils
democracy’.155 The Court also highlighted the obligation of the state to ‘respect, protect,
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’.156 Reading from the jurisprudence of India
and South Africa, it is obvious that the Courts articulated corruption as a human rights
violation. Unfortunately, it is damning that no court in Nigeria has made such a pronouncement
despite the myriad of corruption cases before them. Moreover, reading the South African and
Indian court rulings in conjunction with the ECOWAS Court ruling on the justicability of the
right to education, it becomes obvious that corruption hinders the ability of states to combat
poverty and also precludes the state from delivering on its human rights obligations. It also
appears that Nigeria is in violation of its treaty obligations by failing to make socio-economic
rights justiciable according to the provisions of the ratified African Charter157. Thus,
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considering that the legal framework of the universal human rights instruments makes socioeconomic rights fundamental and inalienable, the universal human rights instruments supports
the demand for the realisation of these rights despite their categorisation. It also becomes
plausible to demand, like Ndiva Kofele-Kale, ‘a corruption-free society’.158 This entails the
total rejection of the everyday culture of corruption and impunity and an insistence on making
people’s rights count, and at the same time, realisable.
This chapter acknowledges the numerous legal instruments against corruption in Nigeria but
argues that grand corruption has diminished the supposed effectiveness of the legal
instruments. This chapter suggests a human rights approach in dealing with the grand
corruption issues in Nigeria as it appears, human rights argument may be capable of
precipitating the much needed reform in the present circumstance of other institutional failures.
Finally, the chapter contextualises the relationship existing within law, human rights, grand
corruption and state capacity and argues for the need to synthesise the various concepts in order
to tackle the malaise of grand corruption in Nigeria.

Ndiva Kofele-Kale, ‘The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and
Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime under International Law’ (2000)
The International Lawyer Vol. 34, No. 1, 149-178.
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Chapter Four
International and Regional Legal Instruments on Corruption
4.1 Introduction
The existence of corruption in different countries of the world deflates the claim that corruption
is a domestic political issue. Corruption is a global phenomenon and therefore deserves a global
coalition against it. Moreover, the sustained campaign by various governments, nongovernmental organisations/civil societies,1 and the general public attests to the damage caused
by corruption, thus precipitating the need for aggressive steps in controlling it. Over the years,
global corruption scandals have confirmed that corruption cuts across a diverse range of
institutional, organisational and cultural settings.2 The scandals have clarified the previously
held view that corruption is a problem that is confined to a specific sector or to the developing
world.3 The consequences of corruption are significant and known to affect people worldwide.

1

The Transparency International with its headquarters in Berlin, Germany has championed
the campaign against corruption; The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have also
played prominent roles in combating corruption worldwide.
2
Transparency International in ‘Global Corruption Report 2004’ published a list of heads of
government who allegedly embezzled large amounts of public funds. This list illustrates through
estimates, the funds allegedly embezzled by some of the most notorious leaders of the last 20 years.
The 10 leaders in the list are not necessarily the 10 most corrupt leaders of the period and the
estimates of funds allegedly embezzled are extremely approximate: Mohamed Suharto President of
Indonesia, 1967–98 US $ 15 to 35 billion, GDP per capita US $ 695; Ferdinand Marcos President of
Philippines, 1972–86 US $ 5 to 10 billion, GDP per capita US $ 912; Mobutu Sese Seko President of
Zaire, 1965–97 US $ 5 billion, GDP per capita US $ 99; Sani Abacha President of Nigeria, 1993–98
US $ 2 to 5 billion, GDP per capita US $ 319; Slobodan Milosevic President of Serbia/Yugoslavia,
1989–2000 US $ 1 billion, GDP per capita n/a; Jean-Claude Duvalier President of Haiti, 1971–86 US
$ 300 to 800 million US,GDP per capita $ 460; Alberto Fujimori President of Peru, 1990–2000 US $
600 million US, GDP per capita $ 2,051; Pavlo Lazarenko Prime Minister of Ukraine, 1996–97 US $
114 to 200 million US $ 766; Arnoldo Alemán President of Nicaragua, 1997–2002 US $ 100 million,
GDP per capita US $ 490; Joseph Estrada President of Philippines, 1998–2001 US $ 78 to 80 million
US, GDP per capita $
91<http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2004_gcr_politicalcorruption_en/23?e=0;
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_report_2004_political_corrupti
on> accessed 30 October 2015.
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Clare Fletcher and Daniela Herrmann, Internationalisation of Corruption: Scale, Impact and
Counter measures (Ashgate Publishing Ltd 2012) 101-106; Lists numerous examples of political
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Scholars and analysts have linked corruption with political instability, human rights violations,
the exacerbation of poverty, insecurity, forced migration, the erosion of public confidence in
institutions and many other negative outcomes.4 Corruption remains a major obstacle to
political, social and economic development in many parts of the world.
Globally, there is evidence of changing attitudes about corruption gleaning from the myriad of
international, regional and state legal instruments aimed at combating it. Charles Carter argues
that ‘contemporary globalisation of anti-corruption laws can at least partly be understood as a
manifestation of the collective realisation by states that emerging threats are increasingly
transnational-such as corruption…- and thus require international response’.5
The international response to combating corruption raises so many questions, for instance: How
did corruption become a serious subject in international law? What is the nexus between the
international attempts to combat corruption and international human rights projections? Are
the global campaigns against corruption propelled by international commercial concerns? What
propelled the subject of corruption to the top of international agenda? What is the role of
international law and its effectiveness in countering corruption?
This chapter, though certainly provoked by the above questions, does not pretend to give
definite answers. It seeks to contribute to the body of scholarship on the understanding of the
development of anti-corruption frameworks under international law by answering the

leaders entangled in corruption: Former Indonesian President Suharto; Benazi Bhutto of Pakistan;
India’s Narasimha; former Prime Minister Ehud Omert of Israel; Germans’ Helmut Kohl; Former
President Nicholas Sarkozy of France; former Italian prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi; Tunisian
former President, Ben Ali; former military presidentSani Abacha of Nigeria; former Prime Minister of
Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra; and former President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.
4
Secretary-General Lauds Adoption by General Assembly of United Nations Convention
against Corruption, SG/SM/8977GA/10200, SOC/CP/271 (3 November
2003)<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html>accessed 18 November 2015.
5
Charles Carter, ‘Corruption and Global Governance’ in Sophie Harman and David Williams
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following question: what is the status, direction, and development of the treatment of corruption
under international law? In essence, this chapter attempts to answer research question number
two by interrogating how the existing regional and international legal treaties and frameworks
facilitate the fight against corruption.6 The chapter critically evaluates The United Nations
Convention against Corruption (2003) (hereinafter ‘UNCAC’); The African Union Convention
on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003) (hereinafter ‘AU Convention’); the
ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption (2001) and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (1977) (FCPA). Although a U.S statute, the FCPA is widely regarded as the model to all
legal instruments on anti-corruption.
The chapter argues that, by excluding human rights considerations in the framing of most of
the Conventions, there exists an accountability gap in the current international and regional
anti-corruption legal frameworks, which requires additional approaches to combat the
problems posed globally by the high incidence of grand corruption.

4.2 The United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003 (UNCAC)
The ‘United Nations Convention against Corruption is the only legally binding universal anticorruption instrument. The Convention's far-reaching approach and the mandatory character of
many of its provisions make it a unique tool for developing a comprehensive response to a
global problem’.7 It is the only global legal instrument on corruption representing an in-depth

6

Research question number two: How have existing international, regional and domestic
legal frameworks facilitated the fight against corruption?
7
See ‘United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNDOC) <
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/> accessed 03 February 2016.
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unified international response to the problem of corruption. UNCAC is regarded as the most
exhaustive and multifaceted international anti-corruption treaty to date.8 UNCAC was
approved in 2003 by resolution 54/4 of 31 October 2003 of the UN General Assembly and
following the process of ratification, the Convention came into force on 14 December 2005.
The UNCAC has 181 State Parties and 140 signatories as at 12 December, 2016.9 Nigeria
ratified the UNCAC on 14 December 2004. UNCAC does not provide any concise definition
of the term “corruption”. Rather, it lists a number of offences including: bribery;
embezzlement; trading in influence; abuse of functions; illicit enrichment; laundering;
concealment and obstruction of justice.10 By so doing, it creates a situation whereby states may
not have the same obligations regarding all the offences. UNCAC has 71 articles embedded in
eight chapters:
• Chapter I, General Provisions (Articles 1-4)
• Chapter II, Preventive Measures (Articles 5-14)
• Chapter III, Criminalization and Law Enforcement (Articles 15-42)
• Chapter IV, International Cooperation (Articles 43-50)
• Chapter V, Asset Recovery (Articles 50-59)
• Chapter VI, Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (Articles 60-62)
• Chapter VII, Mechanisms for Implementation (Articles 63-64), and
• Chapter VIII, Final Provisions (Articles 65-71).
However, the four main highlights of UNCAC are: prevention, criminalisation, international
cooperation and asset recovery.11

Lucinda A Low, ‘The United Nations Convention against Corruption: The Globalization of
Anticorruption Standards, The Awakening Giant of Anticorruption Enforcement’ (2006)
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2599.pdf> accessed 10 November 2015.
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UNCAC preventive measures highlight the necessity for State Parties to initiate, adopt and
implement crucial policies at the public and private levels.12 Importantly, article 6 mandates
States Parties to establish independent anti-corruption agencies and agencies capable of
implementing anti-corruption policies enumerated in article 5 of UNCAC. Other preventive
measures include the promotion of the participation of civil society in preventing public
corruption as well as raising public awareness on corruption.13 As part of the preventive
measures, article 6 (3) of UNCAC obligates state parties to inform the Secretary-General of
the United Nations about agencies likely to assist other State Parties in implementing measures
aimed at combating corruption. Finally, all preventive measures should ‘reflect the principles
of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and the public property, integrity,
transparency and accountability’.14
UNCAC contains an obligation to criminalise certain corrupt practices and related offences
in both the public and private sphere.15 UNCAC failed to provide a concise definition of
corruption but rather preferred a peculiar approach that provides for the criminalisation of
different forms of corrupt behaviour extending beyond the usual bribery of public officials.16
Indira Carr opines that ‘the stance it adopts is of a holistic nature and it expects the engagement
of the public sector, the private sector, the financial sector, and the judiciary in the prevention
of corruption’.17 Moreover, UNCAC makes a clear distinction between mandatory and optional
offences in terms of criminalisation.18 Offences falling within the ambit of mandatory
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criminalisation include active and passive bribery of national and public officials;19 active
bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organisations;20
embezzlement;21 laundering of the proceeds of corruption;22 obstruction of justice;23 and
participation.24 The offences that are optional to criminalise pursuant to UNCAC are: passive
bribery of foreign officials and officials of public international organisations;25 trading in
influence;26 abuse of functions;27 illicit enrichment;28 private sector bribery;29 private sector
embezzlement;30 concealment;31 and attempt and preparation.32 Other procedural measures
supporting criminalisation measures include; use of investigative techniques33 and protection
of witnesses, victims and whistle-blowers.34
International cooperation is another unique provision of UNCAC as outlined in chapter IV
(articles 43-50) and entails obligations on States Parties to assist one another in gathering and
transferring evidence of corruption for use in courts in cross border criminal matters.
International cooperation also includes provisions on extradition. Lucinda Low submits that
‘in contrast, the international cooperation chapter -- as is the case with other conventions -- is
predominately self-executing. However, even these provisions do not operate in a vacuum, but
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interact with existing treaties in the areas of extradition and mutual legal assistance as well as
national laws’.35 International cooperation remains a fundamental provision of UNCAC.
Asset Recovery appears in Chapter V of UNCAC and is one of the outstanding provisions of
the treaty. It provides for seizure, freezing and repatriation of all assets linked to proceeds of
corruption.36 This provision has ensured the tracing and repatriation of millions of stolen funds
from Nigeria from countries like USA, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Germany and United
Kingdom.37 The Abacha loot hidden in Europe, America, Asia and the Pacific, the Caribbean
and the Middle East was traced using the assets recovery mandate of UNCAC. Switzerland
took it further by enacting the Swiss Restitution of Illicit Assets Act (RIAA) 2010 commonly
known as “Lex Duvalier” to facilitate the quick location of proceeds of corruption hidden under
the veil of the Swiss bank secrecy laws.
Although UNCAC appears comprehensive, it still suffers from a number of deficits. Several
provisions may be undermined by the wordings of the treaty. UNCAC is not strongly worded
and has left loopholes in the manner in which member states have implemented the
criminalisation mandate. Clauses like “states shall endeavour to” and “states shall consider to”
are used instead of the much stronger term “states shall”.38 Martine Boersma argues that ‘the
effectiveness of several provisions might be undermined by their wordings…this makes
numerous preventive provisions optional’.39 Boersma states that ‘apart from the many optional
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provisions which UNCAC contains, the use of numerous safeguard clauses can harm the
effectiveness of the instrument. Several provisions are made subject to principles of domestic
law, national constitutions etcetera’.40
UNCAC does not make any reference to human rights in any of the seventy-one articles,
although there are references to “good governance” and “rule of law” in its preamble. The
reasons for the omission of human rights was not obvious. However, it could be inferred that
it was an attempt to obviate the link between corruption and human rights. This explicit
omission has continuously derailed the argument linking corruption and human rights. In the
same vein, civil society was accorded a weak role in the entire convention. The near exclusion
of civil society by UNCAC undermines the all-important role that “collective action”41
programmes play in the global effort at combating corruption.
In addition, UNCAC did not prescribe any particular sanction for any of the offences it listed.
Rather, it states that the level of sanctions should take into account the gravity of the offence.42
Carr argues that there is an expectation that a convention that creates a long list of corruption
and corruption related offences should provide an equally exhaustive list of sanctions.43
Further, UNCAC does not contain express review mechanisms. Rather, it stipulates that
‘Pursuant to paragraphs 4 to 6 of this article, the Conference of the State Parties shall establish,
if it deems it necessary, any appropriate mechanism or body to assist in the effective
implementation of the Convention’.44 The lack of review, enforcement and monitoring
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mechanisms indicate lack of commitment to strict enforcement of UNCAC. State parties have
indirectly received a mandate to use their discretion in deciding when to incorporate the
Convention into domestic legislation.
U4, an anti-corruption civil society publication on UNCAC, argues that the stance of the
Convention on the presumption of innocence versus burden of proof is worrisome.45 For
instance, ‘article 20 on illicit enrichment is controversial, because it imputes criminal behaviour
to individuals whose assets cannot be explained in relation to their lawful income. This has led
to criticism by human rights advocates, who argue that such requirements reverse the
presumption of innocence protected by many legal systems’.46 However, according to U4,
‘defenders of the provision argue that prosecutors still shoulder the burden of proof, as they
must demonstrate, beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of legal avenues for the accumulation of
excess wealth’.47
UNCAC is also criticised because it ‘fails to forcefully tackle political corruption, one of the
major concerns of citizens around the world… The Convention also refrains from referring to
any specific political system and, by doing so, omits the important role parliaments can play in
holding governments to account’.
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immunity, Article 30 (2) provides a carte blanche, which accords the state parties the
opportunity to grant immunity from prosecution to corrupt officials. This is a major downside
of the Convention, particularly as it relates to Nigeria, where constitutional “immunity”
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protects certain public office holders from prosecution for corruption offences while in office
and remains a major impediment to combating corruption.49

4.3 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003)
The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU Convention) is
another landmark anti-corruption instrument. It was adopted on 11 July 2003 and entered into
force in August 5 2006. To date, 37 countries have ratified the convention and are State Parties
to it and Nigeria ratified the AU Convention on 26 September 2006. The AU Convention
encompasses both private and public sector corruption and draws no distinction between petty
and grand corruption.50 The AU Convention sets forth three fundamental principles that are
crucial for an anti-corruption framework, namely; prevention, criminalisation and cooperation.
Prevention of corruption is a key principle of the AU Convention, which calls state parties to
establish domestic anti-corruption agencies, bodies or commission.51 State parties are also
required to ensure probity in accounting and auditing standards,52 while at the same time
making asset declaration by public servants obligatory.53 Other provisions by the AU
Convention as preventive measures include: Public education and mobilisation involving the
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participation of the media and the civil society,54 and ensuring accessibility to the right
information required in combating corruption.55
The AU Convention calls for the criminalisation of a number of offences by state parties at
domestic level.56 The AU convention provided for mandatory criminalisation of active and
passive bribery and other forms of corrupt acts.57 The AU Convention failed to define
corruption, but adopted the same broad view and categorisation as UNCAC.58 Article 11
recommends adopting legislative and other measures to prevent and combat acts of corruption
and related offences committed in and by agents of the private sector.59
Cooperation is another fundamental principle of the AU Convention. Throughout the
convention, various obligatory provisions set out the platform for international cooperation in
order to enhance mutuality in legal assistance, enforcement, extradition, investigations,
confiscation/seizures and repatriation of proceeds of corruption.60
The follow-up mechanism: Article 22 of the AU Convention contains follow-up mechanisms
and provides for an Advisory Board of eleven members elected by the AU Executive Council,
having broad responsibilities for promoting anti-corruption work, collecting information on
corruption and on the behaviour of multinational corporations operating in Africa, advising
governments, developing codes of conduct for public officials, and building partnerships. The
Advisory Board is required to submit regular progress reports to the Executive Council
detailing the success of States Parties in compliance with the provisions of the AU Convention.
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There are also requirements that States Parties report their progress annually to the Advisory
Board a year after entry into force of the AU Convention.
The AU Convention like the UNCAC has a number of drawbacks. It failed to provide a
concise definition of corruption opting for the broad categorisation which, like, UNCAC, has
hampered the efficiency of the convention. Moreover, Indira Carr argues that what can be
‘considered as a shortcoming of the convention relates to regulation of the financial and the
banking sector, which is largely missing in the convention’.61 The AU Convention fails to cater
for the liability of legal persons for the participation in the offences as listed in the Convention.
The AU Convention also contains no ‘provisions relating to the accountability of NGOS, which
would have added value to the text’.62 The AU Convention fails to provide a long period of
limitation and does not require liability of legal entities. Carr points out that ‘in terms of
sentencing, a significant gap in the AU convention is that it does not provide for legal sanctions
or penalties’.63 The AU Convention also fails to deal with judicial independence, which would
involve measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among
members of the judiciary. An independent judiciary could be instrumental in effectively
combating corruption, and the judicial system in Nigeria has remained a major hindrance in
the fight against corruption.64 Money laundering was omitted by the AU Convention and this
is worrisome because money laundering activities leads to siphoning of funds from the public
treasury and diverting them to safe financial havens. This has proved popular for most corrupt
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Nigerians, for instance, the late General Abacha and convicted Delta state former governor,
James Ibori.65 Olaniyan identified the weaknesses of the AU Convention as:
First, failing to comprehensively address the critical link between corruption,
especially large-scale corruption and human rights, and failure to provide
effective remedies for victims of corruption. Second, the AU Convention,
suffers from excessive use of claw-back clauses which tend to limit or
undermine some of its progressive provisions. For example, article 7, 8 and 14
represents such clauses which could seriously emasculate the effectiveness of
the Convention as well as its uniform application by member states. If not
properly construed, the clauses could defeat, frustrate, or annul the fundamental
objectives of the Convention: eradication of corruption and promotion and
protection of internationally recognised human rights, including economic,
social and cultural rights. Third, the Convention lacks any serious, effective or
meaningful mechanism for holding states accountable for the obligations they
assume under it, or for resolving disputes among state parties, including a
potential claim by one party that another is failing to properly carry out its
obligations.66
The AU convention unlike the UNCAC mentions human rights but fell short of prescribing
ways the Convention could help to mitigate the devastating impact of corruption on human
rights or how the Convention can combat corruption by incorporating human rights principles
as a tool.

4.4 The ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption (ECOWAS Protocol) 2001
The ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption (ECOWAS Protocol) was signed on
21 December 2001 and has not, as at 20 April 2017, entered into force as the ratification of at
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least nine signatory states is required.67 The ECOWAS Protocol was adopted with the
following objectives:
i) To promote and strengthen the development in each of the State Parties
effective mechanisms to prevent, suppress and eradicate corruption;
ii) To intensify and revitalise cooperation between State Parties, with a view to
making anti-corruption measures more effective;
iii) To promote the harmonisation and coordination of national anticorruption
laws and policies.68
The ECOWAS Protocol obliges State Parties to adopt the necessary legislative measures to
criminalise active and passive bribery in the public and private sectors;69 illicit enrichment,70
false accounting,71 aiding and abetting corrupt practices,72 and the laundering of the proceeds
of corruption.73 It also requires State Parties to ensure protection of witnesses/victims74 and to
provide each other with judicial and law enforcement cooperation.75 The ECOWAS Protocol
requires State parties to harmonise their national anti-corruption laws,76 put in place effective
preventive measures against corruption77 and introduce appropriate sanctions.78
The categories of obligation within the ECOWAS Protocol are preventive measures, 79
criminalisation,80and international cooperation81 and follow-up mechanism.82
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Preventive measures adopted to combat corruption in the public and private sectors by the
ECOWAS Protocol include: requirements for asset declaration; code of conduct in the public
service; access to information, whistle-blower protection; procurement standards; transparency
in political party funding; civil society participation; establishing, maintaining and
strengthening independent national anti-corruption agencies.
The ECOWAS Protocol provides for criminalising a wide range of offences including trading
in influence, illicit enrichment, and offences relating to public and private sector corruption,
including the liability of legal persons.
The international cooperation framework in the ECOWAS Protocol provide avenues for
improving mutuality in African law enforcement and a framework for the confiscation and
seizure of assets.
The follow-up mechanism of the ECOWAS Protocol provides for the establishment of a
Technical Commission to monitor the implementation of the protocol at both national and subregional levels; gathering and disseminating information; organising training programmes and
technical assistance to State parties.
However, the ECOWAS Protocol has a number of weaknesses. It failed to proscribe penalties
for non-compliance with the provisions of the protocol for states parties. By so doing, it has
failed to set up a uniform guideline for states parties. Moreover, the Protocol does not include
any specific reference to the criminal intent requirement. The consequence of this, according
to Olaniyan, is ‘this may have serious implications as to the interpretation of the obligations of
any state under these instruments, and can potentially produce inconsistency in the application
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of their criminalisation provisions, as states may need to decide this within their domestic
jurisdictions’.83
The provision on the protection of victims in the ECOWAS Protocol failed to include specific
implementation measures or state’s accountability procedures. The ECOWAS Protocol failed
to spell out appropriate legal sanctions against errant states parties and does not have definite
judicial and legal frameworks for investigating and prosecuting corruption. It also avoided
providing for the consequences of corruption on the victims.
The ECOWAS Protocol is also weakened by the absence of serious enforcement or
implementation mechanisms. The Technical Commission, comprised of experts drawn from
different ministries (finance, justice and internal affairs) and reflecting the bureaucracy of
member states, is vested with the duties of monitoring, information dissemination, training and
states’ assistance but due to technicalities fall short of achieving the enforcement and
implementation obligations.84

4.5 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 1977
The promulgation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (hereinafter “FCPA”) brought the
subject of corruption in state affairs into international limelight. Prior to the enactment of the
FCPA, corruption was rampant in most nations. For instance, in Germany, bribes were tax
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense while international organisations,
like The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, resisted the attempt to
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internationalise corruption and its impact.85 In the U.S, many years before the enactment of the
FCPA, the U.S. Congress identified the overseas behaviour of their Government contractors as
particularly disturbing.86 Particularly, in the 1970s, a bribery scandal involving the Lockheed
Corporation (now Lockheed Martin Corporation), Northrop Corporation, and oil companies
(Gulf Oil Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Company, and Ashland Oil, Inc.) necessitated the
urgent need for legislation prohibiting overseas corruption.87
However, the “Watergate Scandal” became the catalyst that brought the fight against bribery
and corruption to international attention.88 The Watergate scandal triggered high-profile
inquiries that investigated the role of major US corporations in political funding. According to
Posadas, the result of the investigation ‘led to further inquiries into corporate involvement in
foreign political campaigns, with questionable payments and contributions being made to
foreign government officials. The hearings conducted by Congress on these issues revealed
facts and events damaging to the stability and reputation of some foreign governments’.89 The
fallout of the “Watergate Scandal” led to the resignation of President Nixon and the eventual
U.S legislative response in the form of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 1977. The
FCPA is an Act that set the pace for regulating global corrupt practices and in this vein, the
U.S government has robustly enforced FCPA across the world wherever Americans and their
business interest lies. It has extra-territorial features and thus applies generally to various sorts
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of U.S and non-U.S persons and businesses. Moreover, personal and business transactions of
Americans in many cases can give rise to liability even where the corrupt act takes place
entirely outside the jurisdiction or territory of the United States. The extraterritorial features of
the FCPA has three key attributes. The major drawback of the extraterritorial provisions of the
FCPA is that while it concentrates on U.S citizens and their business affairs, it places no
obligation on third countries who may be complicit in such transactions. For example, as
mentioned in other chapters of this thesis, some U.S citizens and companies were fined for
corrupt transactions in Nigeria but Nigerian citizens and companies who connived with them
have not been prosecuted at the time of this writing. While it may be argued that the U.S may
be respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country like Nigeria in this instance,
it still casts heavy doubt on the efficacy of the extraterritorial reach of the FCPA.
The FCPA became the first national statute to criminalise the bribery of foreign officials.
Fletcher and Herrmann argue that the U.S is ‘acutely aware of the international dimensions of
the problem at hand, U.S officials were determined to try to use the FCPA to extend liability
to competitor companies in foreign countries. During the mid-1970s, therefore, they also began
to propose international rules against corruption’.90 Sandholtz and Gray submit that ‘The
United States provided the impetus for enunciating clear norms against corruption’.91 While
this is indisputable, research indicates that years after entry into force of the FCPA, the
continuing involvement of American companies in corrupt acts overseas highlights the
seriousness of the involvement of U.S companies in international corruption. For instance, the
top 10 most expensive settlements in FCPA history include eight large U.S. based companies:
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Siemens AG, Halliburton/KBR, BAE Systems, JGC Corporation, Daimler AG, AlcatelLucent, Panalpina, and Johnson & Johnson.92 Moreover, at the time of this writing, the
companies that settled the three most expensive FCPA enforcement actions by paying
approximately $1.8 billion in fines, are Siemens AG, a German Multinational corporation,
($800 million); Halliburton/KBR, $579 million93; BAE Systems, ($400 million).94 The
Halliburton/KBR’s payment of $579 million and Siemens AG payment of $800 million were
payments of particular relevance to this research as they involved companies listed on the U.S
stock exchange and under the watch of FCPA that operates in Nigeria. Halliburton and Siemens
were enmeshed in serious corruption scandals in Nigeria involving acquisition of various
contracts from the Federal government. The corruption scandals and subsequent U.S fines on
the companies exposes the complicity of MNCs in systemic grand corruption in Nigeria.95
The major highlights of the FCPA are anti-bribery prohibitions,96 recordkeeping and internal
control provisions.97 The Department of Justice is responsible for the criminal enforcement of
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the anti-bribery provisions involving domestic concerns and foreign companies and nationals.98
The Department of Justice is also responsible for the criminal enforcement of “wilful”
violations of the provisions on books and records.99 The provisions on the preservation of
accounting records are ‘presumably designed to make it impossible, or at least difficult for
companies to maintain “slush funds” for illegal purposes or otherwise conceal illicit payments
in legislative accounts’.100
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is responsible for civil enforcement of
the books-and-records provisions, as well as for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions
as applied to “issuers”—any U.S. or foreign company, or an officer, employee, agent, or
stockholder thereof, that either issues securities (or American Depositary Receipts) or must file
reports with the SEC.101 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now plays a prominent role
in FCPA matters, including through its specialised “International Corruption Unit” dedicated
to the investigation of overseas corruption. All three agencies have specialised units dedicated
to the enforcement of the FCPA.102
The jurisdiction of the FCPA is technically transnational as it applies ‘to any act in furtherance
of” an improper payment taken within the United States, regardless of the nationality of the
party engaging in the improper activity.103 Thus, the anti-bribery provisions apply to both U.S.
and foreign concerns, if the conduct occurs in any area over which the United States asserts
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“territorial jurisdiction”.104 Jurisdiction under the accounting provisions of the FCPA affects
individuals or companies that meet the definition of “issuer”. However, according to Tillipman,
‘in recent enforcement actions, the Government has continued to expand FCPA jurisdiction,
especially in regard to foreign companies and individuals. Since 1998, the FCPA anti-bribery
prohibitions have applied to both “issuer” and non-“issuer” foreign companies and individuals
that commit an act in furtherance of the bribe while in the territory of the United States’.105
Olaniya submits that ‘the physical presence of the bribing party on the U.S territory is not
required, and the bribe itself does not have to take place within a U.S territory as long as some
action leading to the eventual payment of the bribe occurred in the United States’.106 Olaniya
surmises that ‘this provision thus extends the FCPA’s reach to any foreign conduct when, for
example, a phone call or email can be tracked back to a US territory’.107
The FCPA has a number of shortcomings, despite being regarded as the forerunner of the global
fight against corruption. The FCPA does not apply to foreign affiliates of U.S. companies,
hence, companies affiliated with U.S. firms could hide under the veil of this shortcoming and
commit corrupt acts.
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The FCPA does not include bribery between private concerns. This could be contrasted with
the UK Bribery Act, 2010 (sections 1, 6 and 9) that outlaws bribery involving foreign officials,
private individuals and companies.
Olaniyan argues that the FCPA ‘excludes “greasing payments” for “routine government
actions” by foreign officials, such as obtaining official documents, the provision of basic
utilities, and so on’.108 Olaniyan further argues that ‘it also excludes the legality of payments
under the law of the host country or the reimbursement for allowed travel and lodging arising
out of promotional activities aimed at obtaining or retaining new business’.109 This places U.S
companies at a competitive disadvantage and undermines their competitiveness in the global
business arena.110 Meaning that their inability to bribe corrupt nations leads to contract loses.

4.6 Conclusion
In response to corruption as a global problem impeding economic growth, international and
regional institutions have over the last decade, drafted an impressive array of international
conventions, declarations and guidelines to combat corruption. Thus, the proliferation of anticorruption frameworks indicates remarkable advances in recognising corruption as an
international problem demanding global commitment in order to combat it. The need for the
international effort against corruption is heightened by the fact that owing to continuous
globalisation and advancement in technology, the consequences of corruption in one country
now extend to other countries. The known consequences of grand corruption like

108

Olaniyan (n 83) 31.
ibid 32.
110
Jan Wouters, Cedrick Ryngaertt and Ann Sofie Cloots, ‘The International Legal
Framework Against Corruption: Achievements and Challenges’ (2013) 14 Melbourne Journal Of
International Law 209.
128
109

‘underdevelopment, unemployment, insurgency, violence and insecurity in one country can
lead to forced migration resulting in the influx of refugees and mercenaries to other parts of the
globe as is currently the aftermath of the Arab Spring’.111 These consequences are borne by the
people.
The anti-corruption Conventions, though carefully drafted with a global outlook, are still
bedevilled with deficiencies. Among others, are the lack of review and enforcement
mechanisms meaning that when State Parties fail to comply with the provisions of a convention
that receive little or no sanction for defaulting on treaty obligations. The Conventions
erroneously assume that all forms of corruption are the same irrespective of their scope. This
is a significant weakness as ‘persistent incidents of large-scale corruption also precipitate
systemic distortions of critical institutions of governance’.112 The conventions failed to agree
on a concise definition of the term “corruption”. While it is often argued that by purposely
omitting a precise definition of corruption, the conventions ensure more extensive applicability,
the issue remains that by choosing vague terminologies, the conventions limit their
applicability to certain behaviours. Additionally, this accords State Parties discretion in
deciding the manner by which they interpret given obligations which usually are closely
connected to their cultural practices and domestic legal systems. In systemically corrupt states
with a dysfunctional justice system, this poses a hindrance to the fulfilment of the treaty
obligations. According to Olaniyan, ‘the utility value of criminal law is limited, in countries
where the criminal justice system itself is overridden by corruption’.113 Most of the
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Conventions especially the UNCAC failed to incorporate human rights protection as their
cardinal objective. Raj Kumar believes that the conventions got it wrong at this point as the
exclusion of human rights from corruption discourse has the potential to stir up public unrest.114
Olaniyan opines that the exclusion of ‘human rights content renders the Conventions almost
entirely a toothless tiger… by focusing strictly on the criminal aspects of corruption, without
entrenching its human rights dimensions, the Convention (African Union Convention)
excludes the possibility of remedies for victims of official corruption’.115 For Olaniyan, ‘the
drafters of the Convention (AU Convention) missed an important opportunity to build on
developing international statements, such as the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on
Corruption, in this area’.116
In addition to the shortcomings of the conventions analysed in this chapter, there are concerns
that corruption is exploitative of the public, leads to the abuse of power, contributes to
discrimination in the making and the formulation of laws, and unquestionably creates an
uneven enforcement and application of law, as the wealthy and politically connected can escape
punishment for any wrongdoing.117 At the receiving end are vulnerable people whose human
rights are violated daily.
Surprisingly, the proliferation of anti-corruption conventions has not adequately addressed the
issue of the link between corruption and human rights, which prompts the question of, whether
international law condones acts of corruption?118 Olaniyan argues:
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The approach adopted by the Anti-Corruption Convention appears to presume
the adequacy and effectiveness of the accountability institutions and the systems
designed to protect human rights, or that state interest and those of individuals
or groups are the same, and will always coincide. However, in practice, this is
rarely the case. The absence of provisions in the Convention for adequate
compensation for individuals or groups whose human rights are violated as a
result of corruption means the interests of states and their agents would continue
to predominate.119
Olaniyan further reiterates ‘nevertheless, it is clear that a human rights approach to corruption
would not only help to increase the implementation of the Convention, but also enhance
international accountability in respect of human rights, especially in Africa where respect for
those rights is the exception, rather than the rule’.120
So far, it is only the AU Convention that mentions human rights briefly in the preamble121
while the other conventions are silent on the subject. Corruption has implications for state’s
human rights obligations. It is argued in this thesis that incorporation of human rights principles
by the Conventions could assist in reconceptualising the theoretical and conceptual nexus
between corruption and human rights. Zoe Pearson notes that ‘moving from an economic and
political perspective on corruption to a human rights approach involves shifting from viewing
corruption as a misappropriation of wealth and distortion of expenditure …, to viewing
corruption and the tolerance by states as also a breach of fundamental rights’.122 Lyal Sunga
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and Ilaria Bottiglier reiterate that ‘human rights based approach in anti-corruption strategies
can strengthen democracy and the rule of law and promote the enjoyment of human rights’.123
Finally, the analysis and argument explored in this chapter suggests that the corruption
Conventions have failed to effectively combat corruption partly as a result of its inability to
address the technical errors inherent within the Conventions which this research has
highlighted. Moreover, the undue neglect of human rights principles within anti-corruption
Conventions have the potential to frustrate the establishment of ‘significant accountability
mechanisms and normative standards for implementing long-term durable, sustainable, and
broad legal and institutional reforms against corruption’.124
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Chapter Five
Socio-Economic Rights: The Normative Gap in International Criminal Law
5.1 Introduction
International criminal law remains a significant global platform for responding to, and
remedying major forms of violence afflicting global society. It is ‘… the dominant
accountability mechanism for episodes of mass atrocity…’1 And in this regard, attempts to
respond to the past, and deter future, atrocity which it achieves by processes which ‘lie in its
purported ability to identify, punish and end impunity for the authors of violence … .’2 Evelyne
Schmid opines that ‘international law is best considered a normative system that operates
within, and for, the social context of an imperfect and diverse international community,
composed of states, individuals and other organs of society’.3 Within the framework of
international criminal law is embedded the concept of human rights, which forms the platform
on which the response to and deterrence of atrocities is anchored. The identification,
punishment and end to impunity do not happen in abstraction but are linked to human rights
violations. However, the rhetoric that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent and
interrelated and therefore deserving equal respect according to the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action remains a mirage in the light of the reality that socio-economic rights
retain second class status; thereby making them more susceptible to breaches than observance.
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Socio-economic rights and their alleged nature as aspirational, programmatic, or nonjusticiable have received an extensive discussion in scholarly writings.4
While it is not the intention of this chapter to attempt a holistic analysis of socio-economic
rights, it is pertinent to reiterate that when rights do not specify concrete legal obligation, they
lack normative content. Javaid Rehman emphasises the normative gap in international human
rights law, arguing that ‘… in practice human rights law continues to be constrained and
limited…not only are there substantive weaknesses in existing rights, the application of these
rights is impaired by the absences, weaknesses and limitations of implementation mechanisms
and procedures’.5 Mark Drumbl highlights the normative gap in the international criminal law,
especially its over-reliance on ‘the provenance of collective violence and organisational
massacre’6 in the exclusion of ‘post conflict justice, a broader paradigm that includes diverse
accountability modalities and more sublime modalities …’.7
This chapter sets out to appraise the normative gap in international law as regards the realisation
of socio-economic rights on the basis that ‘further confusion arises in relation to the position
of economic, social and cultural rights which carry no obligations of immediate implementation
and are more in nature of aspirations or goals’.8 In achieving this, it interrogates why
international criminal law fails to deal with the roots of social and economic conflict and,
rather, deals only with atrocities committed during conflict. It views this from the perspective
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of corruption as a form of violence and conveys the devastating impact on individuals and
societies, similar to the devastation caused by pervasive acts of physical violence. What are the
limitations and possibilities of realising socio-economic rights in international and domestic
laws? The illustrations for this chapter are drawn from instruments of international criminal
and international human rights law, the Nigerian legal system and case law as well as from
other parts of the world to explore the issues raised. The main arguments are further developed
into three sections: section two discusses Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice:
Inclusions, Exclusions & Misconceptions; section three discusses Socio-Economic Rights in
International Criminal Law: Limitations and Possibilities and section four concludes the
arguments in the chapter.

5.2 Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice: Inclusions, Exclusions &
Misconceptions.
The need to address the violence that originates from economic crimes remains a blind spot of
transitional justice despite the recent attraction of the subject to scholars,9 policy makers and
some truth commissions. The United Nations defines transitional justice as ‘full set of
processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy
of large-scale past abuse, in order to secure accountability, serve justice and achieve
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Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’ International Journal of Transitional
Justice 3 (2009) 7; Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, ‘Transitions from Authoritarian
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reconciliation’.10 Transitional justice also refers to ‘the measures that are designed and
implemented to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses that occur
…under….regimes, thereby strengthening human rights norms that were previously
systematically violated’.11 Transitional justice is defined within the confines of this research as
processes involving redress and restorative mechanisms in response to established wrongs
perpetrated in a given time. The scope of such redress remains controversial being that vital
components like distributive justice are still not holistically incorporated in the process
suggesting that the parameters of transitional justice are too limited.
The UN subsumes transitional justice within the precincts of international human rights law,
international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international refugee law. From
the preceding definitions, it appears that transitional justice is construed and defined in such a
way that it focuses mostly on political violence in war-torn and post-conflict countries. The
overt emphasis on outrageous violations in the form of physical violence underlines the
argument as to whether transitional justice should depart from the normative principles which
the UN argues, are aimed at assisting in the ‘complex but vital work of rule of law and
development’12, but rather, address matters concerning distributive justice and allied
deprivations which are precursors to physical violence.
Sharp notes that ‘… the blind spots of transitional justice mirror historic divisions and
hierarchies within international human rights law’.13 Yet, ‘… the proper role of transitional
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justice with respect to economic violence-including violations of economic and social rights,
corruption and plunder of natural resources14 is far less certain. Economic violence and
economic justice have sat at the periphery of transitional justice work’. 15 These postulations
beg some important questions: why is economic violence so relegated in transitional justice
mechanisms? Can transitional justice ‘grapple with larger and deeper dimensions of economic
violence’?16
According to the United Nations, ‘concepts such as … and transitional justice are essential to
understanding the international community’s efforts to enhance human rights, protect persons
from fear and want, address property disputes, encourage economic development, promote
accountable governance and peacefully resolve the conflict. They serve both to define our goals
and to determine our methods’.17 Socio-economic rights, as encapsulated in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESCR) include the right to education,
the right to adequate housing, the right to a fair remuneration for work, the right to health, and
the right to freedom from destitution. These rights impacts directly on vulnerable groups such
as those with disabilities, children, the elderly, minority communities or the unemployed. It is
beyond the scope of this chapter to deal exhaustively with the provisions of the ICESCR.18
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This section contextualises the argument around the relationship existing between socioeconomic rights and transitional justice, and in particular, the rights and the obligations they
impose together with inclusions and exclusions. This research argues like Schmid and Nolan,
that ‘looking at the linkage between ESR and transitional justice in practice, it is often relatively
straightforward to assess compliance with the obligations to respect and protect ESR, as well
as the obligation of non-discrimination, in the context of identifying and assessing violations
during a past armed conflict or situation of widespread violence’.19 In attaining this linkage,
methods used in achieving the ESR obligations include the tripartite typology (respect, protect
and fulfil), ‘conceptualizing ESR obligations in terms of those which are immediate and those
which are progressive; defining the duties imposed by such rights into obligations of conduct
and the obligations of result’.20 According to Schmid and Nolan:
The obligation to respect prohibits the state from interfering with existing
enjoyment of rights, for instance by arbitrarily destroying food or water sources.
The obligation to protect tasks the state with ensuring that non-state actors do
not interfere with people’s enjoyment of ESR, such as by adopting and
enforcing legislation to protect against abuses in the workplace by private
companies. The obligation to fulfil implies that state parties are obliged to do
whatever it takes to overcome obstacles to the full enjoyment of the right in
question, including both the immediate and progressive duties it imposes.21
Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR specifically provides in this regard that:
Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption
of legislative measures.
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Thus, the question of whether the transitional justice system has incorporated socio-economic
rights remains elusive despite suggestions that, ‘there are also countervailing considerations to
broadening the mandate of transitional justice measures to include violations of social and
economic rights, or at least economic crimes, including questions about the capacity and
effectiveness of measure that have a hard enough time satisfying their more traditional,
narrower, mandates’.22 The United Nations envisage that ‘the heightened vulnerability of
minorities, women, children, prisoners and detainees, displaced persons, refugees and others,
which is evident in all conflict and post-conflict situations, brings an element of urgency to the
imperative of restoration of the rule of law with large-scale past abuses, all within a context
marked by devastated institutions, exhausted resources, diminished security and a traumatized
and divided population, is a daunting, often overwhelming, task’.23 The UN is of the view that
‘it [corruption] requires attention to myriad deficits, among which are a lack of political will
for reform, a lack of institutional independence within the justice sector, a lack of domestic
technical capacity, a lack of material and financial resources, a lack of public confidence in the
Government, a lack of official respect for human rights and, more generally, a lack of peace
and security’.24
It is worthy to note at this point that Truth Commissions are iconic mechanisms of transitional
justice and from 1974-2004, thirty-four Truth Commissions were established worldwide but
only three dealt with economic crimes.25 Why has this very important link been missing over
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the years? It is argued further, by Carranza, that ‘an engagement with corruption would allow
transitional justice mechanisms, particularly truth commissions, to frame their work within a
larger factual context. By exposing the extent of grand corruption or the scale of economic
crimes, these mechanisms would reveal that the depth of the damage caused by perpetrators
goes beyond violence directed against their opponents or against citizens targeted by repressive
measures’.26 This argument would also suggest that the consequences of grand corruption
which include, ‘the diminution of agency, the depletion of social capital or growth of distrust,
and the weakening of institutions can be curbed through the application of measures whose
mission is to reaffirm basic norms and strengthen institutions that give force to these norms’.27
The foregoing suggests that it is customary and normative for transitional justice to be
associated with societies emerging from violent political crisis, aiming at ‘meeting the
immediacy of their security needs and to address the grave injustices of war, the root causes of
conflict have often been left unaddressed’.28 According to Dustin Sharp, ‘a more balanced
approach is to reconceptualise and reorient the “transition” of transitional justice, not simply
as a transition to democracy and the “rule of law,” the paradigm under which the field
originated, but as part of a broader transition to “positive peace” in which justice for both
physical violence and economic violence receives equal pride of place’.29 It is argued that such
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‘a reorientation would not guarantee or even mandate greater emphasis on economic concerns
in all cases’,30 however, this suggested trajectory could be an important step in the direction of
bringing socio-economic rights into the purview of transitional justice practice and policy. For
instance, incidents of grand corruption that pervade Nigeria may not present as many
challenges to civil and political rights as they do to socio-economic rights. Abusive conduct
that deprives people of their rights to health, food, education and other socio-economic rights
may inflict more serious damage than violations of civil and political rights. In Nigeria, as in
many other developing countries, it is likely that more people die from food deprivation and
poor health infrastructure than from the disenfranchisement of voters. A recent case at hand
would be the starvation at the camp of the internally displaced persons (IDP) fleeing Boko
Haram terrorism that has been highlighted in chapter one. Despite the devastating impact of
corruption on the lives of vulnerable people, ‘looters of public treasuries in Africa also derive
support from or are emboldened by the international legal regime. International legal practice
is dominated by a number of anachronisms which frustrate any effort to mount an effective
international campaign against the impunity of rogue leaders’.31 Yet, research indicate that
some prominent scholars have watered down the import of further engagement in the
exploration of socio-economic rights within the ambit of normative transitional justice and
international criminal law. Lars Waldorf, for instance, doubts the efficacy of any attention paid
to socio-economic rights related matters in international criminal law in the context of
transitional justice processes.32 Nevertheless, Waldorf still concurs with other scholars that
there is indeed bias in the way that international criminal law deals with matters relating to
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violation of socio-economic rights. Paige Arthur suggests that those pushing for the inclusion
of socio-economic rights in the transitional justice system are the same people leading ‘the
effort to get social and economic rights recognised as equal counterparts to civil and political
rights’.33 Arthur argues that those pushing for the inclusion are invariably asking for a paradigm
shift within transitional justice mechanisms that would focus on socio-economic rights as part
of the transitional justice normative framework as well as allied civil and political rights
issues.34 Similarly, Naomi Roht-Arriaza argues that ‘broadening the scope of what we mean
by transitional justice to encompass the building of a just as well as a peaceful society may
make the effort so broad as to become meaningless’.35 While Roht-Arriaza’s arguments are
entirely legitimate, they should be treated with caution in the sense that relegating some
economic factors that drive political strife could jeopardise the place of the international human
rights and criminal law system and as such would be regressive in the long run. This thesis
would rather argue as Sharp for ‘a careful analysis of the drivers of conflict and the social,
political, and financial capital that can be marshalled to effect change via the various
mechanisms of transitional justice in the wake of conflict’.36 Other scholars have also argued
for a change from “transitional justice” to “transformative justice”.37 This suggests that a shift
in nomenclature could, perhaps, bring closer into focus the need to address ‘a broader
conception of violence that would encompass often equally devastating forms of “economic
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violence”— including violations of economic and social rights, endemic corruption, and largescale looting of natural resources such as oil, diamonds, and timber’.38
The need to address the dissenting views of some scholars on the inclusion of socio-economic
rights in transitional justice is reflected in a recent OHCHR publication that states that ‘lack of
knowledge among transitional justice stakeholders of economic, social and cultural rights and
of the mechanisms available to protect them constitutes [a] challenge for a nuanced assessment
of the pros and cons of including these rights into transitional justice endeavours’.39 The former
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour supports this view. She
unequivocally stated that transitional justice should incorporate socio-economic rights
violations:
Transitional justice should take up the challenge that mainstream justice is also
reluctant to rise to acknowledging that there is no hierarchy of rights and
providing protection for all human rights, including economic, social and
cultural rights...A comprehensive transitional justice strategy would therefore
want to address the gross violations of all human rights during the conflict and,
I suggest, the gross violations that gave rise or contributed to the conflict in the
first place.40
The UN, in essence, argues robustly that ‘nevertheless, transitional justice can contribute to the
fight against impunity for violations of economic, social and cultural rights, and to their
prevention, by laying the foundations for forward-looking reforms and agendas’.41 This
research argues, like Carranza, that economic crimes impact adversely on the people through
acts culminating in the deprivation of essential provisions and infrastructures, hence, ‘an
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impunity gap is created when transitional justice mechanisms deal with only one kind of abuse
ignoring accountability for large-scale corruption and economic crimes’.42 All these constitute
human rights violations in themselves and arguably their investigation is a practical necessity
especially in transition processes.43 In sum, the structural violence occasioned by the endemic
corruption in Nigeria has a wider impact than direct political violence, and such structural
violence fuels direct violence. Carranza reiterates that:
Victim countries would benefit from having a transitional justice mechanism as
an alternative means of dealing with the legacies of corruption and economic
crimes. As stand-alone asset recovery efforts are not often part of a
comprehensive agenda to extract accountability from former rulers, situating
these initiatives in a transitional justice context could only be beneficial.44
The transitional justice system may not be the panacea for addressing issues of injustice
associated with the non-realisation of socio-economic rights, however, an impunity gap is
created and enhanced when transitional justice mechanisms deal with only one kind of abuse
while ignoring accountability for large-scale corruption and economic crimes. This highlights
the import of the question as to ‘whether transitional justice should also engage deeper issues
of distributive justice and structural violence that predate conflict and which may have in part
helped to precipitate it’?45 In answering this, it is advocated that addressing compelling socioeconomic deprivations could form part of the strategic goals of any transitional justice
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undertaking.46 This research argues that there appears to be no convincing reason why the
inclusion of socio-economic rights in transitional justice frameworks could not be
accommodated if transitional justice is geared towards redressing legacies of past abuses of
which failure to resolve in a timely manner may serve to ‘obfuscate and legitimate very serious
human rights abuses’.47 More so, ‘failure to address these concerns may ultimately undermine
the goals of transitional justice itself, including the prevention of a relapse into conflict’.48 This
research agrees with Sharp that there is the need ‘to replace the historic emphasis and exclusion
of economic violence with a more nuanced, contextualised, and balanced approach to the full
range of justice issues faced by societies in transition. In this, we would take one step forward
in moving beyond the constructed and self-imposed blind spots and biases in the field of
transitional justice’.49

5.3 Socio-Economic Rights in International Criminal Law: Limitations and Possibilities
Socio-economic rights include a number of entitlements, such as ‘the right to work; social
security; the protection of the family;…the right to an adequate standard of living; which
includes adequate food, clothing, and housing and continuous improvement of living
conditions; the right to the highest attainable standard of mental health; the right to education;
…’.50 Defined more expansively, socio-economic rights are ‘those human rights that aim to
secure for all members of a particular society a basic quality of life in terms of food, water,
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shelter, education, health care and housing’.51 These rights concern the material well-being of
the people and in particular, the vulnerable and downtrodden in society. The link between
these rights and their actualisation leaves a huge gap and has challenged international human
rights law. According to Ilias Bantekas and Louis Oette, ‘the gap between the promise
embodied in international human rights law and actual practice is frustrating … It is no longer
self-evidently good or considered able to provide solutions to the myriad contemporary
challenges’.52 This discrepancy undermines the tripartite typology of ‘to respect, protect and
fulfil’,53 the philosophy underscoring international human rights law. While this tripartite
typology ‘is often invoked as part of the strategy to break down the hierarchy between the two
sets of rights socio-economic rights and civil and political rights’,54 however, in reality, for
implementation based reasons, the ‘two sets of rights are [are] fundamentally different in their
normative character as civil and political rights are mostly considered “negative”, precise and
cost-free rights subject to immediate implementation whereas economic, social and cultural
rights are regarded as “positive”, vague and resource-demanding rights subject to progressive
realisation’.55
A positive right is a right that requires or whose main feature entails the presence of duties on
others to act in ways that protect or promote it. Thus, within the literature, ‘socio-economic
rights are mostly seen as “positive rights”, requiring the state to expend resources to provide a
remedy, whereas civil and political rights are “negative rights”, which simply require the state
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to refrain from unjust interference with individual liberty’.56 While there is currently no
consensus over the constellation of the “negative or positive” nature of these rights,57 what is
certain is that the process of realising civil and political rights might be relevant within the
context of socio-economic rights discourse and, moreover, both sets of rights encompass a
variety of obligations that overlap to a considerable extent.58 Other evidence of where negative
and positive rights overlap could be illustrated by the case of a right to fair hearing, which is a
civil and political right adjudication. Contrary to the generally held view that civil and political
rights are not resource intensive, such a case could involve a very expensive court process.
Airey v Ireland 59 represents one such case that suggests that the right to a fair trial could involve
the right to access to legal aid which is cost-intensive and of which the State bears the burden.
Another powerful example is the right to vote, which is a civil and political right involving
huge positive expense. In comparison, the right of protecting the privacy of people on welfare
requires minimal expense. Thus, the protection of civil and political rights may at some time
involve the imposition of positive duties and public expenditure which may not realistically be
less than what would have been the case in the realisation of socio-economic rights. This serves
to repudiate assumptions that only socio-economic rights demand intensive resource. Such
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claims are therefore questionable and may depend on the individual case. Sustained debates on
the merits of the “negative and positive” obligations dichotomy may not add substance to the
core of providing proper human rights protection. Rather, efforts should be geared towards
remedying the aberration in human rights jurisprudence where some ‘human rights are more
vaguely worded and more resource demanding than others’.60
In the light of these considerations, do socio-economic rights have a place in international law?
Can international criminal law address socio-economic rights violations? Does lack of
international jurisprudence hamper the realisation of socio-economic rights? What are the
limitations and possibilities? These questions are fundamental and beg for answers since the
neglect or denial of socio-economic rights customarily does not impose criminal liabilities. The
arguments around socio-economic rights within the ambit of the transitional justice system
remains a hazy area in international criminal law yet, the former United Nations SecretaryGeneral and Louise Arbour have variously pleaded for a deeper exploration of transitional
justice mechanisms.61
This section will expound the fundamentals of both the substantive and procedural issues
around the concept of socio-economic rights in international criminal law. A starting point is
to set out once again the definition of international crimes. International crimes are ‘conducts
outlawed by international law or conducts states deem that must be prevented and repressed by
international cooperation or both’.62 Ilias Bantekas defines it as ‘any act entailing liability of
the perpetrators and emanating from treaty or custom’.63
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In dealing with the concept of socio-economic rights violations, the central dissenting views
lie in the ‘position that certain abuses fall outside the scope of international criminal law
because their underlying factual conduct primarily affects people’s access to socio-economic
rather than civil and political rights. This situation raises serious and contentious questions
about the scope of current international law’.64 As stated earlier, the current normative
framework in international criminal law is predicated on the assumption that international
crimes are confined to the violations of certain civil and political rights and may not extend to
other inhumane violations that are socio-economic in nature, like those affecting housing,
education, health care, water, sanitation and working conditions. As set out in chapter 7 of this
thesis, the core international crimes as contained in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) include war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and aggression.
This research argues that grand corruption could be considered as an international crime falling
within the ambit of crimes against humanity under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute. Grand
corruption is responsible for siphoning resources from government spending on social
infrastructure, mainly education, health care, housing, water and sanitation.
Nevertheless, there is a reluctance within the realm of international criminal law to consider
grand corruption as an international crime, let alone to link it to direct violation of socioeconomic rights. However, there are causal links between grand corruption and socio-economic
rights violations. Drawing from the tripartite typology of “ to respect, protect and fulfil”, there
are indications that ‘a nuanced analysis of the definition of crimes showed that many types of
abusive conduct depriving people of their rights to food, health, water, education, participation
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in cultural life, food or other socio-economic ought to be prioritised within the ambit of
international criminal law’.65
It is also vital to emphasise that obstacles in the form of meeting certain legal criteria, fulfilling
the elements of a crime, evidentiary challenges and presentation of valid witnesses make the
task of bringing socio-economic rights within the ambit of international criminal law herculean.
Despite these obstacles, Louise Arbour has argued that though ‘efforts to address the legacy of
widespread human rights abuses display a bias towards civil and political rights’66, it is still
pertinent to pursue the merits of considering the treatment of the most egregious violations of
socio-economic rights within the context of the bias in relation to widespread human rights
abuses.67 Arbour’s views are not held in isolation. Sigrun Skogly states that ‘there are possible
violations of economic and social human rights that are sufficiently severe to merit an inclusion
into the crimes against humanity concept, such as deliberate starvation or forced evictions’.68
Schmid submits that ‘cases of traditional looting of personal property, the burning of civilian
homes in armed conflicts or the starvation of detainees are among the most straightforward
examples demonstrating that dealing with abuses of socio-economic is not inherently more
complex than the prosecution of abuses touching upon people’s civil and political rights’.69
The limitations of these arguments lie in a number of facts. ‘Normative advancements in the
field of socio-economic rights have not completely eradicated uncertainty as to whether socioeconomic rights can be understood as similar to other human rights’.70 This begs the question
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whether the way that crimes against humanity are understood in the international instruments
could give room for the inclusion of socio-economic violations.71 The principle of legality, a
bedrock of international criminal law, poses serious hurdles to such aspirations. The principle
of legality requires specificity, precise and unambiguous prescriptions. Van Den Herik
reiterates:
This fundamental principle of criminal law encapsulates several dimensions. In
addition to the prohibition of retroactivity, it also requires that crimes be prescribed
with sufficient clarity and precision so as to provide fair warning to individuals about
what constitutes criminal conduct. Such requirements contrast sharply with the
relatively vague formulation of socio-economic rights, in particular, as they have been
codified in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).The imprecise wording, or softness, of socio-economic rights, may thus
present a certain technical barrier that hinders direct criminalization.72
Arguably, the principle of legality precludes international lawyers from engaging with subjects
of violations of socio-economic rights as it prescribes the rules of legal interpretations to
conform to international normative practices. This is unwarranted since ‘legislative drafting of
this nature would render criminal laws rigid and inflexible and unsusceptible to future social,
economic and other developments’.73 Furthermore, current political affairs suggest that postconflict state building based on civil and political rights violation alone has not been successful.
Moreover, considering the fact that socio-economic rights violations often lead to civil and
political rights violations, it is plausible that both should be dealt with using the same platform.
It is a matter of necessity and not an aspiration that this limitation should be addressed.
Bantekas however, cautions that ‘if the criminal law was exclusively vague … it would allow
great latitude to judges and would ultimately offend the rule against the employment of
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analogies’.74 The argument around the principle of legality in international criminal law should,
therefore, be conducted in a way that recognises that ‘a balance between the two extremes is
necessary and within the parameters of legitimacy’.75
The legal impossibility argument further hinders the chance of socio-economic rights attaining
the same international criminalisation standard as civil and political rights. It presumes that
socio-economic rights jurisprudence needs holistic legal modification before international legal
regimes could engage with it. It supposes that the neglect of socio-economic rights in
international criminal law may have been deliberate. In this regard, Schmid observes that ‘the
practice of tribunals and quasi-judicial mechanisms, scholars, policy-makers and nongovernmental organisations have generally tended to accept the traditional view that the
consideration of the abuses of socio-economic rights has little or no place in international
criminal law’.76 This is developed by Van Den Herik:
On the one hand, international criminal law as a form of criminal law is based upon
principles of a classic liberal criminal law system which emphasises respect for the
independence of the individual, in particular, the defendant. On the other hand, the
human rights perspective, and possibly its very origin, focuses on the protection of
victims. This paradox leads to a tension, in substantive international criminal law in
particular, whereby it is difficult to reconcile strict methods and principles of
interpretation, such as in dubio pro reo, with the teleological and more victim-oriented
interpretation methods which are typical in human rights.77
Another barrier to the international criminalisation of socio-economic rights is the argument
that it spells out positive obligations. Positive obligations denote the responsibilities of States
to secure the full enjoyment of fundamental rights by individuals and are contrasted with
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negative obligations which require states to abstain from rights violations. Positive obligations
are tied to the failure to act by states (to secure the enjoyment of fundamental human rights) as
opposed to the normative criminal law requirement of the commission of an act rather than
omission. Article 7 (2) (a) of the Rome Statute of the ICC elaborated on these elements of
crime as a fundamental requirement in all ICC prosecutions, and as a ‘filtering prism to identify
the existence of a crime’.78
Socio-economic rights are also described as vague and unenforceable in nature. This does not
mean that it is a proven fact, but this has been an argument against the practical realisation of
socio-economic rights in many jurisdictions. Thus, by its substantive and procedural nature,
international criminal law is less disposed to deal with such rights as they are assumed as
essentially unbefitting for judicial determination. It follows that the argument is that socioeconomic rights do not conform to the principle of legality and have no clearly defined
prescriptions.
From the analysis given by Arbour, it appears that socio-economic rights in contemporary
international criminal law jurisprudence remain relegated as ‘aspirational expectations to be
fulfilled by market-driven or political processes alone’.79 Notwithstanding these obstacles, Van
Den Herik maintains that socio-economic rights stand the chances of attaining the legal status
currently enjoyed by adjudications on civil and political rights despite the widely held notion
that they are ‘less susceptible to international criminalization and entailing obligations of result
rather than obligations of conduct’.80 As a caution, Van Den Herik states that ‘there cannot be
any direct ‘transplants’ given that the two bodies of law are very distinct’. The argument of this
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author is that de lege lata, the international criminal law can already engage (and has engaged)
with many claims that factually relate to violations of socio-economic rights.
Notwithstanding the multifarious issues identified as working against the possibility of socioeconomic rights garnering the same international criminal law relevance as civil and political
rights, some scholars have expressed optimism that socio-economic rights could feature more
in the processes set up to address issues of transitional justice. Paul Ocheje canvasses for
expunging the unwarranted dichotomy between socio-economic rights and civil and political
rights primarily at the ICC jurisdiction.81 Ocheje argues that ‘whereas the disapproval of breach
of civil and political rights is virtually universal, breach of social and economic rights is yet to
receive the unanimous condemnation of humankind. This unequal treatment of human rights
has created the unfortunate impression that violators of social and economic rights can do so
with impunity’.82

5.4 Concluding Remarks
The Vienna Declaration of Rights 1993 reaffirms the universality, indivisibility and
interdependence of human rights, thereby reiterating that both civil and political and socioeconomic rights are of equal relevance at all the times. The evolving nature of international
law that appears to have created a huge rift between the two classes of human rights is now
exposed to scrutiny for the current bias existing between the two classes of rights. The reality
remains that ‘the position of socio-economic rights at the international level reflects these
attitudes of negativity or ambivalence about enforcement on the international level, which
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persist despite the United Nations' efforts to realign approaches to the two covenants’.83
Ultimately, it is time international law sheds this bias and begin to give equal attention to the
realities of socio-economic rights violations.
Grand corruption fuels human rights abuses and may constitute a violation of socio-economic
rights. It is also a subject of international criminal law due to its international nature. At the
domestic, regional and international level, a range of instruments with penal characteristics
address certain corrupt acts. Grand corruption, as argued strongly in other chapters of this
thesis, could constitute a human rights violation when juxtaposed with the tripartite typology
of the state’s obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. A typical example is where a government
tolerates corruption among the ruling elites, which is often tied to failure to fulfil socioeconomic obligations. Moreover, a state’s tolerance of corruption as exemplified by the
endemic grand corruption cases in Nigeria also violates the state’s duty to fulfil the rights to
social security among others.84 The assertion of President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria in a
recent anti-corruption conference in London that ‘the abuse and misuse of public office for
private gain has been a constant feature of governance in Nigeria for the past 30 years. In the
last two decades, especially, corruption – with its corresponding devastating socio-economic
consequences on national development and the well-being of our people …’85 suggests the
direct link between grand corruption and violations of socio-economic rights in Nigeria and reemphasises the government’s acceptance of its failure to protect, respect and fulfil socio-
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economic rights. It is argued that international criminal law is condoning impunity arising from
cases of endemic grand corruption through legislative insensitivity. Ocheje states;
There are many examples of international interventions to penalize regimes that
have been adjudged guilty of oppression and repression, but, although
expressions of sympathy for the plight of the poor is not in short supply in the
international community, no single instance of such intervention to liberate a
country from poverty or economic despoliation comes to mind.86
I conclude by reiterating the views of Ruth Gavison that ‘the answer to the question of which
concerns should be seen as rights or as human rights should be determined by our analysis of
the urgency of the needs, their relations to human dignity, and the need to give them the special
protection generated by rights’.87 In other words:
In addition, given the indivisibility of human rights, we must abandon for good the
erroneous notion that one class of rights (civil and political rights) require full
recognition and respect, while another class (social, economic and cultural rights) does
not require observance of any kind. From an international normative perspective, the
notion that social, economic and cultural rights are not legal rights has been superseded
for good. The idea that social rights are non-actionable is purely ideological and not
scientific; they stand out as authentic and genuine fundamental rights that are
actionable, demandable and that require serious and responsible observance. For this
reason, they should be demanded as rights, and not as gestures of charity, generosity or
compassion.88
Hence, there is no reason for concluding that socio-economic rights cannot be the subject of
international criminal law concern despite the normative gaps identified within the
international criminal law framework in this chapter. More so, as argued, grand corruption has
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substantive international criminal law aspects that should place it within the ambit of
international criminal law and transitional justice mechanisms.
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Chapter Six
International Criminal Law and Grand Corruption
6.1 Introduction
There appears to be a close link between international criminal law and grand corruption.
However, this relationship is not legally substantive, particularly at the international level.
While appreciating that both concepts are intertwined, scholars have written extensively on
some legal technicalities that may preclude international criminal law from prosecuting grand
corruption.1 Starr argues:
Grand corruption cannot be prosecuted internationally without some legal basis.
The ideal option would be widespread ratification of a new treaty, or an
amendment to the ICC’s Rome Statute spelling out the elements of the crime.
This would remove any doctrinal doubt and would send a clear, loud signal as
to what conduct is prohibited- valuable in terms of fairness to defendants as a
well as potential deterrent and norm-shaping effects.2
This suggests, inter alia, that using the jurisprudence of international criminal law to prosecute
grand corruption remains a difficult task. This chapter explores ways of situating grand
corruption within the purview of international criminal law bearing in mind that corruption is
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a treaty-based or transnational crime,3 not yet conceptualised as a crime under international
law (stricto sensu). Crimes under international law involve individual criminal responsibility,
and are punishable under international law, primarily by the ICC.4
Thus, by inquiring into the appropriateness of the mechanisms of international criminal law for
combating grand corruption, the chapter interrogates the relationship between international
criminal law and grand corruption. The chapter examines the forms of grand corruption that
qualify for international criminalisation.5 It further explores the Rome Statute as a possible
instrument for prosecuting grand corruption while also advancing other ways through which
international criminal law could prosecute grand corruption.

6.2 International Criminal Law and Grand Corruption
International criminal law (ICL) ‘is a body of international rules designed both to proscribe
certain categories of conduct (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture,
aggression, international terrorism) and to make those persons who engage in such conduct
criminally liable’.6 International criminal law is a relatively new branch of international law
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and it continues to evolve.7 The existence of international criminal law depends on the sources
and processes of international law, and according to Cassese, Gaeta, Baig, Gosnell and Whiting
‘it simultaneously derives its origin from and continuously draws upon both international
humanitarian law and human rights law, as well as national criminal law’.8 Stephen Hall posits
that the ‘emergence of international human rights law and the international criminal law means
that the international law’s material space extends even into areas which were, until a few
decades ago, considered sensitive matters of exclusive domestic jurisdiction’.9 International
criminal law as a body of law evolved after the establishment of the international tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.10

6.2.1 Defining International Criminal Law
International criminal law has been defined by various scholars. Bassiouni broadly defines
international criminal law to include the criminal law aspects of international law as well as
the international aspect of national criminal law.11 Bassiouni’s definition falls within the ambit
of international criminal law largo sensu, covering both direct and indirect systems of
enforcement, prosecution of crimes by international tribunals and by domestic authorities based
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on treaties.12 Cryer and Werle define international criminal law (stricto sensu) with a narrower
perspective as encompassing all norms that establish, exclude, or otherwise regulate
responsibility for crimes under international law.13 The definition of Cryer and Werle refers to
core international crimes, namely, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and crimes
against peace.14 Core international crimes provide for international criminal liability that
persists irrespective of whether any criminal liability is prescribed under domestic laws.15 The
International Bar Association (IBA) defines international criminal law as ‘a body of
international rules prescribing international crimes and regulating principles and procedures
governing the investigation, prosecution and punishment of these crimes’.16

6.2.2 What Constitutes International Crimes?
Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which occurred after the Second World War, the
definition of the crimes classified as international crimes has been undergoing intense
examination and refinement.17 The International Bar Association agreed that there is neither a
universally accepted definition of an international crime nor general criteria for determining
the scope and content of an international crime.18 However, general criteria drawing on the
characteristics of international crime are adopted as a guideline in defining international crimes.
In particular, the ICC’s preamble refers to the crimes that are of most concern to the
‘Treaty based crimes’ are used in this context to refer to crimes which due to treaty
stipulations oblige states to criminalise certain offences at the domestic level (see section 2.2).
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international community as a whole and recognises that such crimes threaten the peace, security
and well-being of the world so such crimes merit inclusion as international crimes.19 It appears
that the language employed in the Rome Statute in its preamble restricts the classification and
jurisdiction of international crimes to constitute “the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole”. While not being exhaustive in the definition of the two
dominant themes “threat to international peace” and “shocking the conscience of mankind”,
the Rome Statute has evidently placed a very high threshold in recognising international
crimes. However, in line with these general criteria for classifying international crime,
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression are regarded as
“core” international crimes or international crimes in a narrow sense (stricto sensu). The
international courts and tribunals, including ICTY, ICTR and ICC, have been given jurisdiction
over these crimes.20 In a broader sense (largo sensu), other crimes have been classified as
international crime; these are also referred to as “Treaty Crimes” and without purporting to be
exhaustive and in no particular order include, the following: piracy; torture; terrorism; slavery;
international trafficking in illicit drugs; international hostage-taking; trading in women and
children; serious apartheid offences; international postage offences; and pollution of the sea.
Transnational crimes are treaty-based crimes and do not fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction and
grand corruption is viewed as a transnational crime. Thus, transnational crimes are not
autonomous from the treaties in which they are contained and require participating states to
criminalise on the basis of their existing principles of criminal law.21
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The Preamble to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), recognises
corruption as a transnational crime. Specifically, in chapter III, UNCAC contains obligations
to criminalise certain corrupt practices and related offences in both the public and private
spheres. Other regional anti-corruption instruments have similar provisions for the
criminalisation of corrupt acts. In particular, Article 2 (3) of the AU Convention provides for a
harmonised criminalisation of acts of corruption and related offences at the national level.
Notwithstanding that grand corruption has been criminalised in many jurisdictions, and Nigeria
in particular,22 this research interrogates why grand corruption still remains in the category of
transnational crimes. In agreement with Sonja Starr, I emphasise the same questions, ‘would a
shift in focus enable better use of international resources’?23 ‘What changes in approach would
be necessary’?24

6.2.3 Grand Corruption within the Context of International Criminal Law
‘International criminal law is the law that governs international crimes. It may be said that this
discipline of law is where the penal aspects of international law, including that body of law
protecting victims of armed conflict known as international humanitarian law, and international
aspects of national criminal law, converge’.25 Cassese defines it as ‘a body of international
rules designed to proscribe certain categories of conduct (…) and to make such persons who
engage in such conduct criminally liable’.26 Despite the classification of international crimes
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in the paradigm of stricto sensu and largo sensu, the crux of the argument of this research is
anchored in locating the subject of grand corruption within the jurisprudence of international
criminal law. In this regard, the reasoning of Ilias Bantekas that ‘the prohibition of certain
conduct by treaty or by custom always entails criminal liability under international law,
irrespective of whether the prohibited conduct is defined as a universal crime or an offence to
be further elaborated through domestic law’27 remains a focal point. For Bantekas, this process
represents the first step in the criminalisation process.28 Sonja Starr shares simillar views with
Bantekas for she notes that ‘international criminal law is generally understood to be a
mechanism for, responding to, punishing, and preventing war crimes and mass atrocities’.29
Sunga and Bottigliero argue that ‘the optimal starting point in the development and
implementation of effective anti-corruption strategies through a multilateral institutional
framework must be the relevant emerging international legal norm and mechanisms’.30 Kofelekale opines that ‘the breach of the independent right to a corruption-free society should be
treated as a crime under international law’.31 He claims that ‘one can safely conclude that an
emerging customary law norm that treats corruption as a crime under international law draws
strong support...’.32 While Kofele-kale’s claims remain unsubstantiated, other international
criminal law scholars like Bantekas, Starr, Boersma, Acheampong and Ocheje have suggested
that grand corruption deserves upgrading to a crime under international law while others, like
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Eboe-Osuji, Wolf and Acquaah-Gaisie, suggest that it has already acquired the status through
customary international norms.
Paul Ocheje argues that the ‘harrowing consequences of official corruption for African
societies elevate corruption to the level of a breach of the social and economic rights recognised
in international human rights law’.33 Ocheje suggests the ‘elevation of corruption to the status
of a crime in positive international law and expansion of the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court to include official corruption and looting of public funds’. 34 Bantekas is more
definitive and suggests that corruption might fulfil the requirements of the crime of
extermination (Article 7 (2) (b) of the Rome Statute).35 Acquaah–Gaisie, Sonja Starr and
Ubong Effeh expresses similar opinions that the ‘requirements set by (Article 7 (2) (K) of the
Rome Statute are met considering the effects of grand corruption on human rights.36 However,
Starr suggests that ‘it is broadly accepted that some kind of international interest is necessary
to justify international criminalisation, as is some degree of seriousness’.37 The Rome Statute
in its preamble retains the language that restates the seriousness of limiting jurisdictions to ‘the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’.38 While the
vagueness relating to the degree of international interest and seriousness required for the
international criminalisation of crimes remains open to debate and interpretation, Sunga and
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Bottigliero argue that corruption should be treated as ‘a matter of international legal concern
rather than as a matter falling within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of individual states’.39
These restrictive definitions do not sustain a pattern of argument more likely to favour the
upgrading of grand corruption as a crime under international law.
According to Dinstein, in order to attain this status, ‘the practice of States is the conclusive
determinant in the creation of international law (including international criminal law), and not
the desirability of stamping out obnoxious patterns of human behaviour’.40 Moreover, Bantekas
and Nash posit that ‘the legal basis for considering an offence to be of international import is
where existing treaties or customs consider the act as being an international crime’. 41 Arguing
from these points, it would appear that grand corruption in particular merits inclusion as an
international offence as an existing treaty (UNCAC) considers it to be an international crime.
However, while it is certain that grand corruption has international dimensions, international
efforts to combat it over the years have been grossly inadequate and ineffective.42 Accordingly,
could it be inferred that crimes affecting economic and social interests are by their nature less
harmful than the other crimes widely held as core international crimes? While this is not the
case, the reality is that there is an overt emphasis and focus on violent crimes by international
criminal law, thereby according undue preference to civil and political rights at the expense of
socio-economic rights. There also are scant arguments as to why grand corruption should not
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be criminalised by international criminal law.43 The dearth of such arguments underscores the
merit in the case for the criminalisation of grand corruption by the international criminal law
regime.
In summary, it appears that action has not matched rhetoric in dealing with the devastating
impact of grand corruption and, thus, the role of international criminal law in combating
corruption has remained inadequate. The effects of grand corruption, as argued in the previous
chapters, in many respects surpass that of other international crimes that have garnered
international sympathy and recognition. Sonja Starr argues that ‘if a population is sufficiently
vulnerable and a diversion of funds sufficiently large relative to the total amount available to
serve the population’s need, it is clear that great suffering or health injury will follow from the
diversion in the ordinary course of events’.44 It is thus pertinent to emphasise the devastating
effect of grand corruption on ordinary people and to inquire how international criminal law
could aid in combating the scourge. This becomes an option owing to the failings of some
national courts, particularly in Nigeria, to prosecute grand corruption cases to logical
conclusions.45
To proceed further with the argument, it is pertinent to restate that amongst the forms of
corruption listed in chapter III UNCAC, bribery (passive), embezzlement and illicit enrichment
are the forms this chapter recommends for the purpose of consideration for international

Karen Alten and Juliet Sorensen ‘Let Nations, Not the World Prosecute Grand Corruption’
U.S News (April 30 2014)-They argue that corruption should be left under States’ jurisdictions
considering that the ICC is clearly overwhelmed by its caseloads. They also cited the opposition from
America and Russia towards the mandate of ICC as a major consideration against the international
criminalisation of corruption.
44
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criminalisation. Article 15 of UNCAC defines passive bribery as ‘the solicitation or acceptance
by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the
exercise of his or her official duties’.46 Article 17 UNCAC defines embezzlement as ‘the
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or
for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities
or any other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position’.47
Article 20 UNCAC defines illicit enrichment as ‘a significant increase in the assets of a public
official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income’.48 The
justification for advancing bribery (passive), embezzlement and illicit enrichment lies in the
mandate given by UNCAC to state parties to criminalise the offence within the domestic
legislations. This is opposed to some other corruption offences with the optional mandate for
criminalisation. Articles 30 (1) and 26 (4) of UNCAC suggest appropriate sanctions in line
with relevant corruption offences. The author maintains that while international criminal law
may not totally eradicate the global menace of grand corruption, it is still the choice expressed
by many scholars and stakeholders, especially, Kofele-Kale.49
Despite these facts, international criminal law remains crisis-based due to the practices that put
international tribunals’ focus on crimes committed in crisis situations, predominantly warfare
while neglecting other abuses whose impact is similar. The violations of the ‘right to housing,
food, and education, work, health or other ESCR through corrupt acts are not always beyond
46
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the realm of international criminal law; however, to date, most transitional justice mechanisms
have not realised that violations of certain ESCR rights can constitute... crimes against
humanity in peace times’.50 This trend is worrying as, at times, the effect of corruption on
people leaves a more devastating impact, for instance, ‘lack of access to water can prove more
deadly than a massacre by firearms’,51 and the ‘same is true for the wilful hindrance of
humanitarian assistance’.52 In human rights language, such scenarios can often be understood
as violations of socio-economic rights, particularly where states fail to respect these rights,
such as by directly interfering with the enjoyment of people’s access to housing, food,
education or health, or where states fail to protect persons within their jurisdiction from abuses
by non-state actors. Some of the questions for this research pertinent to this section are:
•
•

‘Have the international criminal tribunals emphasised crisis situations and security
threats while ignoring longer-term, systemic causes of human suffering?’53
Could “other inhumane acts of a similar character” be used to extend the reach of the
Rome Statute?

This leads to the consideration of the third research question: How can international criminal
law conceptualise grand corruption as a crime under international law to be prosecuted as a
crime against humanity? The Global Organisations of Parliamentarians against Corruption
(GOPAC) strongly support the project of upgrading corruption to an international crime.
GOPAC offers a number of options in this regard.54 Moreover, Kofele-kale reiterates that ‘...
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The focus has now shifted to the ICC Assembly of State Parties to persuade it to take another
look at the Rome Statute of the ICC with a view to amending Articles 5 and 7 to include
indigenous spoliation as one of the crimes within the court’s jurisdiction’. 55
Kofele-Kale concludes that he hopes ‘decent people would be revolted by the excesses of a
Pinochet, a Sani Abacha, the Omar Bongos and Obiang Nguemas or an Ondong Ndong and
would as a consequence share this research’s view that depredations of this sort qualify as a
crime against humanity’.56 In Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia defines crimes against humanity as ‘... Inhumane acts that by their very
extent and gravity go beyond the limits tolerable to the international community, which must
per force demand their punishment’.57 The definition of crimes against humanity cited in
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic accordingly is the crime this research argues grand corruption is akin
to, particularly, within the context of the Nigerian State.

6.3 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
The International Military Tribunal (hereinafter, “IMT”) in Nuremberg is the precursor of the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The IMT at Nuremberg was ‘formally established by the
London agreement of 8 August 1945 between the governments of Great Britain, the U.S,
France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic’.58 The IMT was principally established ‘to
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prosecute German war criminals; the London Charter gave the IMT jurisdiction over crimes
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity’.59
The preamble to the Rome Statute reflects many principles, including ‘affirming that the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished
and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level
and by enhancing international cooperation …’60. According to the ICC handbook,61 the
history, relevance and scope of the Rome Statute are encapsulated in these words:
On 17 July 1998, 120 States adopted a statute in Rome - known as the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the Rome Statute”) - establishing
the International Criminal Court. For the first time in the history of humankind,
States decided to accept the jurisdiction of a permanent international criminal
court for the prosecution of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes
committed in their territories or by their nationals after the entry into force of
the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002. The International Criminal Court is not a
substitute for national courts. According to the Rome Statute, it is the duty of
every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes. The International Criminal Court can only intervene where
a State is unable or unwilling genuinely to carry out the investigation and
prosecute the perpetrators. The primary mission of the International Criminal
Court is to help put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, and thus to
contribute to the prevention of such crimes. A well-informed public can
contribute to guaranteeing lasting respect for and the enforcement of
international justice.62

Accordingly, the United Nations reiterates that:
The International Criminal Court was established to bring to trial the
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international
See Article 6 of the Tribunal Charter; Tonya J Boller, ‘The International Criminal Court:
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community as a whole, i.e. the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and the crime of aggression (once a provision is adopted defining the
latter crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction with respect to this crime). The jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. By
establishing the International Criminal Court the States party to the Statute
aimed to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole, and thus to contribute to
the prevention of such crimes, and to secure the peace, security and well-being
of the world, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations, and in particular the principle that all States shall refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.63
The Rome Statute has a global reach with excess of 120 State parties and ‘representing all
regions: Africa, the Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as
Western European and North America’.64 The decisions of the ICC are not retroactive.65
The ICC’s administrative composition presents it as a core permanent international criminal
court. The judicial arm has eighteen full-time judges elected for a renewable tenure of nine
years by the Assembly of State Parties (ASP). There is also a requirement of requisite
knowledge of criminal law proceedings attached to the posts of these judges. Articles 34 to 39
of the Rome Statute deals with the administrative matters and running of the ICC in general.
Principles like the independence of the judges and the enormous powers attached to the office
of the prosecutor make the ICC a unique international criminal court.66
On the issue of jurisdiction, ‘States surrender their judicial sovereignty to ICC with respect to
the crimes enumerated in the Statute when they become parties to the Rome Statute. In essence,
States agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court, which may exercise its jurisdiction in
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situations where the alleged perpetrator is a national of a State Party or where the crime was
committed in the territory of a State Party. Also, a State not a party to the Statute may decide
to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC. These conditions do not apply when the Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, refers a situation to the Office of the
Prosecutor’.67 The ICC was recently under threat from the African Union, which raised the
possibility of running a parallel court that might undermine the ability of the ICC to attain its
jurisdictional mandate. Cases against certain African heads of States, in particular, Uhuru
Kenyatta of Kenya and Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan by the ICC, opened a plethora of debates as
to the relevance of the ICC to the African continent. Is ICC anti-Africa? Does ICC indulge in
selective justice? These are the questions currently been debated by scholars relating to the
relationship between the African States and ICC.68 It is not within the scope of this research to
discuss this exhaustively; however, these questions are pertinent to this research as one of the
key arguments pursued is arguing for the ways of using the ICC as an instrument of combating
grand corruption in Nigeria. Also, given the corruption records of some of the incumbent
African leaders, would corruption trials present a realistic possibility where these rulers are in
power and use their powers to make the African Union cut relations with the ICC?
The implications of this to anti-corruption battle is grave hence, the ICC remains central to this
research. The ICC by its scope prosecutes individuals not groups or States, which makes it
ideal for the thesis arguments. ‘Any individual who is alleged to have committed crimes within
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the jurisdiction of the ICC may be brought before the ICC. In fact, the Office of the Prosecutor’s
prosecutorial policy is to focus on those who, having regard to the evidence gathered, bear the
greatest responsibility for the crimes, and does not take into account any official position that
may be held by the alleged perpetrators’.69 Thus, the ICC extends no immunity to any
individual, whether in political authority or not (Article 27 (2). The absence of any immunity
clause adds to the credibility of the ICC as the presence of immunity clause in some domestic
constitutions remains a major hindrance in the fight against corruption in such States. For
instance, section 308 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria still provides for the “immunity
clause” for some elected officers and has shielded certain political office holders from legal
prosecution while in office, notwithstanding the weight of any corruption allegation against
them.
Article 5 (1) of the Rome Statute sets out the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has
jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following
crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War
crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.70
The Nuremberg Tribunal and the ICC Statute are to a large extent interrelated. It is not an
overstatement to reiterate that the Rome Statute extended the competence of the IMT in many
aspects.
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6.3.1 Article 7 of the Rome Statute (Crimes against Humanity)
Article 7 forms the first focal point of the analysis of this chapter and defines “crime against
humanity” as ‘any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognised as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health.71
In so doing, the Rome Statute provides the ICC with broad universal jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute anyone who perpetrates an international criminal act, so long as the perpetrator’s
state is a party to the Statute and the acts were committed after the Statute entered into force
on July 1, 2002. Crimes against humanity have evolved over the years and now refer to
atrocities committed in peacetime as well as in wartime. Moreover, ICC prosecution is
restricted by the complimentarity principle of the Rome Statute (articles 17-20 and 53), which
limits ICC jurisdiction to crimes that the host state is unwilling or unable to actively pursue. In
this regard, many states have enacted legislation that provides for the investigation and
prosecution of crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
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The historical antecedents of the ICC is not the focus of this chapter as it has been extensively
addressed by others.72 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that during the Travaux Preparatoires
(official record of negotiation) of the Rome Statute, offences of an economic nature, such as
financial crimes were mooted by Libya and Cuba, but from the official documents, elicited no
further debate or action and thus were excluded from incorporation within the jurisdiction of
the ICC.73 Nigeria delegates made no suggestions for the inclusion of financial crimes in the
Rome Statute. In this regard, Neil Boister argues that the exclusion of treaty crimes from the
Rome Statute was undermined by feelings of uncertainty and irreconcilable opinions by
different member states.74 Arguably, there were concerns about trivialising the mandate of the
ICC as well as the need to preserve its reputation. Opposition from key states like the USA
helped to compound matters and thus, treaty crimes were foreclosed and more attention was
paid to the core international crimes. Despite this, the analysis in this thesis will focus on the
relevance of the Rome Statute towards the legitimacy of international prosecutions for the
crime of grand corruption.
The emergence of the ICC undoubtedly strengthened the place of international criminal law
(stricto sensu) by reiterating the so-called core international crimes entrenched in Articles 5 to
9 of the Rome Statute. The core international crimes remain offences that are firmly established
in customary international law. Although the main focus of the ICC has been in armed conflicts,
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the ICC it is argued, remains a desirable means of responding to serious long-term crimes such
as grand corruption.75 However, beyond the jurisprudence of these core international crimes,
the evolution of certain transnational crimes has given impetus to the exploration of the
provisions of the Rome Statute for potential to prosecute other offences including grand
corruption, thereby attempting to conceptualise them as crimes under international law, which
arguably would fall under international law stricto sensu.
Grand corruption, the focus of this thesis, lends to this paradigm shift being that the crippling
impact of grand corruption in Nigeria may properly be considered a crime against humanity
under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute. “Other inhumane acts” arguably remain ‘a residual
category whose drafters did not require exhaustive enumeration because its purpose was to
encompass all serious conduct that was not otherwise found within the list of acts that give rise
to crimes against humanity’.76 The drafters of the Rome Statute anticipated that some inhumane
acts like grand corruption could unleash situations that could be more precarious than warfare.
When read with Article 21 of the Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (k), encourages a form of judicial
activism and provides a route for navigating the uncharted world of international criminality.
It provides avenues whereby, given appropriate cases, gross human rights abuses and violations
can be challenged as serious crimes against humanity. Relying on the enormous power given
to the ICC by the Rome Statute, the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project
(SERAP), petitioned the Prosecutor of the ICC in 2009:
To use your position and powers to examine and investigate whether the
systemic/grand corruption in Nigeria amounts to a crime against humanity
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and to prevail on the
Nigerian government to fulfil its obligations to effectively and fairly investigate
and prosecute all allegations of grand corruption since 1985. Nigeria is a state
75
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party to the Rome Statute and deposited its instrument of ratification on 27
September 2001.77
The extent of engagement the ICC had with this petition is uncertain as the office of the
Prosecutor has not reacted officially to the petition, but SERAP has set a precedent by relying
on the extensive powers of the ICC to push for the international criminalisation of grand
corruption. The International Law Commission supports the view that the core test of crimes
against humanity is that they must be instigated or directed by the government or by any
organisation or group.78
The Rome Statute provides a review mechanism in Article 123 whereby treaty crimes like
grand corruption could potentially be dealt with. Despite this provision, there are concerns that
endemically corrupt states can conspire to frustrate such provisions. Some signatories to the
ICC Charter are countries where systemic corruption is rife, according to research data from
Transparency International and the World Bank. Moreover, opposition to the use of the ICC
for potentially prosecuting grand corruption is widespread. The overall performance of the ICC
is criticised as being below people’s expectations and as a result, it may be argued that it makes
no sense to expand its jurisdiction when it is often saddled with heavy workload and struggles
to cope with such enormous workload. The prolonged trial of Thomas Lubanga of the Congo
79

is often cited as one of the clear cases of ICC’s ineptitude while the collapse of Uhuru
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Kenyatta case has attracted much criticism.80 Nevertheless, the subject of corruption is not
totally absent in the functioning of the Rome Statute. Article 70 (1)81 contemplates corruption
within the administrative bodies of the ICC. Esther Hava is critical of restricting the inclusion
of corruption to the administrative arms of the ICC arguing that ‘… it is clear that such
provisions, while necessary for ensuring the proper functioning of the Court, are far from ideal
when it comes to achieving the goal stated at the start of this report, i.e. preventing impunity in
the most serious cases of Grand Corruption’.82

6.3.2 Grand Corruption as an Inhumane Act
Grand corruption leads to gross economic and social deprivation resulting in inefficiency in
governance, inhumane treatment of the citizenry as well as the unwillingness of the authorities
to investigate or prosecute such cases. It is in line with this argument that this research argues
specifically, that Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute provides a ground of prosecuting such
“other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to the body or to mental or physical health” caused by grand corruption as crimes against
humanity. Yury Fedotov of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) admits
that:
Corruption … Impacts the vulnerable, so much that universal primary education
cannot exist if bribes are needed to enter children into school systems …
Reductions in child mortality are more difficult where payments are required to
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obtain medical assistance. This could be the difference between eating or going
hungry, and in some cases, … even between living and dying.83
In Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 1 defined inhumane
acts as ‘serious violations of international customary law and basic rights pertaining to human
beings, drawn from the norms of international human rights law, which are of similar nature
and gravity to the acts referred to in Article 7 (1).84 This is the basis from which the argument
of this chapter is constructed. Although a subject of robust scholarly engagement, Article 7(1)
(k) jurisprudence implies that the ICC has broad discretion to charge individuals with crimes
that are not listed expressly in the Rome Statute.85 Similarly, ad hoc tribunals (namely, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also have prosecuted “other inhumane acts” as crimes
against humanity.86
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Starr argues that grand corruption can fall within the scope of “inhumane act” as codified in
Article 7(1) (k). GOPAC supports Starr adding that this could be effective ‘if grand corruption
is defined in a manner that makes it explicit that it is restricted to inhumane acts that cause
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’.87 Acquaah-Gaisie
maintains that ‘large-scale corruption causes death of infants, devastation by diseases such as
AIDS and malaria, denial of a decent education, results as serious as the repercussions of armed
conflict’.88 GOPAC however, cautions that:
There are concerns that equating corruption with crimes against humanity may
be unreasonable, since the devastation caused by corruption is not as obvious as
in, for example, genocide or slavery. Expanding the scope of “other inhumane
acts” to include corruption may encourage political actors to try to further
stretch the definition and pursue political vendettas through the ICC.89
The argument of GOPAC, as coherent as it appears, may not really be plausible when
consideration is given to the current socio-economic state in Nigeria, particularly the security
threat, unemployment, infrastructural decay and non-payment of workers’ wages. The
increasing security threat by Boko Haram, Niger Delta Avengers and MEND are linked to the
consequences of pervasive grand corruption.90 Does this loss of lives and properties not equate
to “other inhumane acts”? In the words of Yury Fedetov, ‘the millions of people … have
inspired the world and shown their hatred of corruption and corrupt societies…an emphatic
rejection of corruption and a cry for integrity ’.91
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6.4

Other Ways International Criminal Law can Prosecute Grand Corruption

Scholars have suggested that while the Rome Statute may not be the ideal platform for the
prosecution of grand corruption, there are other potential areas that if judicially explored, could
help in placing grand corruption under serious legal scrutiny. Judge Mark Wolf strongly argues
for the establishment of an “International Anti-corruption Court”, while GOPAC in a paper
published on 8 November 2013 listed the following options as alternative routes for combating
grand corruption and ending the culture of impunity at all levels of governance:
i, National Courts with Universal Jurisdiction
ii, Regional Courts
iii, Creating New Mechanisms.

6.4.1 An International Anti-Corruption Court (IACC)?
Judge Mark Wolf is a strong advocate of the establishment of an International Anti-Corruption
Court (IACC) as a platform for the global prosecution of grand corruption. Wolf makes the
case that ‘grand corruption is a crime in virtually every country. It is also a violation of the
United Nations Convention against Corruption, which more than 100 countries have ratified,
and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials, which 40 nations have
signed. A commitment to combat, grand corruption is also a requirement of membership in the
WTO’.92 Wolf argues that ‘corruption is not a victimless crime’93 but rather impacts adversely
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on the vulnerable people who witness the diminishing of the substance of the rule of law
through acts attributable to graft. These acts lead to innumerable catastrophic consequences for
the most vulnerable people and, as such, should be dealt with by the establishment of an
International Anti-Corruption Court. The blueprint of Wolf is:
An International Anti-Corruption Court (“IACC”), similar to the ICC or as part
of it, should now be established to provide a forum for the criminal enforcement
of the laws prohibiting grand corruption that exist in virtually every country,
and the undertakings that are requirements of various treaties and international
organisations. Staffed by elite investigators and prosecutors as well as impartial
judges, an IACC would have the potential to erode the widespread culture of
impunity, contribute to creating conditions conducive to the democratic election
of honest officials in countries which have long histories of grand corruption,
and honor the courageous efforts of the many people, particularly young people,
who are increasingly exposing and opposing corruption at great personal peril.94
Wolf advocates for an international anti-corruption court to be staffed by an elite corps of
investigators and experienced impartial judges.95 The court should operate on the ‘principle of
complementarity and empowered by the international law to hear civil fraud and corruption
cases brought by private whistle-blowers’.96 The IACC should, in essence, have both criminal
and civil jurisdictions. Judge Wolf opines that while the ICC may not really be the proper
platform to prosecute grand corruption due to overwhelming administrative, technical and
political issues confronting it, the IACC may be the best option and may enjoy the support of
the USA which never supported the ICC due to issues they argue impinges on their national
interest.

94

Wolf (n 92)14.
ibid 10.
96
Ibid; See http://whistle.finance.gov.ng/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 25 March 2017.
Whistle-blowing is now officially compensated in Nigeria. The government reports huge sums of
money recovered as a result of recent government open policy of rewarding authentic whistle-blowers
from December 2016, see Anthony Maliki, Hamisu Muhammed, Adelanwa Bamgboye, John Chuck
Azu, Abbas Jimoh, Latifat Opoola ‘Whistleblowers Smiling to the Bank’ Dailytrust (Abuja, 24 March
2017).
183
95

The proposals of Judge Wolf were criticised by some scholars. Mathew Stephenson in
particular, argues that the contribution of Wolf to the discourse at its best, ‘adds to the existing
debate on this topic’.97 What this means is that Wolf’s proposals look attractive, but, unrealistic.
According to Stephenson, the proposal of Wolf constitutes an attempt at infringement on state
sovereignty. States would oppose undue intrusion into their national issues and this would work
against the proposal of Judge Wolf. Moreover, Wolf believed that America would support the
proposed IACC despite its opposition to the ICC, although there is no guarantee that this would
happen. Besides, the claim by Wolf that, ‘American companies generally behave ethically and,
in any event, are significantly deterred from paying bribes by the threat of prosecution for
violating the FCPA’98 is controversial considering the number of bribery scandals in which
American companies trading abroad were involved.99 Stephenson adds further that Wolf failed
to take into consideration the fact that certain states like Afghanistan, Argentina and Thailand
practice patronage politics. He also doubts if corruption hotspot states like Nigeria, China,
Russia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa could be trusted to embrace
Wolf’s proposal.100 In the absence of these states, how would the court function efficiently?
There are also issues with the enforcement mechanisms which are overtly high-handed and
may not reflect the human right standards on which the battle against grand corruption is
premised. The threat of state expulsion from the WTO should they fail to sign onto the IACC
would impact negatively on the downtrodden.101

See Mathew Stephenson, ‘The Case Against an Anti-Corruption Court’ (31 July 2014) The
Global Anti-Corruption Blog < http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/07/31/the-case-against-aninternational-anti-corruption-court/> accessed 11 November 2015.
98
Wolf (n 92) 6.
99
See section 2.6 on Multinational Corporations and Grand Corruption in Nigeria.
100
Stephenson (n 97) 3.
101
Wolf ( 92) 9.
184
97

In sum, Stephenson argues:
There are a number of ways Judge Wolf’s proposed IACC could actually prove
counterproductive — eroding the international norm against anticorruption,
emboldening some leaders to resist other forms of pressure to clean up their
acts, possibly triggering a backlash among citizens in certain countries who
resent the intrusiveness of the IACC, and — for those countries that remain
outside the IACC despite Judge Wolf’s proposed sanctions — cutting them off
from the economic opportunities and international engagement that might, in
the long-term, do more to reduce corruption than the punishment of a handful
of officials from a few, likely very poor, countries.102
Despite the sustained criticism against the principal model advanced by Judge Wolf, his writing
has added substantially to the project of devising alternative ways of combating grand
corruption at the global level.

6.4.2 National Courts with Universal Jurisdiction
The suggestion of exploring the option of establishing national courts with universal
jurisdiction has emerged within the debates around the internationalisation of the crime of
grand corruption. The doctrine of universality entails the ability of states to prosecute certain
offences without territorial limitations. In essence, an offence like grand corruption can be
prosecuted by any state irrespective of where the act occurred or the nationality, or country of
domicile of the perpetrator.
The establishment of national courts with universal jurisdiction is not a new concept. However,
the discussion paper by GOPAC and the opinion of Judge Mark Wolf in the Brookings paper
highlights the topical nature of the subject and encourages strong scholarly scrutiny.103 Within
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the scope of international criminal law, the ‘Pinochet and Habre104 cases involved attempts to
use universal jurisdiction to prosecute leaders for various heinous crimes committed by their
regimes over the course of many years. The analysis of the outcome of the Pinochet and Habre
cases is not within the scope of this chapter, but it is worth mentioning that very few universal
jurisdiction prosecutions have been tried post, Pinochet. Moreover, when juxtaposed with a
recent Act (Organic Act No 1/2014) passed in Spain to limit the power of Spanish judges to
pursue criminal cases involving human rights abuses committed outside the country, it shows
that significant doubt has been cast on the merits of arguing for the use of universal jurisdiction
in prosecuting crimes of grand corruption. Notwithstanding the shadows over the merits of
universal jurisdiction, a national court with universal jurisdiction, according to GOPAC is
advantageous because ‘its effectiveness does not require a majority of states to co-operate.
Even a small group of motivated states that are highly committed to applying universal
jurisdiction could have a significant impact’.105 Sarah Ali opines that ‘there are ample reasons
to consider a legal anti-corruption mechanism that transcends state borders: the flow of capital
that emanates from grand corruption is global, and victims of such high-level fraud are
absolutely powerless within their own legal systems’.106 Bringing the notion of universal court
jurisdiction to bear on the Nigerian experience, it appears that courts of universal jurisdiction
can, to a large extent, assist in combating the scourge of grand corruption ravaging the state
due to the dysfunctionality of the Nigerian justice system. Perhaps, a national court with
universal jurisdiction could mitigate the culture of ingrained corruption, particularly in the
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judiciary. The criminal justice system in Nigeria has been criticised for complicity in grand
corruption cases. Lawyers and judges are accused of using technicalities to derail the course of
justice. An empirical study by the Human Development Initiative (HDI) Network in Nigeria
posits that ‘some lawyers and judges conspire to frustrate, rather than advance, justice through
frivolous applications and adjournments, respectively’.107 In a recent Supreme Court ruling,
Justice Sylvester Nwali (JSC) stated that ‘it is not the duty of learned Counsel to resort to
motions aimed principally at delaying or even scuttling the process of determining whether or
not there is substance in the charges as laid. In my view, this motion is a disservice to the
criminal process and a contemptuous lip service to the fight against corruption. The tactics
employed here are only one of the means by which the rich and powerful cripple the criminal
justice process’.108
Nuhu Ribadu, a former head of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in
Nigeria, gave credence to the postulations of the HDI and Justice Nwali adding that ‘it has
become an ‘art’ for defence attorneys to ensure that financial crime cases do not go on and
substantive cases are never tried on their merits. Defence attorneys delay and prolong cases by
a tactic of applying for stay of proceedings and, where such application is granted, they accuse
judges of bias, which provide grounds for an application to transfer their cases to other
judges’.109 Hence, the suggestion that invoking the doctrine of courts with universal jurisdiction
may help to settle the complicity of the Nigerian justice system sounds attractive but, it also
presents a number of challenges. Citizens may react negatively or resent its intrusiveness into
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their domestic affairs. Also, the 2014 Act in Spain could be followed in other jurisdictions and
this may undermine the option of considering courts with universal jurisdiction.

6.4.3 Regional Courts
Another very strong option canvassed by scholars is the establishment of regional courts
charged principally with the prosecution of corruption-related offences. Regional human rights
courts arguably benefit from acceptability and credibility while administering international
justice as opposed to the ICC that has received numerous criticism of bias against the African
continent.
Regional courts exist in Africa, Europe, and America and according to GOPAC ‘an advantage
of regional courts is that they can hold member states accountable to the anti-corruption
conventions those states have ratified, and eventually prosecute (or at the very least denounce)
those who violate these conventions’.110 In support of the efficacy of regional courts as an
option for consideration in the quest for international prosecution of grand corruption, GOPAC
refers to the success of the grand corruption court action brought against Nigeria by the
Nigerian NGO, the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) at the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice.
SERAP argued that Nigerians’ right to education had been breached by massive corruption in
the public education budget, and cited an international convention, the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, as the applicable law. This marked the first time that a regional
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human rights court has explicitly considered corruption as a violation of human right. The case
also resulted in the recovery of N3.4 billion that had been stolen from the education budget.111
Arguments in favour of the regional courts appear stronger and more realistic given that
‘countries would presumably have already submitted to their jurisdiction, so the sovereignty
objection would get less traction. Second, a regional grouping would be less vulnerable to
charges of outside interference and neo-imperialism. However, it’s not clear how effective such
courts would be; the greatest benefit may be that an adverse ruling will empower domestic civil
society groups and opposition factions’.112 In this regard, it would be worthwhile expanding
the scope of the regional courts to cover cases of grand corruption taking a cue from the
ECOWAS court ruling against Nigeria.
Regional courts as a platform for the prosecution of grand corruption is criticised on the ground
that it may be unduly influenced by regional politics, particularly in Africa. Most of the African
justice systems are already compromised due to the systemic nature of grand corruption and
there may be concerns that its spill over effects might preclude the court from functioning well.
There are concerns about adequate funding to keep it afloat and GOPAC cautions that ‘the
collective web of regional courts is far from global in reach, and even in regions where such
courts do exist, many do not have jurisdiction over economic crimes such as corruption’.113
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6.4.4 Creating New Mechanisms
There are other ways to prosecute grand corruption at the international and regional level aside
from the options already discussed. One of the most innovative ways emphasizes asset recovery
mechanisms. This ensures that funds laundered abroad are traced and repatriated to the States
from where they were looted. This is the process pursued by the current Nigerian administration
and it appears to be yielding dividends as some of the financial safe havens where Nigerian
funds were laundered have started returning them. The prime example is the Abacha loot
returned from Switzerland, The United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The
drawback of this mechanism is that most repatriated funds are duly re-looted by other state
officials and this keeps going in a vicious cycle.114
Stephenson suggests ‘reforms to banking and bank secrecy laws … domestic political
movements and entrepreneurial (and often heroic) domestic law enforcement agents are also
making a difference. And broader political reform will likely help too, in the long term… ’115
GOPAC outlines the following measures:
1. Amending the UNCAC to include provisions requiring States Parties to
incorporate grand corruption crimes into their universal jurisdiction legislation,
or requiring States Parties to collaborate with regional and international
authorities in the prosecution of grand corruption.
2. Amending the OECD or Civil Law Conventions to include an endorsement
of laws that reward citizen-plaintiffs for representing their countries in matters
of transnational corruption.
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3. Developing technology-based tools for detecting and deterring corruption,
such as Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) that could help
capture evidence of corruption in the act and facilitate the prosecution of the
perpetrators.116

6.5 Conclusion
Grand corruption remains a serious concern to the international community and which has
defied global solution. International law and grand corruption are intertwined as the
transnational nature of grand corruption places it under international focus. The pervasive
nature of grand corruption attests to the failure of the domestic justice system in dealing with
the scourge and thus demands intervention from the international community in the form of the
ICC or the other mechanisms detailed in this chapter. The devastation caused by grand
corruption is to some extent, analogous to the subject of genocide which prior to 1948 was
treated as mass murder and had not sufficient judicial weight attached to it. However, the
intervention of the Polish Jurist, Raphael Lemkin highlighted the deficiencies attached to the
name and promoted the re-naming as “genocide”.117 Ever since the 1948 Genocide Convention
was passed, the international community now treats cases of genocide with utmost seriousness.
Such grave and concerted international effort are thus required in anti-corruption cases and
legislation.
This chapter thus reiterates the words of other agencies and scholars, including Sonja Starr,
Ilias Bantekas, Ndiva Kofele Kale, Martine Boersma, Transparency International, the World
Bank, Human Rights Watch, GOPAC and especially Judge Wolf that the ‘best hope is an
international forum for the effective prosecution of grand corruption, eroding the culture of
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impunity, and contributing to the opportunity for democratic elections to produce honest
officials with the will to serve the public good in countries which have long been led by corrupt
criminals’.118 There seems to be no generally accepted model that could presently remedy the
devastating consequences of grand corruption which former Secretary General, Kofi Annan
describes as an ‘insidious plague’119 that destroys the capacity of governments to protect the
rights and improve the plight of the people they are constituted to serve. At its best, the ICC,
an international platform could be the body for combating the scourge. In comparing grand
corruption to crimes against humanity, this chapter argues that grand corruption requires
immediate action due to its severity and this action could be met by international intervention
through the instruments of the ICC, notwithstanding its numerous shortcomings.
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Chapter Seven
Grand Corruption: A Crime against Humanity?
7.1 Introduction
The Rome Statute did not include corruption as a crime against humanity. The Rome Statute
gave primacy to civil and political rights, so a series of other social injustices like grand
corruption were left to the post-transitional reform era. This is despite the fact that grand
corruption could be more prevalent and egregious like genocide and war crimes. The thought
of including grand corruption as a crime against humanity has thus generated enormous
scholarly debate, especially when juxtaposed with other crimes within the definition and
contextualization of the customary norm of international criminal law.
The scope of this chapter is to holistically examine the crime of grand corruption in relation to
other enumerated criminal offences that constitute crimes against humanity. This is
contextualised using these sub-headings: categories of international crimes; crimes against
humanity; does corruption merit inclusion as a crime against humanity? The chapter concludes
by summarising the arguments raised within the chapter and in so doing, provides the necessary
platform for arguing that corruption should be criminalised as a crime against humanity under
international law.
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7.2 Categories of International Crimes
According to William Schabas, ‘the concept of international crimes has been around for
centuries. They were generally considered to be offences whose repression compelled some
international dimension’.1 The necessity for classification into international crimes stems from
‘the need to ensure that there is no impunity for state-sponsored crimes and the objective
heinousness of the offence act as somewhat competing justifications for the exercise’.2 The
consequences that flow from classifying crimes as international crimes include: ‘possible
exercise of universal jurisdiction, a duty to prosecute or extradite, a prohibition on statutory
limitation and a justification for prosecution before international courts’.3
International crimes were specifically featured in the Charter of Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal based on the London Agreement of 8 August 1945,4 and according to
Schabas, ‘all four crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court were prosecuted, at least in an
earlier and somewhat embryonic form, by the Nuremberg Tribunals and the other post-war
courts’.5 The recent codification of international crimes garnered international impetus through
the work of the International Law Commission, a body of experts assembled by the United
Nations and vested with the ‘codification and progressive development of international law’.6
The result was the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC
Statute) in Rome on 10 July 1998, during a diplomatic conference attended by most of the then
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189 Member States of the United Nations’.7 The ICC is a body with universal8 jurisdiction with
its own international legal personality and legal capacity.9 Thus, the ICC provides for the
creation of an international criminal court with power to try and punish the most serious
violations of human rights in cases when national justice fails at the task.10
The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over four categories of international crimes:
Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and the Crime of Aggression.11 These crimes
are ‘set in Articles 6-8bis of the Rome Statute, completed by the elements of crimes, correspond
in a general sense to the state of customary international law’.12 Schabas notes that ‘most of
the development in the definition of these crimes is attributed to the evolution of customary
law, whose content is not always easy to identify with clarity’.13 Seemingly, the ‘four categories
of crimes are drawn from existing definitions and use familiar terminology’.14 These crimes
were described in the preamble to the Statute and Article 5 as ‘the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole’.15 In particular, the preamble described the
crimes as ‘unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity’.16 Article 1
specifically described it as ‘the most serious crimes of international concern’. 17 It is not the
intention of this chapter to treat the four categories of international crimes exhaustively,
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however, the crime of genocide will be discussed briefly due to its relationship with crimes
against humanity, the major focus of this chapter.
Genocide, a word coined by Raphael Lemkin in his 1944 work18 has been described as ‘the
ultimate crime’19 and the crime without a name by Winston Churchill.20 The massacre
perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against its Armenian population is widely acknowledged
as the first recorded case of genocide in international law, even though no international action
was taken due to the fact that it was seen as ‘a form of retroactive criminal legislation and
therefore no prosecutions were ever undertaken on an international level for the genocide of
the Armenians’.21 However, the Armenian case reawakened the sense of responsibility amongst
nation states that ‘states are not allowed to commit crimes of a mass scale upon their
population…’.22 While genocide was not codified at the time at the international level, it was
the case of the Jewish Holocaust that led to the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948.
Genocide has a ‘detailed and technical definition as a crime against the law of the nations’ 23
and in its preamble recognises that at all ‘periods of history, genocide has inflicted great losses
to humanity’.24 In contemporary international criminal law, 1993 marked a critical year around
the concept of genocide when in response to massive atrocities in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina, the United Nations Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY became the first international criminal tribunal
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since Nuremberg and the first ever mandated to prosecute the crime of genocide. Thereafter,
the Rwandan violent crisis led to the Security Council establishing the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The establishment of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the first permanent international criminal court in 1998 saw the listing
of genocide in Article 6 as one of the core international crimes. In essence, the Rome Statute’s
drafting process, the ICC’s ongoing case against the President of Sudan, Hassan Ahmad Omar
Al Bashir, and the Rwandan crisis charts the trajectories for the international law of genocide.
Specifically, in 2007, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a ground-breaking ruling
addressing state responsibility to prevent and punish genocide in the case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro.25

7.3 Crimes against Humanity
Crimes against humanity ‘outrage the conscience of mankind’26 and as such elicit a state of
moral urgency and exceptionalism. According to David Luban, the concept suggests offences
that ‘aggrieve not only the victims and their own communities, but all human beings, regardless
of their community and that, these offences cut deep violating the core of humanity that we all
share and distinguishes us from other beings’.27 As per Bassiounni, ‘crimes against humanity
is basically founded on the formulation of Article 6 (c) of the London Charter…Thus a
discussion of crimes against humanity at the … ICC as well as the mixed-model tribunals is
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part of the evolution of the customary international law that started with Article 6 (c) of the
London Charter’.28
Furthermore, the recent practice of states and international tribunals suggests that there is no
requirement for armed conflict in establishing cases of crimes against humanity.29 They can be
perpetrated during peace time.
Crimes against humanity were codified in the Nuremberg Charter (Article 6 (c), Tokyo Charter
(Control Council Law no 10), the Statutes of ICTY (Article 5) and the ICTR (Article 3). While
it is not the intention of this chapter to trace the historical paths leading to the emergence of the
concept of crimes against humanity, this chapter will focus on Article 7 of the Rome Statute,
and will in addition draw on the judgements from the ad hoc tribunals and scholarship on
crimes against humanity where necessary in contextualising the argument of the chapter.
According to Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute, for an offence to be classified as a crime against
humanity, it must be:
Committed as part of a widespread or systemic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack:
a. Murder
b. Extermination
c. Enslavement
d. Deportation or forcible transfer of population
e. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law
f. Torture, Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilisation or any other form of sexual violence of comparative gravity
h. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethical, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognised as impermissible under international law, in connection with any
act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court
i. Enforced disappearance of persons
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j. The crime of Apartheid
k. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.30
Drawing from the definition of the concept, these five necessary condition emerges:
i, there is an attack
ii, the relevant acts are part of the attack
iii, the attack must be widespread and systematic
iv, the attack must be directed against a civilian population
v, there must be knowledge of the attack (the mens rea or mental element).

7.4 Attacks
Encapsulated within Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC (attack directed against any civilian
population), the term “attack” connotes violence and armed conflict. While the initial
conception of the concept of crimes against humanity tilted towards violence, later
developments and jurisprudence have moved beyond this as it could happen outside of known
armed conflicts. However, if strictly construed on the line of armed conflict, as espoused by
Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY, it could preclude grand corruption for consideration as a
crime against humanity as this identified a direct link between crimes against humanity and
armed conflict. On the contrary, Article 3 of the ICTR and Article 7 of the ICC made no link
to armed conflict. This was further strengthened in the decisions of Tadic in the ICTY and
Akayesu in the ICTR ‘an attack may be non-violent in nature, like imposing a system of
apartheid… or exerting pressure on a population to act in a particular manner, may come under
the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on a massive scale or in a systemic manner’.31 Similarly
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in the Semanza32 judgment, the attack could be directed also against a civilian population. Thus,
the Chamber explained in the Semanza judgment that in connection with crimes against
humanity, the prosecutor must prove: that there was an attack; the attack was widespread and
systematic; the attack was directed against civilian population; the attack was committed on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds, and the accused acted with the knowledge
that his act (s) formed part of the attack. Reading from the above judicial pronouncements, an
attack, therefore need not involve the use of violence or armed forces.33 In essence, it is in line
with the stipulations of Article 7 of the ICC Statute that extermination, the exertion of pressure
or inhumane treatment against a civilian population will qualify as an attack. According to
Agbor, ‘an attack in itself does not constitute a crime against humanity’.34 It is merely a ‘vehicle
for the commission of crimes against humanity’. Agbor further argues that ‘it is the framework
or foundation, with and upon which the enlisted crimes are perpetrated’.35 Can this argument
be sustained within the context of the crime of grand corruption? This could be answered by
considering the elements of crimes against humanity as contained in the Rome Statute.
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7.5 Widespread and Systematic
In Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi,36 the ICTR ruled that ‘in accordance with customary
international law, the twin elements “widespread” or “systematic” should be read disjunctively
and not as cumulative requirements’.37 “Widespread” ‘refers to the scale of the attack and the
multiplicity of victims; “systematic” reflects the organised nature of the attack, excludes acts
of random violence, and does not require a policy or plan’.38 However, the judgment reiterates
that ‘the existence of such a plan or policy may, for evidential purposes, be relevant in proving
that the civilian population was the target of the attack or of its widespread or systematic
character’. 39

7.6 Directed against any Civilian Population
The conditions to be met in attacks directed at a civilian population were defined in Akayesu40.
“Civilian population” was ‘defined as people not taking an active part in hostilities, members
of the armed forces who have surrendered or otherwise laid down their arms, and those who,
either for sickness, injury, detention or otherwise, have been placed hors de combat. The
presence of non-civilians within a group of “civilians” as defined above, does not deny the
population of its essential civilian character’.41 The Bagilishema Trial Chamber added, relying
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on Blaškic, that in determining the existence of a “civilian population” as a constitutive element
of crimes against humanity, the Chamber must consider ‘the specific situation of the victim at
the moment the crimes were committed, rather than his status’.42 The situation of the civilian
population was explained further on enquiry as to whether the crime has to be committed
against the entire people. The court in Prosecutor v Bisengimana
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held that the ‘term

population does not require that crimes against humanity be directed against the entire
population of a geographical territory or area’.44 Hence, it follows according to the decision in
Muvunyi that ‘it is irrelevant whether the particular victim of a crime against humanity was a
member of a listed group if it can be proved that the perpetrator targeted the civilian population
on one of the enumerated discriminatory grounds’.45

7.7 Knowledge or Mental Elements of Crimes against Humanity
Bassiouni submits that ‘the mental or subjective element is required in major crimes and in
some lesser ones in almost every legal system in the world. It is considered the essential basis
for the determination of criminal responsibility or culpability, depending upon whether national
legal systems consider the mental element an element of responsibility or culpability’.46
Bassiouni maintains that ‘but in all systems, it is predicated on a number of legal assumptions
or presumptions, most notably freedom of will, mental capacity, and knowledge of the law’.47
Bantekas states that ‘despite the complexities associated with the legal definition of intent, its
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lay counterpart is not removed from its common meaning. In general terms, it means acting
with a desire to bring about a particular result’.48 Bantekas further argues that ‘this broader
mental element, the dolus, consists of a very high degree of awareness as to the necessary
features of the actus reus, in addition to the desires to bring it about’.49 It is pertinent to
distinguish between the concepts dolus directus (in the first and second degree) and dolus
eventualis. Dolus directus in the first degree entails that the perpetrator knows of, and wants to
achieve the consequences of the criminal action. Dolus eventualis is a situation in which the
suspect is aware that the risk of the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her
actions of omissions and accepts, such as an outcome by reconciling himself or herself with it
or consenting to it’.50
Bassiouni clarifies that ‘there are two doctrinal approaches to the presumption of knowledge
and ignorance at International criminal law. One approach is to treat the question as part of the
mental element of criminal responsibility; the other is to treat it as an evidentiary question
needed to prove the mental element’.51 It is pertinent to state that Article 22 of the Rome Statute
provides in its second paragraph that ‘the definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and
shall not be extended by analogy. In the case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted
in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted’. This is a caution that
crimes codified in the Rome Statute may not be broadly interpreted.
The Rome Statute does not use the two conventional concepts: actus reus and mens rea. Rather,
it defines the mental element in Article 30 as follows:
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1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements
are committed with intent and knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. ‘Know’ and
‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.52
Despite the enumeration of the mental elements of the crimes in the Rome Statute in Article
30, it is criticised as ‘far short of covering all the issues pertaining to the mental element’53.
Bantekas, however, is of the view that ‘the situation of intent of the first and second degree in
the context of the ICC Statute is certainly a lot clearer because the drafters of the Statute paid
attention to the need to clarify the various mental states as to leave no room for arbitrary
analogies or judicial innovations’.54 According to Bantekas, ‘Article 30 of the ICC Statute is
adamant from the outset that the general rule applicable to all its crimes and forms of liability
will be intent and knowledge’.55 This is an innovation which places the Rome Statute a step
ahead of all the post-WWII treaties. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Protocol thereto,
and other treaties which never contemplated the elucidation of the elements of crime creation
of international tribunals.56 Article 21 of the ICC Statute permits Article 30 to resort to other
sources of law and this suggests a potential conflict in view of the provisions of Article 22.
In sum, the mental element of a crime against humanity consists of both (i) knowledge of the
contextual element and (ii) mens rea required for the specific criminal act.57 The decision in
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Bemba (confirmation of Charges Decision, para. 362) which sets aside Lubanga (confirmation
of Charges Decision, para. 352) confirms that dolus eventualis was excluded from the ambit of
Article 30 of the Statute. This is to argue that in considering grand corruption as an international
crime, the issue of “intent” needs closer scrutiny as future convictions would depend on how
far the “intent” of the accused has been established.

7.8 Does Grand Corruption Merit Inclusion as a Crime Against Humanity?
The consequences of grand corruption suggest a close affinity to crimes against humanity. It is
therefore not morally contestable that the inclusion of grand corruption in the Rome Statute is
desirable but is it feasible and legally achievable? Within the scope of this research, passive
bribery, illicit enrichment and embezzlement are the three major aspects of grand corruption
under analysis.
As espoused earlier in this chapter, article 7 (1) (k) of the ICC Statute is the platform for the
argument that grand corruption merits inclusion as a crime against humanity. Article 7 (1) (k)
provides ‘other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’. According to Schabas, this is ‘where
the Rome Statute leaves the door open for some evolution… the final paragraph of the list of
crimes against humanity …’58. Does grand corruption fit into other inhumane acts of a similar
character that intentionally causes great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health? Is Article 7 (1) (k) a ‘residual category, providing crimes against humanity
with the flexibility to cover serious violations of human rights that are not specifically
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enumerated in the other paragraphs of the definition, on the condition that they be of
comparable gravity’.59
To begin answering the questions, it is essential to emphasise that for a crime against humanity
to occur under customary international law, there must be an attack against a civilian population
where the attack is widespread or part of a systematic policy.60 On the issue of the “attack”,
recent jurisprudence in international criminal tribunals shows that there is no longer the need
to establish links with armed conflict. According to Schabas, ‘in the celebrated Tadic
jurisdictional decision, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY described the nexus as obsolescent,
and that there is no logical basis for this requirement and it has been abandoned in subsequent
state practice with respect to crimes against humanity’.61 Crimes against humanity could
happen in peace time and in war time.62 The argument dissociating attacks from armed conflict
emerges in Akayesu63 and Kamuhanda64. The idea that a crime against humanity could happen
in peace time reinforces the argument that grand corruption could fit into the category. Who
then are the people capable of committing crimes against humanity? Bassiouni and Drumbl,65
outline three types of people who commit crimes against humanity: policy makers, intermediate
agents, and low-level executors. This research argues that Bassiouni and Drumbl’s
classification includes that group of oligarchs inflicting pains on Nigerians through policies
that impoverished and created an undue hardship on the civilians. Accordingly, ‘the policy
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makers are the most important because they are the moral authors of the crime. These are the
agents who have the power to commission of the crime without having a direct connection to
the material element of the crime’.66 The deliberate diversion of $2 billion funds meant for the
fight against Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria into private pockets was a clear case of an attack
on the civilian population orchestrated by acts of grand corruption.67 Given the jurisprudence
on “attack on civilian population”, it could be argued that grand corruption meets the threshold
for inclusion as a crime against humanity.
Another major test to be met under Article of the Rome Statute in the contextual element of
crimes against humanity is the presence of ‘widespread and or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population’. The definition of the terms widespread or systemic is found
in Akayesu. A widespread attack is one that is ‘massive, frequent, large scale action, carried
out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims’.68
Systemic is ‘thoroughly organised and following a regular pattern of on the basis of a common
policy involving substantial public or private resources’.69 This element, therefore, serves to
link what would otherwise be disparate acts, but given a subject like grand corruption, is very
hard to establish due to its secretive nature of transactions as well as its transnational features.
Perhaps, this could be the reasoning behind Schabas argument that right from the outset, ‘there
was no consensus on including treaty crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and they were
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excluded at the Rome Conference’.70 He, however, suggests that despite this, ‘the possibility
of amending the list of crimes at a Review Conference is explicitly foreseen’.71
The civilian population is another requirement to be fulfilled under Article 7 (1) of the ICC
Statute for a crime to be categorised as an international crime. The court in Prosecutor v
Bisengimana72 held that the ‘term population does not require that crimes against humanity be
directed against the entire population of a geographical territory or area’.73 Restated in
Muvunyi, ‘it is irrelevant whether the particular victim of a crime against humanity was a
member of a listed group if it can be proved that the perpetrator targeted the civilian population
on one of the enumerated discriminatory grounds’.74 It goes on to say that civilian classification
is not subject to any form of territoriality. The mere fact that civilians are occupying a given
locality at a given time of an incident would suffice in satisfying this condition. For example,
given the grand corruption issues in Nigeria, displaced civilians living in the Boko Haram
ravaged Northeast region of Nigeria would satisfy the threshold raised in Article 7 of the ICC
Statute.
The requirement of knowledge and intent is another core condition for qualification as a crime
against humanity. Crimes against humanity require an actus reus and a mens rea as well as the
contextual elements. The contextual element of crimes against humanity differentiates a crime
under international law and a crime under domestic jurisdiction. The Kunarac Trial Chamber
of the ICTY stated that the accused must either intend to commit the offence, that his acts were
part of an attack on civilians, or that he ‘took the risk’ that his acts would be part of such an
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attack.75 The ICC Statute described knowledge in the context of trials as ‘awareness that
circumstance exists or a consequence will be a likely outcome’.76 This is complemented by the
requirement of intention in Articles 7 (1) (k) and 7 (2) example of the ICC Statute, at least in
the context of torture, persecution, extermination, and, most importantly for our case, ‘other
inhumane acts’. It is important to note that intent here does not need to be discriminatory insofar
as it targets a specific person or group. There does not need to be detailed knowledge of the
attack.
This seems to exclude grand corruption as intentionality of this sort does not characterise those
who might harm the global poor. Hence, if we are contemplating the crime of grand corruption,
the contextual element could arguably consist of the deliberate large-scale diversion of State
funds. The mens rea requirement is very difficult to attain due to the applicable standard of
Article 30 which does not cover dolus eveventualis. Article 30 is limited to dolus directus in
the first and second degree. This is a major threshold recognised by the ICC statute in Article
30. The case laws of Lubanga laid the initial controversial precedent, but was overturned by
the decision in Bemba, which clearly deviates from Lubanga and re-emphasised that dolus
eventualis is not covered in Article 30.

7.9 Conclusion
This chapter considered whether grand corruption meet the requirements of the elements of
crimes against humanity to merit inclusion as an international crime under article 7 (1) (k) of
the ICC Statute. It has been argued that as the definition of an attack is not contingent on the
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presence of war or armed conflict, the crime of grand corruption cannot be dismissed. The
crime of grand corruption also cannot be described as isolated, but rather forms part of a
widespread and systemic policy pursued by some states.
Some scholars have objected to upgrading corruption to the status of a crime against humanity.
Albin-Lackey vehemently criticises the move adding that ‘corruption as a crime against
humanity argument is at best an example of serious overreaching. Such arguments often seem
to reflect misguided efforts to fix a square peg into a round hole with the idea that if the ruse is
pulled off, the real-world results would be good ones’.77 Albin-Lackey criticised the seminal
work of Bantekas stating that though it was well-intentioned, ‘this argument puts the cart
squarely before the horse’.78 He maintains that corruption is ‘too sprawling a phenomenon to
be crammed entirely inside a human rights analysis.79 The views of Albin-Lackey, though
meriting further examination, are not the arguments followed by this thesis. Examples of the
perpetration of grand corruption in some African countries and in particular Nigeria appear to
have fulfilled the requirement of being ‘inhumane acts of similar character [as acts such as
murder, extermination and enslavement]80 intentionally-causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or mental or physical health’81. Scholars like Kim Lim agree that grand
corruption merits inclusion as a crime against humanity under Article 7 (1) (k).82 Lim cites
Nigeria as a state with serious grand corruption cases that should compel the international
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community to act urgently and seriously in vindicating the rights of the civilians suffering from
systematic and widespread attack due to grand corruption. Lim cited the case of former
President Ibrahim Babangida whose loot could have prevented many deaths had the stolen
funds been invested into health care, social services and other infrastructural upgrades in
Nigeria.83 Sonja Starr also argues like Lim that ‘grand government corruption … the largescale ransacking of treasuries by the heads of States and their associates … has catastrophic
consequences that are foreseeable to the perpetrators: extreme poverty, and decimated
government services, resulting in widespread deaths from food-borne diseases, water-borne
diseases, and HIV/AIDS... International criminal tribunals could contribute meaningfully to
the fight against kleptocracy’.84 Starr submits that there is indeed ‘strong legal argument for
treating grand corruption as a crime against humanity, without necessitating the adoption of
new treaties … grand corruption could fall within the category of “other inhumane acts,” long
recognised under customary international law and included in the Rome Statute’.85 Starr clearly
advocates for the ‘eventual expansion of international criminal law’s focus beyond crisis
crimes’.86 While it is not the intention of this chapter to contest international law’s crisis
response and intervention in periods of extreme violence in places such as the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra-Leone, Cambodia, Liberia, South Sudan, Libya, Congo and EastTimor, it is a nuanced view that the overt crisis focus ‘diverts attention from structural issues
of global injustice and the politics of everyday life’.87 It is apt to ask if ‘international criminal
tribunals emphasised crisis situations and security threats while ignoring longer-term, systemic
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causes of human suffering’.88 ‘Should a shift in focus enable better use of international
resources?’89 Should the facilities of the international tribunals not be fully maximised in
‘addressing systemic human rights abuses committed in places that have not undergone an
extraordinary crisis or political transition’?90 Ndiva Kofele-Kale also identified grand
corruption as an international economic crime worth international codification.91
As earlier stated in this chapter, grand corruption may not have completely met the
requirements of crimes against humanity, yet the argument should not be discharged as
generally baseless as suggested by Albin-Lackey. Rather, the international tribunals should
harness genuine claims to assess how grand corruption is harming people in real life
circumstances. A step further could be taken on two prominent petitions written from Nigeria
that have presented provable claims for the Prosecutor of the ICC to act on.92 Peter Eigen of
Transparency International submits that ‘corruption always inevitably causes a range of human
rights abuses … If the rights to basic health care, education and sanitary conditions are part of
human rights, then corruption must be seen as a violation of the most basic economic and social
rights’.93
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Grand corruption has not been accommodated within the competence of the Rome Statute for
some unstated reasons. So far, the most plausible option in accommodating the crime of grand
corruption within the purview of the Rome Statute is found within Article 7, precisely, Article
7 (1) (k) of the Statute. Thus, taken together and distilled into their essential ingredients, the
elements related to Article 7 (1) (k) which had been dealt with in this chapter, where satisfied,
may entail that ‘the prosecution may not need to prove other additional elements constituting
a specific kind of inhumane act. This is because any other “inhumane act” constitutes, under
long-standing customary law, a crime against humanity’.94 According to Starr, ‘to convict a
person for an “other inhumane act” an international criminal tribunal need not define “grand
corruption”, or any similar term. The charge would simply be “other inhumane acts”, although
the specific material facts would have to be pleaded in indictment’.95 How far this suggestion
can go is a matter to be resolved over time through robust scholarly activism. International
criminal law is still evolving and though a crisis-focused discipline, it demands urgent action
from the international community to curb the menace of grand corruption. This chapter
advances the claim that grand corruption merits upgrading to a crime against humanity, and
submits that this argument cannot be dismissed based on the deficiency of the requisite
elements. Rather, it is suggested that a holistic synergy with the crimes enunciated in Article 7
and in particular, Article 7(1) (k) of the Rome Statute, could facilitate a possible upgrade to the
status of a crime against humanity.
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Chapter Eight
Summary, conclusions and recommendation
“The state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power”
Section 15 [5] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
8.1 Introduction
Corruption is a global scourge and the World Bank estimates that ‘about $1 trillion dollars is
paid each year in bribes around the world, and the total economic loss from corruption is
estimated to be many times that number’.1 The bribery aspect of corruption is not the only
aspect. This research emphasises other aspects like illicit enrichment and embezzlement.2
Furthermore, the ‘World Bank estimates that each year US$ 20 to US$ 40 billion,
corresponding to 20% to 40% of official development assistance, is stolen through high-level
corruption from public budgets in developing countries and hidden overseas’.3
The purpose of this research, therefore, is to appraise the concept of grand corruption in Nigeria
from the lens of international human rights and international criminal law. Broadly, the
researcher used four research questions in the thematic framing of the research:
RQ1. How can grand corruption violate human rights in Nigeria?
RQ2. How have existing international, regional and domestic legal frameworks facilitated
efforts at combating grand corruption?
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RQ3. How can international criminal law conceptualise grand corruption as a crime under
international law prosecutable as a crime against humanity?
RQ4. Why are violations of socio-economic rights less susceptible to international
criminalisation?
Appendix vi dealt with the methodology and the participants’ responses to the thirteen
interview questions. The interview questions derived directly from the research questions and
showed the elite’s perceptions on various issues relating to grand corruption in relation to
international human rights and international criminal law. The thematic findings in line with
the analysis of the four research questions are presented below:
8.1.1 RQ1. How can grand corruption violate human rights in Nigeria?
Within scholarly literature, there are arguments suggesting that some human rights are violated
by grand corruption. However, the question in this research is the question of how corrupt acts
violate human rights in Nigeria? The former Irish President and United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson argues that ‘analysing corruption in the light
of its impact on human rights could well strengthen public understanding of the evils of
corruption and lead to the stronger sense of public rejection’.4
The thirteen interviewees in this research unanimously agreed that grand corruption violates
human rights in Nigeria. Similarly, the response by the interviewees that grand corruption
violates human rights is in agreement with the views of the United Nations that corruption leads
to violation of the government’s human rights obligation, ‘... the corrupt management of public
resources compromises the government’s ability to deliver an array of services, including
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health, educational and welfare services, which are essential for the realisation of economic,
social and cultural rights’.5
It is imperative to review the various connections between corruption and human rights as well
as the oppositions that exist against making such a crucial connection. This entails focusing on
the realisation of socio-economic rights as well as civil and political rights. This research
emphasised the impact of grand corruption on socio-economic rights because these rights are
still not justiciable in Nigeria. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, as expressed
in the preamble, affirms that ‘the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a
guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights’6 and presumes a binding obligation on
courts in Nigeria to hold the rights and obligations enacted by it enforceable. In recognition of
this, Nwodo J, of the Federal High Court ruled that Chapter II rights such as the right to health
of prison inmates can be enforced by the court through the provisions of the African Charter.7
The African Charter, in its preamble, cited earlier in this chapter, recognises socio-economic
rights of individuals from member states. This guarantee becomes conditional in light of
international law, which suggests that states can only be held accountable for the obligations
they voluntarily assume through ratification of international and regional human rights treaties,
as well as their constitutional and statutory provisions. This research contests this principle in
that it gives states leeway to abdicate their responsibility if they fail to ratify international
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treaties that oblige them to ensure the satisfaction of socio-economic rights of their citizens. It
is noteworthy that a violation of a human right occurs only when a state fails to act in order to
fulfil its obligation to respect, protect, fulfil, and recognise the human rights of persons in its
jurisdiction. In essence, the practical conduct of a state is assessed in relation to the effort they
are making to ensure their behaviour is in order and guided by the prevailing international
standard. The terms “breach” and “violation” should only be applied where a legal obligation
clearly exists.
The recognition of socio-economic rights as an essential component of human rights is no
longer in contention. Nigeria is a signatory to many international and regional treaties that
oblige states to ensure the recognition, respect, protection and fulfilment of the human rights
of its citizens. To what extent does the preponderance of grand corruption constrain the
Nigerian government’s ability to fulfil its obligation regarding the realisation of the socioeconomic rights of its citizens according to the stipulations of ratified international and regional
treaties? It is apparent that grand corruption plays a vital role in the inability of the Nigerian
government to fulfil its obligations of respecting and fulfilling certain human rights of the
citizens. The situation in Nigeria as espoused in this thesis is that the courts have not developed
a consistent jurisprudence regarding the fulfilment of socio-economic rights having relied on
restrictive rather than purposive interpretations of the Constitution and case laws. Thus, issues
relating to the realisation of socio-economic rights in Nigeria remain aspirational and open to
diverse judicial interpretation until the Constitution is amended. Notwithstanding, the argument
of the thesis is in agreement with United Nations Human Rights (Office of the Commissioner)
that:
The corrupt management of public resources compromises the government’s
ability to deliver an array of services, including health, educational and welfare
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services, which are essential for the realisation of economic, social and cultural
rights. Also, the prevalence of corruption creates discrimination in access to
public services in favour of those able to influence the authorities to act in their
personal interest, including by offering bribes. The economically and politically
disadvantaged suffer disproportionately from the consequences of corruption
because they are particularly dependent on public goods.8

8.1.2 RQ2. How have existing international, regional and domestic legal frameworks
facilitated efforts at combating grand corruption?
Research question two (number 2) seeks to understand how international, regional and
domestic legal frameworks assist in combating grand corruption. The literature cited in this
research indicates that there are multiple ways that the existing legal frameworks at all levels
have facilitated the battle against grand corruption. From the commencement of UNCAC to
the AU Convention, and down to the domestic acts of Nigeria (EFCC Act and ICPC Act), all
efforts have been made to tackle corruption legally. The areas of international co-operation in
terms of information and intelligence gathering, personnel training as well as tracing and
repatriation of stolen public fund have yielded appreciable results. However, these legal
frameworks have not been without technical challenges. For instance, there are no enforcement
mechanisms, no specialised anti-corruption police, no special anti-corruption courts, and
mostly, budgetary constraints among others frustrate the functioning of the legal frameworks.
The recommendation of this research is for the government to streamline the existing legal
frameworks and institutions. There is also the need to delineate the borders of the law to avoid
duplication, infringement and convolution of functions. The mandate of EFCC, ICPC and Code
of Conduct Bureau (CCB) criss-cross one another in many instances and where an agency is

8

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/AntiCorruption.aspx
> accessed 24 August 2016.
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not sure of its functions, it indirectly affects its performance and leads to the erosion of public
confidence. The government needs to incorporate all the ratified treaties into domestic law in
order to ensure their domestic application.

8.1.3 RQ3. How can international criminal law conceptualise grand corruption as a crime
under international law to be prosecuted as a crime against humanity?
Considering that ‘crimes against humanity bear the strongest relationship with human rights,
principally consisting of the most serious offences against human dignity’,9 there are sufficient
grounds to conceptualise grand corruption as a crime against humanity and for it to be
prosecuted as such. It continues to be a subject of contemporary global economic, political,
social and cultural debate that grand corruption indirectly causes untold hardship to the citizens
of a country where it was perpetrated. Its effects, no doubt, cause great suffering, serious injury
to the mental and physical health of those affected as ‘it weakens the ethical fabric of the civil
service and prevents the emergence of well-performing government capable of developing and
implementing public policies that promote social welfare’.10
The case of Nigeria is a classic example of the vulnerable suffering untold hardship as a result
of grand corruption ravaging the country. It has led to the inability of the government to provide
basic social services, infrastructural development, employment for the youth population, good
health care and free education. It is so devastating that the current President of Nigeria,

9

Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, Perason Education Limited
2010) 740.
10
The World Bank, ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank’ <
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm> accessed 28 September
2016.
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Muhammed Buhari, has said that, ‘Nigerians need to kill corruption or corruption will kill the
country’.11
However, notwithstanding scholarly efforts at establishing causal links between grand
corruption and the inhumane acts as captured in Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute, there are
some legal technicalities that need to be satisfied before grand corruption can be conceptualised
and prosecuted as a crime against humanity. For instance, satisfying the elements of crimes
against humanity and also elements of “other inhumane acts” as encapsulated in Article 7 (1)
(k). In particular, “other inhumane act” has been criticised by William Schabas who states that
‘this category lacks precision and is too general to provide a yardstick’.12 Despite the challenges
of surmounting the threshold of “other inhumane acts” Sonja Starr asserts that the
consequences flowing from grand corruption acts demand a concerted effort in demanding the
international criminalisation of grand corruption. Starr points out that ‘if a population is
sufficiently vulnerable and a diversion of funds sufficiently large relative to the total amount
available to serve the population’s need, it is clear that great suffering or health injury will
follow from the diversion in the ordinary course of events’.13 The research argues that a further
enlargement of the scope of “other inhumane acts” and the precise listing of its constituents
could benefit the concept of grand corruption in attaining the status of an international crime.

See ‘British High Commissioner, Paul Ackwright Speaks on the UK Perspective on AntiCorruption (2 February 2016) < https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/british-highcommissioner-paul-arkwright-speaks-on-the-uk-perspective-on-anti-corruption> accessed 28
September 2016.
12
William Schabas, An Introduction to International Criminal Law (University Press
Cambridge) 109.
13
Sonja Starr, ‘Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond Crisis
Situations’ 101 Northwestern University Law Review 1257 (2007) 1281.
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8.1.4 RQ4. Why are violations of socio-economic rights less susceptible to international
criminalisation?
The fourth research question relates to the reasons for socio-economic rights being less
susceptible to international criminalisation. Socio-economic rights in international law as
earlier defined in this research ‘include a variety of rights, such as: (i) the right to work and to
just and favourable conditions of work; to rest and leisure; to form and join trade unions and to
strike; (ii) the right to social security; to protection of the family, mothers and children; (iii) the
right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing; (iv) the
right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; (v) the right to education;
and (vi) the right to participate in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress’.14
Considering the scope of socio-economic rights, why is it less susceptible to international
criminalisation? As argued in chapter six, socio-economic rights, unlike civil and political
rights have retained second-rank status in practice and this results in the lower status accorded
to them in most domestic legal frameworks. Further, international criminal law is overtly crisis
focused.15 Starr proffers three reasons for the crisis-focus nature of international criminal law,
‘its historical and doctrinal roots, the theories used to support international criminalisation, and
the mechanisms by which the tribunals come into existence and take jurisdiction over cases’.16
This research argues that the basic necessities of life classified as socio-economic rights are
not realised in Nigeria owing to the consequences of grand corruption, including within the
justice system. According to Justice Nwali (JSC) ‘if the medical facilities are not available
locally to meet their medical needs, it is only because due to corruption in high places the

14

See the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 993
UNTS 3, enterered into force 3 January 1976 (Annex A).
15
Starr (n 13) 1266.
16
ibid 1266.
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country cannot build proper medical facilities equipped with the state of the art gadgets’.17
Inferring from the point of view of Justice Nwali and the high incidents of official looting in
Nigeria, it is argued that there is causal links between the non-realisation of socio-economic
rights and grand corruption. Moreover, the arguments made here and in chapter five attempts
to answer research question no 4 by suggesting that the progressive nature ascribed to socioeconomic rights is an indication of the lip-service paid to the presumed interrelatedness,
interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights. In reality therefore, socio-economic
rights are accorded second-rank status compared to civil and political rights. This explains why
violations of socio-economic rights are less susceptible to international criminalisation.
The lower status accorded to socio-economic rights in domestic legislations is evidenced in the
1999 Nigeria Constitution where chapter II classifies them as “Fundamental Objectives and
Directive Principle of State Policy” rather than as “Fundamental Rights”. However, as argued
in chapter three of this thesis, enforceability of socio-economic rights in Nigeria may still be
realisable given certain defined parameters. Hence, the recommendation is that socio-economic
rights should be made justiciable.

8.2 Recommendations
The responses on the theme from the semi-structured interviews as well as the review of other
scholarly

work

underscores

the

formulation

of

recommendations:

17

Dariye V FRN [2015] LPELR-24398 (SC) 34-35.
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the

following

suggestions

and

8.2.1 Legal and Institutional Reform
There is currently no single panacea to the scourge of grand corruption in Nigeria. However, it
appears that the fundamental remedy is legal and institutional reform. There is evidence that
weak institutions sustain corruption, while weak justice systems help to consolidate it. This
research recommends the strengthening of Nigeria’s legal and institutional framework to reflect
global best practices and standards. The research recommends legal reform to enact proactive
laws that respond to present realities and dynamics of society. In particular, it recommends the
strengthening of the anti-corruption institutions, especially the EFCC and the ICPC. It proposes
the merger of the two major anti-corruption agencies. The merger would help to streamline the
functions of the agencies, foreclosing the gaps and institutional lapses which impede their
success. The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria should be reviewed to expunge offensive clauses
like Section 308 that provided the “immunity clause” for serving government officials. This
provision of the Constitution has hindered the efforts to combat grand corruption in Nigeria as
serving government officials could not be prosecuted while still in office.

8.2.2 Judicial Reform
This research recommends the overhaul of the judicial system which, as it stands, aids
corruption through direct involvement in bribery by judicial officers as well as through using
legal technicalities to defeat the course of justice.18 An example is the backlog of high-profile
corruption cases pending in different courts for a number of years. The sentencing of Mr Ibori
in London after he had been exonerated by a Nigerian court exposes judicial complicity and
makes strong case on the need to embark on judicial reform. Moreover, the pending court cases

See ‘Nigerian Supreme Court Judge Charged with Corruption’ BBC News (London 21
November, 2016).
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against judges involved in high-profile bribery and illicit enrichment makes good case for
thorough judicial reform. Moreover, a recent publication of “National Corruption Survey” by
the National Bureau of Statistics restates that the judicial system is the second most corrupt
public bodies in Nigeria.19 This research, among others, recommends judicial overhaul
involving innovations and activisms like mandatory retirement of corrupt judges, training and
re-training of judges for specialised roles to enable them to imbibe the principles of
international best practices in combating grand corruption.

8.2.3 Global Cooperation
The research recommends international collaboration as essential for combating corruption
partly due to the lack of success by the Nigerian government. The research has given examples
of public funds stolen from Nigeria and laundered abroad, and recommends that only
collaboration with international bodies and institutions could facilitate repatriation of such
funds. For example, cooperation with Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA, and Luxembourg
have already yielded results and these countries have commenced repatriating illegal funds
deposited by corrupt Nigerian government officials. The recommendation, therefore, is that
Nigeria should intensify efforts at international cooperation in areas of intelligence gathering,
tracing, and training in order to maximise the international gains arising from such

National Bureau of Statistics ‘National Corruption Survey: Corruption in Nigeria- Bribery
as Experience by the Population Vol. 1 (2017) <
file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/NBS_NATIONAL_CORRUPTION_SURVEY_2017_RECOVERED
%20VOLUME%201_.pdf > accessed 01 Sepember 2017.
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collaborations. Such cooperation has ensured high-profile prosecutions like James Ibori20 in
the UK and Dan Etete of Malabu Oil & Gas in France and the UK 21.

8.2.4 International Criminalisation
The research recommends international criminalisation and upgrading of grand corruption to
be at par with other core international crimes. This would ensure that there would be no hiding
place for corrupt Nigerian officials. The research recommends further that efforts should be
made by the government to support the upgrading of grand corruption to an international crime.
Nigeria as a party to the ICC, having ratified the ICC Statute and in line with the anti-corruption
policies of President Buhari’s administration should be at the forefront of the campaign to
upgrade the status of corruption to an international crime.22

8.2.5 Expedited Prosecutions
The unresolved high-profile cases in Nigeria continue to undermine efforts at combating grand
corruption. This research proposes an expedited prosecution procedure and recommends the
establishment of specialised anti-corruption courts to fast-track prosecutions. Statistics from
the anti-corruption agencies, especially the EFCC, show a worrying list of pending high-profile
cases.23 Grand corruption cases awaiting prosecution include the case of the current Senate

20

R v Ibori (James Onanefe) [2013] ECWA Crim 815; [2014] Cr. App. R. (S.) 15; See Stolen
asset Recovery Initiative< http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/19585> accessed 24
August 2016.
21
Energy Venture Partners Limited v Malabu Oil and Gas Limited [2014] ECWA Civ 1295.
22
Nigeria could achieve this using the review mechanisms in Article 123 of the Rome Statute.
23
See< http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/corruptioncases/files/documents/arw/Ibori_Nigeria_EFCC_High_Profile_Cases.pdf> Accessed 24 August 2016.
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President, Bukola Saraki (case on appeal by the federal government), some sitting Judges, past
State Governors, prominent serving and retired public officials and, other cases that originated
from the scandal of the missing National Security funds and Nigeria National Petroleum
Corporation funds. It is the recommendation that these cases should be fast-tracked.24

8.3 Limitations of Research
Resource constraints affected the design of the study, so was a major limitation of the research
as this made findings from the research field work limited to selected elites and confined to
Abuja and Lagos, Nigeria. Moreover, as with most qualitative research, the researcher’s bias
and subjectivity presented an issue. The researcher was aware of the issues, especially the bias
entering into the data collection and analysis. Hence, the researcher took measures to ensure
that the data collection and analysis were not tainted with researcher’s bias and subjectivity.
Some of the precautionary measures taken include the recording of the interviews and taking
field notes. Given these constraints, the research findings may not be generalizable. However,
the research highlights some important trends and dynamics within the elite sample group. This
research assessed grand corruption within the ambit of international human rights and
international human rights law. It did not analyse other forms of corruption, for instance, petty
corruption and therefore the research does not claim to be holistic nor is the data generalizable.

8.4 Opportunities for Future Research
Having outlined the gains and limitations of this research, I suggest that future research could
undertake the mixed research method and triangulation in order to assess more data during field
24

In the case of Taiye Oshoboja v Alhaji Surakatu Amida & ors [2009] 12 SC (pt 11) 107, the
Supreme Court ruled that it is the duty of the court to discourage prolonged litigation.
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work. Also, a comparative study of other African countries like Guinea Bissau, Guinea and
South Sudan could help to diversify and generalise the findings of this research.25
A further study on whistle-blowing as a tool for combating grand corruption, the impact of
grand corruption on gender, children’s rights and minority rights are other areas that have been
under-researched and which future research could explore.

8.5 Contribution to Knowledge
This research has taken an empirical, country-specific, and interdisciplinary approach in
addressing the concept of grand corruption within the context of international human rights and
international criminal law. The use of elite interviews increases the validity of the research
data, accentuates the richness of the study and increases its originality. As a result, the research
findings enhances our knowledge and understanding of grand corruption within an endemic
country-specific context. This research also extends other similar research findings and
contributes to the ongoing and evolving scholarly engagement in grand corruption particularly
in emerging economies. It is a pointer to future and emerging researchers who might have
interest in researching grand corruption within socio-legal or legal doctrinal context. This
research has highlighted the normative gaps in international criminal law and international
human rights law in relation to the treatment of socio-economic rights, in particular, its direct
relationship with grand corruption. The research is also a valuable guide to governments,
national and international policy makers.

25

The 2016 Corruption Perception Index lists Guinea Bissau, Guinea and Sudan as the most
corrupt African States.
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Finally, although other scholars have written on grand corruption and human rights,26 it has
been on a general, global and doctrinal sphere and it is hoped that the result of this study will
attract other researchers to the field.

8.6 Summary
This research subjected the concept of grand corruption to intense academic scrutiny by
interrogating case law, treaties, and other relevant legal human rights instruments. It
particularly examined the impact of grand corruption upon human rights, as well as the analysis
of accountability processes at the domestic level.
Grand corruption, owing to its devastating consequences, work against the realisation of certain
human rights, and since human rights are worthy of protection, the onus is on international
criminal law in conjunction with other regional and domestic legal systems to promote the
requisite protection of such human rights. Nigeria’s endemic corruption suggests that
combating grand corruption is beyond the capacity of a nation-state and reinforces the urgent
need for international collaboration and intervention. The recommendations suggested in this

Chris Albin-Lackey, ‘Corruption, Human Rights and Activism: Useful Connections and
Their Limits’ in Dustin N Sharp (eds) Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (Springer 2013)
148; Martine Boersma, Corruption: A Violation of Human Rights and a Crime Under International
Law? (Intersentia 2012) 195: Ndiva Kofele-Kale, ‘Economic Crimes and International Justice;
Elevating Corruption to the Status of a Crime in Positive International Law’ (2009) Centre for Human
Rights and Democracy in Africahttp://fakoamerica.typepad.com/files/kofele-kale-keynote-address.pdf
>accessed 10 March 2016; Zoe Pearson, ‘An International Human Rights approach to Corruption’, in
Peter Larmour & Nick Wolanin (ed) Corruption and Anti-Corruption (Asia Pacific Press 2001) 50;
Raj Kumar, ‘Corruption and Human Rights: Promoting Service in India’ (2003) Columbia Journal of
Asian Law, 17, 31-72; Laurence Cockroft, ‘Corruption and Human Rights: A crucial Link’ (1998)
Working
Paper<file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Corruption%20and%20Human%20Rights_a%20crucial%20li
nk%20_TI%20Working%20Paper_.pdf>12 March 2016.
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study could help in combating grand corruption while also helping in the realisation of human
rights especially socio-economic rights.
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Appendix ii: Introductory Letter
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Appendix iii (Consent Form)
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Appendix iv
Sample Interview Questions
A, How would you define grand corruption and how would you assess the level of grand
corruption in Nigeria considering the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index rating of Nigeria in 2015?
B, How would you assess the impact of grand corruption on human rights and do you think
that grand corruption violates human rights?
C, How do you evaluate the international, regional and domestic legal frameworks on
corruption using Nigeria as a reference point?
D, In your opinion, what drives the preponderance of grand corruption in Nigeria?
E, what do you think encourages judicial corruption in Nigeria?
F, Can you suggest how the justice system can effectively tackle grand corruption in Nigeria?
Can you also suggest lessons to be learnt from the justice system of the state of South Africa
in the recent President Zuma’s case and also Israel after the sentencing of their former Prime
Minister- Ehud Olmert?
G, How can anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria fight grand corruption more efficiently?
H, How would you suggest the financial institutions should contribute in fighting grand
corruption in Nigeria? Do you think that repatriating proceeds of grand corruption as done by
countries like Switzerland has helped in the battle against grand corruption?
I, Would you support an international approach in combating grand corruption?
J, In your opinion, do you think that making grand corruption an international crime could help
combat grand corruption in Nigeria?
K, Would you advocate for the establishment of a national anti-corruption court and anticorruption hotline?
L, How effective are the legal protection for whistle-blowers in Nigeria?
M, How would you assess the Administration of the Criminal Justice Act, 2015?
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N, How would you rate the prosecution of high-profile individuals involved in cases of grand
corruption and would you argue for allocating more fund into the investigation and prosecution
of corruption cases in Nigeria?
O, How would you react to the insincerity surrounding disclosure of financial interests
including asset declaration by top civil servants and politicians in Nigeria?
P, what is your opinion on the views of Transparency International that “Missing revenues are
depriving Nigerian citizens of a fair share of this wealth that could go to improving health,
education and creating employment for the youth”?
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Appendix v
List of Personal Publications
Anaedozie Florence, ‘Has Systemic Grand Corruption Shaped Boko Haram’s Terrorist
Landscape in Nigeria’? (2015) Journal of Innovative Research and Development, Volume 4,
Issue 5.
Anaedozie Florence, ‘Is Grand Corruption the Cancer of Nigeria? A Critical Discussion in the
Light of an Exchange of Presidential Letters’ (2016) European Scientific Journal, Vol 12, No
5.
Anaedozie Florence, ‘Has the Emergence of Female Suicide Bombers in Nigeria Depicted the
Exploitation of Feminine Vulnerability? A Critical Appraisal of Boko Haram’s Female Suicide
Bombers in Nigeria’ (2016) Journal of Innovative Research and Development, Volume 5, Issue
3.
Anaedozie Florence, ‘Combating Grand Corruption in Nigeria from the Lens of the
Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015: Progression or Retrogression’? (2016) Paper
Presented at the Socio-Legal Studies Conference (SLSA) 2016, The Lancaster University.
Anaedozie Florence, ‘Exploring the Linkages between the Military and Grand Corruption in
Nigeria. A Constitutional Aberration’? (2016) A Paper accepted for Conference Presentation
at the African Studies Association of the UK (ASAUK) Conference, University of Cambridge.
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Appendix vi
Grand Corruption: Methodology and Analysis of Empirical Field Work
This appendix presents the research methodology and findings from the data collected from
field work which involved conducting interviews with thirteen selected elite Nigerians living
in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria. The sample is not intended to represent people in high economic,
social or political standing, but rather special people were chosen because of who they are and
the positions they occupy and for particular reasons relating to the research.
The purpose of elite interviews, according to Jennifer Hochschild is ‘to acquire information
and context that only that person can provide about an event or process: …’.1 The use of the
elite interviews aims at eliciting the opinion of those specialised personnel on issues around
grand corruption in Nigeria in particular, how they ‘understand and explain the trajectory of
the event or process’.2 The elite interviews can also give substance to prior analyses pursued
in the previous chapters of this research from their views on the viability of institutional
mechanisms operating in Nigeria. Qualitative, interpretive analysis enabled me to elicit themes
and categories emerging from the response of the participants. To ensure reliability and validity
of the interview data, I reviewed the validity by presenting the results of the data transcripts to
the original participants and received feedback and correction from the interviewees.
The sample size of thirteen participants satisfies the concept of saturation in research
sampling.3 After obtaining approval from The Dublin Institute of Technology Research Ethics

Jennifer Hochschild, ‘Conducting Intensive Interviews and Elite Interviews’ (2009)
Workshop on Interdisciplinary Standards for Qualitative Systematic Research <
http://scholar.harvard.edu/jlhochschild/publications/conducting-intensive-interviews-and-eliteinterviews> accessed 02 May 2016.
2
ibid.
3
Barney Glaser and Anslem Strauss, The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for
qualitative research (Aldine Publishing Company 1967) cited in Mark Mason, ‘Sample Size and PhD
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Committee (Appendix i) and having secured approval for the funds for the fieldwork, the
fieldwork began (Appendix ii: field trip introductory letter).The thirteen semi-structured
interviews (appendix iv: sample interview questions) were conducted from May-June 2016 in
(Abuja and Lagos) Nigeria, exploring elite individual’s views on corruption. The reason for
selecting Abuja and Lagos for this case study is that most of the federal ministries, donor
agency offices and non-governmental organisations of interest are located in the present and
former capital cities (Abuja and Lagos). The interviewees (Appendix iii: consent letter) were
asked similar questions with the aim of decoding their attitudes, perceptions and expectations.
The research data was then transcribed, coded and analysed to discover existing
conceptualisations of grand corruption within the target expert groups. The end result reflects
the views of experts on issues around grand corruption in the public sector in Nigeria.
Table Appendix vi/1 provides a brief overview of the thirteen interviews with government
ministries/departments, donor agencies, academia, non-governmental organisations and the
other stakeholders. Names and other identifiers have been removed from the data throughout
in order to ensure participant anonymity.

Table Appendix vi/1
SECTOR

DEMOGRAPHY/EXPERTS INTERVIEWS

NON-GOVERNMENTAL

Organisational heads

4

ORGANISATIONS

Studies Using Qualitative Interviews’ (2010) Forum Qualitative Social Research, Vol 11, No.3, Art. 8.
The concept of saturation in research implies when the collection of a new data does not shed any further
light on the subject of investigation.
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GOVERNMENT

Higher/middle Management

4

MINISTRIES/DEPARTMENTS
OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

Elites in academia, industry 5
and business

The researcher used manual coding and transcription in analysing the interview data generated
in the study. Hence, I did an open coding using line by line assessment of the data to generate
codes. This exercise is extremely time-consuming but has the benefit of identifying many rich
concepts and maintaining a very close tie with the data. The coding process involved
recognising an important moment and encoding it prior to a process of interpretation. Open
coding helps the researcher to break apart and separate the data analytically, leading to thematic
conceptualisation. The themes identified in the transcripts were accordingly organised into subthemes because using themes as an analytic device is a useful way of scaling up analysis and
aligning it with the research questions. The elite interviews explored the core of socio-legal
interaction in order to capture the dynamics of grand corruption in social, economic, cultural,
political, and legal systems. The expert views are of prime importance because they are better
informed, more vocal and are generally, the opinion leaders. The expert views are also
considered adequate to give a qualitative texture to the perceptions of citizens within the
context of the research.
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Appendix vi/1 Social Characteristics of Respondents
A total of thirteen participants were interviewed as mentioned earlier. Ten were men and three
were women and all aged 25-67 years. All the participants were university graduates from
various disciplines and have an average of six years working experience in anti-corruption and
allied projects.

Participant’s Profile: Table Appendix vi/2
Participants Gender

Age

Academic
Qualification

Occupation/Business

P1 Male

48-55

University
Degree

Public Service
Executive

P2 Male

60-65

University
Degree

Legal practitioner

P3 male

50-59

University
Degree

Civil Society
Executive

P4 Male

45-55

University
Degree

Civil Society
Executive

P5 Male

43-50

University
Degree

Civil Society
Executive

P6 Male

28-35

University
Degree

Legal Practitioner

P7 Male

48-55

University
Degree
University
Degree

Academia

P8 Female

26-32

University
Degree

Public Service
Executive

P9 Female

35-40

University
Degree

Civil Society
Organisation

P10 Female

50-55

University
Degree

Academia
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P11 Male

48-55

University
Degree

Academia

P12 Male

32-36

University
Degree

Academia

P13 Male

32-36

University
Degree

Academia

Appendix vi/2 Presentation of Findings
The findings of the research field trip which derive from data analysis will be presented in nine
recurrent themes and categories. These themes and categories originate from the thematic
coding of the interview transcripts, a reflection of the views of the interviewees.
The views expressed by each interviewee where highlighted will be presented using
interviewee identifier captions “P1-13”, representing the aggregate numbers of all the
interviewees. The reason for this is to preserve participant’s confidentiality.
The themes that emerged are:
1. Understanding the meaning of grand corruption.
2. Perception of corruption in Nigeria by Transparency International.
3. Causes of Grand Corruption in Nigeria.
4. Judicial Corruption.
5. Law Reform
6. International Criminalisation of Grand Corruption
7. Human Rights and Grand Corruption
8. Prosecution of High-profile Corruption cases in Nigeria.
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9. Institutional Frameworks.

Appendix vi/2a Understanding Grand Corruption
Most of the interviewees understood the meaning of grand corruption as the type of corruption
that occurs at the top echelon of governance. They were able to relate the meaning with vivid
examples from Nigeria. For instance, the first question was “how would you define grand
corruption?” Interviewee no P5 defined grand corruption as “a condition of pervasive and
systemic financial indiscretion at the highest official levels of governance at both public and
private sectors, which disregards due process, transparency and citizen rights to good
governance and consequently bleed public finances and increases all costs in an economy”.
Across the interviewees, there is a consensus that grand corruption happens at the apex level
and mostly in the public sector. Interviewee no P5 extended the definition of grand corruption
to the private sector. However, some contested the use of the term “grand” arguing that there
is really no rationale why the prefix should be added to the term “corruption”. According to
one of the interviewees, it was the categorisation of the concept that has sabotaged the battle
against corruption. The participant argues further that people now indulge in other forms of
petty corruption because the categorisation means that weight should be attached only to big
corruption. In essence, the classification takes a top-bottom approach rather than the bottomtop approach. As argued in chapters one and two of this thesis, there is no universally accepted
definition of the term “corruption”, yet, the meaning of “grand corruption” was understood by
all the interviewees.
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Appendix vi/2b Perception by Transparency International (TI)
The participants agreed wholly with the results of the annual survey by TI in Nigeria. All the
participants unanimously support TI’s ranking of Nigeria as an authentic reflection of Nigeria’s
state of affairs. According to TI in 2016, with an index score of 28, Nigeria is the 136th least
corrupt nation out of the 176 countries surveyed. Nigeria is also the 3rd most corrupt country
in West Africa after Guinea and Guinea-Bissau according to the 2016 Corruption Perception
Index that measures corruption in the public sector. The measurement is based on a scale of
index score 0 to 100 (a score of 0 is “very corrupt” and 100 is “very clean”). This record is a
point higher than previous Nigeria’s best ranking on TI’s corruption Perception Index (CPI).
Nigeria was ranked 144th in 2013, 139th in 2012 and 143rd in 2011 with the 2016 position
surpassing that of 2013 by eight places.
What is the implication of this for the fight against corruption in Nigeria? It shows an
improvement on the corruption rating of Nigeria but on closer critical analysis, it does not really
look good for Nigeria. Placed on a comparable plane with a country like Norway with similar
deposit of natural resources, it becomes clear that Nigeria really has not had a very impressive
performance. Norway has consistently ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in the world.
Why is the “natural resource curse” or the “Dutch disease syndrome” not applicable to
Norway? It goes to show that there is an urgent need for institutional reform within the Nigerian
public sector.
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Appendix vi/2c Causes of Grand Corruption in Nigeria
The interviewees listed various perceived causes of grand corruption in Nigeria. Interviewee
no P3 lists the causes of grand corruption as ‘unqualified leaders, weak enforcement structure,
poor remuneration, poor minimum wages, large unregulated sectors, weak sanctions, poor
accountability structure, poor incentive for integrity, lack of transparency in private and public
sector and very weak judiciary’. Interviewee No P7 lists the causes of grand corruption in
Nigeria as ‘greed, impunity, lack of transparency in government decision process, a culture that
celebrates prosperity over integrity, poverty mind-set, and economic uncertainty. But most
importantly corruption thrives in Nigeria because one can steal and get away with it. An
efficient justice system will deter corruption’. The exploration of this line of argument concurs
with the arguments of Transparency International that ‘the lower-ranked countries in our index
are plagued by untrustworthy and badly functioning public institutions like the police and
judiciary … Grand corruption thrives in such settings’.4 Thus, an understanding of the
fundamental causes of corruption may lead to ways of combating it or at least limit its practices
to avoid it posing more threat to the realisation of the rights of the vulnerable. The participants
in the research were consistent with their answers on themes around the lack of transparency,
greed, weak sanctions and the weak judiciary.

Appendix vi/2d Judicial Corruption
All the participants bemoaned judicial corruption and argue that a transparent judiciary would
enhance government’s resolve to combat grand corruption. The interviewees cited cases of

See Transparency International ‘Corruption Perception Index 2016’ <
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016> accessed 20 March
2017.
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judicial interferences, unnecessary adjournments, bribery within the judiciary and cronyism as
the issues in question. Interviewee no P3 stated that there is huge judicial corruption in Nigeria
because judges believe that just ‘because I can get away with it. A lot of corruption in Nigeria
is done simply because (A) nobody is going to catch me and if they catch me, I will share and
if I share, I will not go to jail’.5 The meaning of this is that judges are rarely caught for brazen
acts of corruption. They use the proceeds of corruption to fight back when there are indications
that they may be held accountable. Interviewee No P3 agrees that there are multiple instances
of judicial corruption but blames poor remuneration of judges. Interviewee P3 states that ‘I am
not comfortable with the salaries and allowances of judicial officers. So to cut off or take off
those things [corruption], the government, the judicial officers must be adequately paid and
catered for … and so, when a judge is handling a case, … political cases are known cases in
Nigeria where the judge looks at the offer and knows that even if he works for the 35 years of
his life, the benefits and pensions he was going to get is not up to the money he makes in that
one scoop, so he takes the money’.6 Interviewee P1 states that weak structures in governance
drive judicial corruption.
These support the argument of the thesis in chapter one that in issues of grand corruption, the
ability of the courts in Nigeria in providing effective judicial remedies is questionable in view
of the myriads of judicial scandals caused by corruption of the judiciary in Nigeria.7

5

Taken from the Transcript of Interviewee No P3.
ibid.
7
The conduct of the notorious Judge in the “Pension Fund” case has cast serious doubt on the
credibility of Nigerian courts. This Judge was suspended after serious outcry from the public; See FRN
V Esai Dangabar. The complicity of Justice Abubakar Talba in perverting the course of justice by an
alleged injudicious discretion was so obvious that the Judicial Service Commission suspended him
without pay from service for one year; See Lanre Adewole and Tunde Oyesina, ‘Pension scam trial
Judge suspended’ Nigerian tribune (Lagos, 27 April 2013).
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Appendix vi/2e Law Reform
A recurrent theme in the interviews was the need for law reform. One respondent, Interviewee
P9 succinctly stated, ‘I recommend efficient and proactive laws that respond to present realities
of the country… I mean, law with a touch of reality’. Interviewee P9 went on to add that, ‘to a
large extent, legal framework is grossly irresponsive enough to manage and sustain social
dynamics of the country’.8 Interviewee P5 argues on the contrary that ‘Nigeria is not lacking
in anti-corruption frameworks and instruments. For instance, besides several statutes and laws
criminalising financial misdemeanours in both public and private spaces, the key prime
frameworks of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent
Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) were empowered institutions to fight financial and other
corrupt practices’.9 Interviewee No P2 supports law reform arguing that law reform could
address the institutional lapses that breed grand corruption. Accordingly, law reform stands to
trigger accountability in all sectors of the economy. This is also an argument of Olaniyan, that
Nigeria needs ‘significant accountability mechanisms and normative standards for
implementing long-term durable, sustainable, and broad legal and institutional reforms against
corruption’.10

Appendix vi/2f International Criminalisation of Grand Corruption
To the question, ‘do you think that making grand corruption an international crime could help
combat grand corruption in Nigeria’? The participants (100%) agreed that grand corruption
should be made an international crime. The interviewees gave various reasons for supporting
8

Taken from the Transcript of Interviewee P9.
Taken from the Transcript of Interviewee P5.
10
Kolawole Olaniyan, Corruption and Human Rights Law in Africa (Hart Publishing 2014)13.
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this view. For instance, interviewee No P13 stated: ‘Yes, I think that grand corruption should
be made an international crime and a crime against humanity because of its devastating effects,
especially the deprivation of the citizens’ enjoyment of their human rights’.11 Interviewee no
P5 asserted: ‘yes, I believe that grand corruption should be made an international crime because
it has inter-jurisdictional characteristics and repercussions. Some of the money laundering
objectives could also be to fund international crimes and terrorist activities’.12 Interviewee no
P3 stated: ‘yes, the legal frameworks are important, but at the end of the day you need the
institutions and the institutional arrangements between the countries in order to make these
things work’.13 Interviewee P9 answers ‘yes, long overdue’. Interviewee P12 agrees to the
international criminalisation of grand corruption, stating that ‘making grand corruption an
international crime would definitely help in combating grand corruption in Nigeria. There
would be no place to hide for corrupt officials’. The views of the interviewees align with the
suggestions of some scholars. Bantekas and Sonja Starr variously argued for the international
criminalisation of grand corruption. Starr suggests that ‘international criminal law is generally
understood to be a mechanism for, responding to punishing, and preventing war crimes and
mass atrocities’.14 The World Bank and TI support the international criminalisation of grand
corruption. This is also a view robustly argued by this project and emphasised in chapters six
and seven of this thesis.

11

Taken from the transcript of interviewee No P13.
Taken from the transcript of interviewee No P5.
13
Excerpt taken from transcript of interviewee no P3.
14
Ilias Bantekas ‘Corruption as an International Crime and a Crime against Humanity: An
Outline of Supplementary Criminal Justice Policies’ (2006) Journal of International Criminal Justice 4,
474; Sonja Starr, ‘Extraordinary Crimes at ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond Crisis
Situations’ (2007) North Western Univ. L. Rev. 1, 7.
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Appendix vi/2g Human Rights and Grand Corruption
Most of the interviewees lament the impact of grand corruption on human rights. Asked this
question, ‘how would you assess the impact of grand corruption on human rights and do you
think that grand corruption violates human rights’? Interviewee P6 replied: ‘grand corruption
impeded on human rights so much that it denies citizens of their basic needs. It is my opinion
that grand corruption violates human rights. This is because, the public funds meant to provide
social infrastructures like health care, roads, employment, the right to justice, etc to the people
are embezzled or looted and citizens are subjected to severe hardship. Grand corruption is a
serious violation of human rights’. Interviewee P5 submits that:
Grand corruption violates the rights of citizens to good things of life, which are
akin to human rights. Grand corruption has depleted resources that could have
been used to provide housing, health, education and other social infrastructure
that would have sustained human and citizen welfare. Several trillions of Naira
are reported to have been stolen from the public treasury and stashed in foreign
economies, which denied the citizen of the country the economic benefit
accruable from its use for public service provision.

Appendix vi/2h Prosecution of High-Profile Grand Corruption Cases in Nigeria
The participants were asked ‘how would you rate the prosecution of high-profile individuals
involved in cases of grand corruption?’ Interviewee No P7 states that ‘the process is biased and
tainted with corruption…corruption trial should be encompassing and not directed only at the
opposition’. Interviewee P7 thinks that ‘a good effort so far but the magnitude of corruption
negates its significance’. Interviewee P6 responds that ‘I rate them very poor. This is because
the prosecution seems “cosmetic” to me. It is highly selective. Also, the names of those that
returned their fair part of the loot were not named or shamed. The trial is like a “child play”
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cum revenge mission on the part of the government’. Interviewee P12 responds that ‘there is
still a long way to go in the prosecution of high-profile individuals in cases of grand corruption
in Nigeria. Such cases tend to drag on for too long in Nigeria compared to other countries
(Cases of South Africa President Zuma and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert)’. Interviewee
P5 responds that ‘I approve of the efforts at prosecuting high-profile individuals involved in
cases of grand corruption. However, this effort could not be rated at this point because it has
not yielded any result. Nevertheless, it is significant that the anti-corruption agencies have a
free hand to carry out their statutory rules, without counter influences from political
influencers’. Olaniyan agrees with the views of most of the interviewees by criticising the
justice system as paying lip service to the prosecution of corruption in Nigeria, adding that
‘comparatively, few high-ranking officials are prosecuted, and corruption cases are taken to
court, proceed at a snail’s pace and serve no more than a symbolic purpose’. 15 Similarly, a
closer look at the list of EFCC convictions in 2016 published on its website shows that none of
the highly publicised high-profile cases was on the list.16

Appendix vi/2i Institutional Frameworks
The role of institutional frameworks in combating corruption in Nigeria was one of the
dominant themes that occurred across the board in the interviews. Most interviewees (50%)
suggested that the institutional frameworks are not sufficient as a stand-alone option or a oneshot endeavour in order to combat corruption. It should be viewed as a challenging long-term

15

Olaniyan (n 10) 8.
See EFCC website<
https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/images/RECORD%20OF%20CONVICTION%202016%20Complete.pdf
> accessed 08 October 2016.
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undertaking. For instance, interviewee No P3 states ‘… It is not the agencies who should fight
corruption, it is the society who should fight corruption with the agencies having a role because
unless the change is anchored by the people, as soon as you change regimes, it reverses and
that has been the cycle in Nigeria’s history’.17 Participant No P13 argued that the institutional
frameworks need independence, stating that ‘the independence of the agencies must be
respected and ensured in order for them to fight corruption effectively’. 18 Interviewee no P2
suggested that ‘the anti-corruption agencies must be given freedom of actions. They must
equally be well-funded and the political will to say no matter whose ox is gored if this is late
this year, you understand, it again boils down to political will’.19 The same argument was
advanced by interviewee No P5 who stated: ‘Anti-corruption agencies can tackle grand
corruption when appropriate political support is deployed from the executive branch. This
political will guarantees heads of anti-corruption agencies the independence to investigate and
prosecute grand corruption cases’.20
The views of some of the interviewees emphasise the relevance of the anti-corruption agencies
in combating corruption, but unanimously agree that there is a need for collaborative effort as
well as robust political will by the executive organ of government to allow these institutional
bodies to discharge their duties with full autonomy. This is in agreement with the views of the
World Bank that ‘successful anti-corruption efforts depend upon political will. This includes
both the political will to initiate the fight against corruption in the first place and subsequently
the will to sustain the battle over time until results are achieved’. 21 The World Bank further
Interviewee No P3’s transcript note.
Taken from the transcript of interviewee No P13.
19
Excerpt from the transcript of interviewee No P2.
20
Taken from the views of interviewee no P5.
21
Derick W Brinkerhoff, ‘Assessing Political Will for Anti-corruption Efforts: An Analytic
Framework (2000) Public Admin. Dev. 20. 231-252 <
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/108384/session4I.pdf> accessed 02 September 2016.
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asserts that ‘strong domestic political will to embark on the long and winding road to asset
recovery is fundamental to successful asset recovery.

Appendix vi/3 Conclusion
This appendix presented data originating from the elite interviews conducted in this research.
The selected elite opinions were presented according to the themes of the research. The
interviewees unanimously agreed that endemic grand corruption violates human rights in
Nigeria being that it undermines government ability to protect certain human rights and provide
the basic infrastructures needed by the people. The interviewees also suggested that
international co-operation in the form of international criminalisation of grand corruption could
help in combating grand corruption being that the domestic legal and judicial systems have
failed over time. In particular, their views highlight the limitations of the Nigerian justice
system often blamed for the unending high-profile corruption cases. So far the enactment of
the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015 has not achieved the anticipated goal
of fast tracking the prosecution of the backlog of grand corruption cases. Kofele-Kale in this
respect comments that ‘corruption in the judiciary is fertile ground for impunity, uncertainty
and unpredictability for those who seek recourse to justice, in particular, the poor and the
disadvantaged’.22 Kofele-Kale’s argument goes to say that the corrupt acts of the judiciary
preclude people from demanding their rights as individuals. The interviewees also suggested

Ndiva Kofele-Kale, ‘Economic Crimes and International Justice: Elevating Corruption to
the Status of a Crime in Positive International Law’ (2009) Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
in Africahttp://fakoamerica.typepad.com/files/kofele-kale-keynote-address.pdf >accessed 10 March
2016.
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enhanced institutional co-operation, legal reforms and intervention as substantive ways of
combating grand corruption in Nigeria.
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